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ESSAYS ON MACROECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS
Laura Gáti




This dissertation consists of three independent explorations of the interplay between
expectations and macroeconomic activity. I investigate economic dynamics and policy
issues concerning the management of expectations both from the lens of business cycles
and medium-term fluctuations, embracing a rational expectations approach as well as
venturing into the wilderness of bounded rationality.
The first chapter, “Monetary Policy & Anchored Expectations - An Endogenous
Gain Learning Model,” investigates how a concern to anchor expectations affects the
conduct of monetary policy. The chapter first proposes a novel model of expectations
which provides a notion for unanchored expectations. In this model, expectations are
the more unanchored the higher the sensitivity of long-run inflation expectations to
short-run fluctuations. I then embed the expectations model in a general-equilibrium
model of the business cycle, and estimate the extent of unanchoring using data on
inflation expectations. Within the context of the thus calibrated model, I derive the
Ramsey-optimal monetary policy. The main result is that it is optimal for a central bank
to anchor inflation expectations to the inflation target. The way the central bank can
achieve this is by responding very aggressively with its interest rate tool to fluctuations
in long-run inflation expectations.
The observation that motivates the second chapter, “Talking in Time - Dynamic
Central Bank Communication,” is that the management of expectations by the mon-
etary authority is a dynamic problem in two ways. Firstly, in a dynamic economy, a
central bank needs to decide when to communicate. Secondly, every time the central
bank does talk to the public, it also has to choose what to talk about: the present
or the future? The chapter thus extends existing macroeconomic research on various
dimensions of optimal central bank communication by asking what the implications of
dynamics are for the optimal information provision of the central bank to the public.
To this end, I analyze a Bayesian Persuasion game between a central bank and the
private sector in a static and a dynamic setting, in which the private sector tracks one
economic variable, while the central bank wishes it to track a second variable instead.
Importantly, the two problems are identical except for the correlation structure between
the two variables, which is either cross-sectional or temporal. This way, I isolate the
role of dynamics for the optimal communication policy.
The main result is that in the dynamic setting, the prior beliefs of the private sector
become endogenous to central bank communication and dampen the effectiveness of
the central bank’s communication. Therefore, the central bank faces a new tradeoff: it
needs to push against priors in two ways. Relatively to the static solution, the central
bank talks more about the economic variable it wants the private sector to learn about,
and it also talks with less clarity in order to render the private sector’s beliefs sufficiently
responsive to its messages at each point in time.
In the third chapter, “ICT-Specific Investment Shocks and Economic Fluctuations
- Evidence and Theory of a General-Purpose Technology,” joint with Marco Brianti,
I explore empirically the role of information and communication technologies (ICT)
for medium-run economic fluctuations. The first set of results demonstrate the hump-
shaped dynamics of total factor productivity after an innovation in ICT, as identified in a
structural vector autoregression context. I interpret the hump-shaped impulse response
as a consequence of the slow diffusion of ICT technologies, and test this hypothesis
using an estimated two-sector growth model. The second set of results document that,
viewed through the lens of the model, the data favor the interpretation of innovations
in the ICT-sector playing the role of a general-purpose technology. In other words, the
slow buildup of the overall effect on productivity stems from the gradual diffusion of
ICT in the economy.
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What would happiness be that was not measured by the immeasurable grief
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1 Monetary Policy and Anchored Expectations
- An Endogenous Gain Learning Model
1.1 Introduction
Inflation that runs below its desired level can lead to an unwelcome fall in
longer-term inflation expectations, which, in turn, can pull actual inflation
even lower, resulting in an adverse cycle of ever-lower inflation and inflation
expectations. [...] Well-anchored inflation expectations are critical[.]
Jerome Powell, Chairman of the Federal Reserve1
(Emphases added.)
There is broad consensus among policymakers that anchoring inflation expectations
is central to the modern conduct of monetary policy. As Powell emphasizes, policy-
makers think of expectations as anchored when long-run expectations do not fluctuate
systematically with short-run inflation surprises. If long-run expectations did respond
to short-term inflation surprises, policymakers fear this would result in an adverse cycle
of self-enforcing movements in expectations.
This paper studies the conduct of monetary policy in a New Keynesian model where
the degree of expectations anchoring responds endogenously to economic conditions.
The main contribution is providing the first theory of monetary policy when expec-
tations can exhibit varying degrees of unanchoring. I propose a novel, quantitatively
realistic model of expectation formation which captures the time-varying sensitivity of
long-run expectations to short-run conditions. I take the model to the data to quantify
my novel anchoring mechanism, and use it to characterize optimal policy analytically
and numerically.
In order to provide a convincing analysis of optimal policy, I need a qualitatively
and quantitatively realistic model of expectation formation. To this end, I build on new
1“New Economic Challenges and the Fed’s Monetary Policy Review,” August 27, 2020, Jackson Hole.
1
work by Carvalho et al. (2019), who model the anchoring of expectations as a discrete
gain function that determines whether agents learn about long-run inflation using a
small or large weight on past expectations errors. My methodological contribution
is to extend this work along two dimensions. First, I embed an anchoring model of
expectation formation in a general equilibrium New Keynesian model, allowing me
to formally consider the monetary policy problem. Second, I use a continuous gain
function, capturing the time-varying degrees of unanchoring in the data.
Fig. 1 provides some preliminary evidence that a model of a smoothly varying gain
function may be appropriate. It shows the regression coefficient of a rolling window
regression of long-run inflation expectations on short-run forecast errors. Letting π̄it
denote the 10-year inflation expectation of forecaster i from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF), and f it|t−1 ≡ πt−E
i











where w indexes windows of 20 quarters. Fig. 1 plots the time series of the estimated
coefficient β̂w1 , along with 90% and 95% confidence intervals.
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As seen on Fig. 1, the relationship between 10-year inflation expectations and one-
year surprises, β̂w1 , is time-varying. Up to about 2005, β̂
w
1 is positive and significant,
with varying magnitude. Between 2005 and 2010, by contrast, it is not significantly
different from zero. In this period, then, long-run expectations were unresponsive to
short-run conditions. Around 2010, this changed once more. A significantly positive β̂w1
since 2010 indicates that on several occasions in the last ten years, short-run inflation
surprises were passed through to long-run expectations.
As an empirical contribution, I bring my smooth gain function to the data to explore
2Appendix A.1 presents robustness checks. Appendix A.2 discusses alternative measures of long-run
inflation expectations.
2
Figure 1: Time series of responsiveness of long-run inflation expectations to inflation surprises
the functional form describing the anchoring of expectations. Calibrating the parame-
ters of the New Keynesian core of my model, I employ a simulated method of moments
estimation strategy (Duffie and Singleton (1990), Lee and Ingram (1991), Smith (1993))
to back out a piecewise linear approximation to the true functional form in the data.
The estimation results show that my novel gain function has several reasonable prop-
erties. First, I estimate an implied gain time series with a median of 0.098, very close
to the values obtained by Milani (2014) and Carvalho et al. (2019) (0.082 and 0.145
respectively). This number means that agents in the model rely only on the 10 most
recent quarters of data when updating their long-run expectations. Most importantly,
the expectations process is nonlinear: larger forecast errors in absolute value lead to
a higher sensitivity of long-run expectations. In line with other studies, like Hebden
et al. (2020), I also find that a forecast error of a particular size leads to higher gains
if its sign is negative than if it is positive. In other words, negative inflation surprises
unanchor expectations more than same-sized positive mistakes.
Having calibrated the model to the data, and establishing that it provides a realistic
description of expectations, I perform my analysis of policy in the model in three stages.
First, I present an analytical characterization of the Ramsey problem of the monetary
3
authority. I demonstrate that the first-order condition of the Ramsey problem is a
target criterion for the policymaker. The target criterion prescribes that the central
bank should smooth out the effects of shocks by taking advantage of the current and
future expected degree of unanchoring.
Second, I solve the optimality conditions of the Ramsey problem numerically. Be-
cause the endogenous gain function renders the model nonlinear, I rely on global meth-
ods to obtain the optimal policy function. Like the degree of unanchoring, the optimal
interest-rate setting is time-varying. Since the interest rate responds to movements
in long-run expectations, the monetary authority acts aggressively when expectations
unanchor. When expectations are well-anchored, by contrast, the central bank accom-
modates fluctuations in inflation because in this case, long-run expectations do not
respond to short-run conditions.
Third, I consider the class of simple, time-invariant Taylor rules that constitute the
most common specification of monetary policy in practice. I solve for the optimal re-
sponse coefficient of the interest rate to inflation numerically in the case of both the
anchoring and the rational expectations versions of my model. It turns out that the
central bank finds it optimal to respond less to inflation under anchoring than under ra-
tional expectations. The reason is that positive feedback between inflation expectations,
interest-rate expectations and inflation induces too high volatility in response to aggres-
sive interest rate movements. Moreover, although the Taylor rule is not fully optimal
in the model, an optimally chosen inflation coefficient does a good job in eliminating
most of the volatility coming from unanchored expectations.
The model I use to study the interaction between monetary policy and anchoring
is a behavioral version of the standard New Keynesian (NK) model of the type widely
used for monetary policy analysis. Monetary policy in the rational expectations (RE)
version of this model has been studied extensively, for example in Clarida et al. (1999)
or Woodford (2003), whose exposition I follow. The formulation of a target criterion to
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implement optimal policy is in the tradition of Svensson (1999).
The behavioral part of the model is the departure from rational expectations on the
part of the private sector. Instead, I allow the private sector to form expectations via an
adaptive learning scheme, where the learning gain - the parameter governing the extent
to which forecasting rules are updated - is endogenous. The learning framework repre-
sents an extension to the adaptive learning literature advocated in the book by Evans
and Honkapohja (2001). This literature replaces the rational expectations assumption
by postulating an ad-hoc forecasting rule, the perceived law of motion (PLM), as the
expectation-formation process. Agents use the PLM to form expectations and update it
in every period using recursive estimation techniques. My contribution to this literature
is to study optimal monetary policy in a learning model with an endogenous gain.
Adaptive learning is an attractive alternative to rational expectations for several
reasons. First, many studies document the ability of adaptive learning models to match
empirical properties of both expectations and macro aggregates. Adaptive learning
models imply that forecast errors are correlated with forecast revisions, a feature of ex-
pectations documented by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015). In fact, the prediction
of adaptive learning models concerning the response of expectations to shocks exactly
aligns with new evidence by Angeletos et al. (2020), suggesting that in response to
shocks, expectations initially underreact, and then overshoot. As for the macro evi-
dence, Milani (2007) demonstrates that estimated constant gain learning models match
the persistence of inflation without recourse to backward-looking elements in the Phillips
curve. Eusepi and Preston (2011) show how a calibrated adaptive learning version of
the real business cycle (RBC) model outperforms the rational expectations version. In
particular, even with a small gain, the learning model leads to persistent and hump-
shaped responses to iid shocks, resolving the long-standing critique of RBC models of
Cogley and Nason (1993).
Secondly, having an endogenous gain improves the empirical properties of adaptive
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learning models further. Milani (2014) documents that endogenous gain models can
generate endogenous time-varying volatility in models without any exogenous time-
variance. Additionally, Carvalho et al. (2019) estimate the evolution of the endogenous
gain for the last fifty years in the US. Not only does their model display excellent out-
of-sample forecasting performance in terms of matching long-run expectations, but the
estimated gain time series invites a reinterpretation of the Great Inflation as a period
of unanchored expectations.
Thirdly, an extensive experimental literature in the spirit of Anufriev and Hommes
(2012) demonstrates that simple adaptive learning rules provide the best fit among
competing models to how individuals form expectations in controlled lab settings. In
fact, the idea that individuals in the economy do not know the true underlying model
and thus rely on simple, estimated heuristics to form expectations is intuitive from
an economic perspective. Economists do not know the true model of the economy, so
why should firms and households? And just like an econometrician estimates statistical
models to form forecasts of relevant variables, it is reasonable to suppose that the private
sector does so too.
My work is also related to the literature attempting to explain features of expec-
tations data using departures from the full information rational expectations (FIRE)
paradigm. This literature consists of two main lines of attack. The first is questioning
the assumption of full information. In this body of work, information is either not fully
or not symmetrically available, or information acquisition is costly (Mankiw and Reis
(2002), ?, Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009), Angeletos and Pavan (2009)). The second
strand of this literature, to which this paper belongs, instead emphasizes that expec-
tation formation departs from rational expectations. Arguably the leading candidate
in this literature, Bordalo et al. (2018), complements the empirical results of Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2015) with new evidence to contend that the pattern of over- and
underreaction to news is consistent with diagnostic expectations instead of dispersed
6
information. As opposed to these papers, my objective is not to find the model that best
rationalizes stylized facts of expectations in the data. Instead, my contribution to this
literature is to investigate how anchoring, a little-studied feature of the expectations
data, affects the conduct of monetary policy.
Adaptive learning models have been the object of scrutiny in the past, perhaps most
prominently in Sargent (1999). The main interest of Sargent (1999) is exploring whether
a story in which the Federal Reserve learns the natural rate hypothesis adaptively
can better match the Great Inflation than an alternative where the Fed understands
that there is no exploitable tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. My focus
is different. Based on the reduced-form empirical evidence of Fig. 1, I entertain an
anchoring expectation formation on the part of the private sector and ask what the
implications for optimal monetary policy are.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the model. Section 1.3
describes the learning framework and spells out the anchoring mechanism. Section 1.4
estimates the anchoring function. Section 1.5 presents the results in three parts. First,
Section 1.5.1 discusses an analytical characterization of the Ramsey policy. Second,
Section 1.5.2 solves for the interest rate sequence that implements the optimal Ramsey
allocation using global methods. Third, Section 1.5.3 investigates the optimal choice of
response coefficients if monetary policy is restricted to follow a Taylor rule. Section 1.6
concludes.
1.2 The model
Apart from expectation formation, the model is a standard New Keynesian (NK) model
with nominal frictions à la Calvo (1983). The advantage of having a standard NK
backbone to the model is that one can neatly isolate the way the anchoring mechanism
alters the behavior of the model. Since the mechanics of the rational expectations
version of this model are well understood, I only lay out the model briefly and pinpoint
7
the places where the assumption of nonrational expectations matters.3
1.2.1 Households
The representative household is infinitely-lived and maximizes expected discounted life-














In the above, the only non-standard element is the expectations operator, Ê
i
. As de-
tailed in Section 1.3, this operator captures non-rational expectations and is assumed






t. The remaining ele-
ments are familiar from the rational expectations version of the NK model. U(·) and
v(·) denote the utility of consumption and disutility of labor, respectively, and β is





t(j) denotes the supply of labor hours of household i at time t to the
production of good j, and the household participates in the production of all goods j.
Similarly, household i’s consumption bundle at time t, Cit , is a Dixit-Stiglitz composite










where θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the varieties of consumption goods.
Denoting by pt(j) the time-t price of good j, the aggregate price level in the economy









3For more details on the NK model, see Woodford (2003).
8
The budget constraint of household i is given by







t(j)dj − Tt − PtCit , (5)
where Πit(j) denotes profits from firm j remitted to household i, Tt taxes, and B
i
t the
riskless bond purchases at time t.4
The only difference to the standard New Keynesian model is the expectations op-
erator, Ê
i
. This is the subjective expectations operator that differs from its rational
expectations counterpart, E, in that it does not encompass knowledge of the model.
In particular, households have no knowledge of the fact that they are identical. By
extension, they also do not internalize that they hold identical beliefs about the evo-





= Ê, households cannot do so. As we will see in Section
1.2.3, this has implications for their forecasting behavior and will result in decision rules
that differ from those of the rational expectations version of the model.
1.2.2 Firms
Firms are monopolistically competitive producers of the differentiated varieties yt(j).
The production technology of firm j is yt(j) = Atf(ht(j)), whose inverse, f
−1(·), signi-
fies the amount of labor input. Noting that At is the level of technology and that wt(j)
is the wage per labor hour, firm j profits at time t can be written as
Πjt = pt(j)yt(j)− wt(j)f−1(yt(j)/At). (6)
4For ease of exposition I have suppressed potential money assets here. This has no bearing on the model
implications since it represents the cashless limit of an economy with explicit money balances.
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Firm j’s problem then is to set the price of the variety it produces, pt(j), to maximize























is the stochastic discount factor from households. Nominal frictions enter the model
through the parameter α in Equation (7). This is the Calvo probability that firm j is
not able to adjust its price in a given period.
Analogously to households, the setup of the production side of the economy is stan-
dard up to the expectation operator. Also here the model-consistent expectations oper-
ator E has been replaced by the subjective expectations operator Ê
j
. This implies that
firms, like households, do not know the model equations, nor do they internalize that
they are identical. Thus their decision rules, just like those of the households, will be
distinct from their rational expectations counterparts.
1.2.3 Aggregate laws of motion
The model solution procedure entails deriving first-order conditions, taking a loglinear
approximation around the nonstochastic steady state and imposing market clearing
conditions to reduce the system to two equations, the New Keynesian Phillips curve
and IS curve. The presence of subjective expectations, however, implies that firms
and households are not aware of the fact that they are identical. Thus, as Preston
10
(2005) points out, imposing market clearing conditions in the expectations of agents is
inconsistent with the assumed information structure.5
Instead, I prevent firms and households from internalizing market clearing condi-
tions.6 As Preston (2005) demonstrates, this leads to long-horizon forecasts showing
up in firms’ and households’ first-order conditions. As a consequence, instead of the
familiar expressions, the IS and Phillips curves take the following form:
xt = −σit + Êt
∞∑
T=t
βT−t((1− β)xT+1 − σ(βiT+1 − πT+1) + σrnT ), (10)
πt = κxt + Êt
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t(καβxT+1 + (1− α)βπT+1 + uT ). (11)
Here xt, πt and it are the log-deviations of the output gap, inflation and the nominal
interest rate from their steady state values, and σ is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. The variables rnt and ut are exogenous disturbances representing a natural
rate shock and a cost-push shock respectively.
The laws of motion (10) and (11) are obtained by deriving individual firms’ and
households’ decision rules, which involve long-horizon expectations, and aggregating
across the cross-section. Importantly, agents in the economy have no knowledge of
these relations since they do not know that they are identical and thus are not able to
impose market clearing conditions required to arrive at (10) and (11). Thus, although
the evolution of the observables (π, x) is governed by the exogenous state variables
(rn, u) and long-horizon expectations via these two equations, agents in the economy
are unaware of this. As I will spell out more formally in Section 1.3, it is indeed the
equilibrium mapping between states and jump variables the agents are attempting to
5The target of Preston (2005)’s critique is the Euler-equation approach as exemplified for example by
Bullard and Mitra (2002). This approach involves writing down the loglinearized first-order conditions of the
model, and simply replacing the rational expectations operators with subjective ones. In a separate paper,
I demonstrate that the Euler-equation approach is not only inconsistent on conceptual grounds as Preston
(2005) shows, but also delivers substantially different quantitative dynamics in a simulated New Keynesian
model.
6There are several ways of doing this. An alternative to Preston (2005)’s long-horizon approach pursued
here is the shadow price learning framework advocated by Evans and McGough (2009).
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learn.
To simplify notation, I gather the exogenous state variables in the vector st and












where īt is a shock to the interest rate that only shows up in the model for particular









As detailed in Appendix A.4, one can use this notation to reformulate the laws of motion
of jump variables (Equations (10), (11) and (41)) compactly as
zt = Aafa,t +Abfb,t +Asst, (14)
where the matrices Ai, i = {a, b, s} gather coefficients and are given in Appendix A.4.
Assuming that exogenous variables evolve according to independent AR(1) processes, I
write the state transition matrix equation as
st = hst−1 + εt with εt ∼ N (0,Σ), (15)
where h gathers the autoregressive coefficients ρj , εt the Gaussian innovations ε
j
t , and η
the standard deviations σjt , for j = {r, i, u}. Σ = ηη′ is the variance-covariance matrix
7For generality, I treat the exogenous state vector as three-dimensional throughout the paper, even when
the monetary policy shock is absent.
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of disturbances.8
1.3 Learning with an anchoring mechanism
The informational assumption of the model is that agents do not know the equilibrium
mapping between states and jumps in the model. Without knowing the form of the
observation equation, then, they are not able to form rational expectations forecasts.
Instead, agents postulate an ad-hoc forecasting relationship between states and jumps
and seek to refine it in light of incoming data. In other words, they act like an econo-
metrician: they estimate a simple statistical model and constantly attempt to improve
their model as new data arrive.
1.3.1 Perceived law of motion
I assume agents consider a forecasting model for the endogenous variables of the form
Êtzt+1 = at−1 + bt−1st, (16)
where a and b are estimated coefficients of dimensions 3 × 1 and 3 × 3 respectively.
This perceived law of motion (PLM) reflects the assumption that agents forecast jumps
using a linear function of current states and a constant, with last period’s estimated










I also assume that
Êtφt+k = φt ∀ k ≥ 0. (18)
8For the sake of conciseness, I have suppressed the expressions for these in the main text. See Appendix
A.4.
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This assumption, known in the learning literature as anticipated utility (Kreps (1998)),
means that agents do not internalize that they will update the forecasting rule in the
future. Clearly, this poses a higher level of irrationality than not knowing the model
and using statistical techniques to attempt to learn it. Nevertheless, because it has
been demonstrated not to alter the dynamics of the linearized model (Sargent (1999)),
anticipated utility has become a standard assumption in the adaptive learning literature
in order to simplify the algebra.
Since the states st are exogenous, I assume that agents know Equation (15), the
equation governing the evolution of st.
9 Then, the PLM together with anticipated
utility implies that k-period ahead forecasts are constructed as
Êtzt+k = at−1 + bt−1hk−1st ∀k ≥ 1. (19)
The timing assumptions of the model are as follows. In the beginning of period
t, the current state st is realized. Agents then form expectations according to (16)
using last period’s estimate φt−1 and the current state st. Given exogenous states and
expectations, today’s jump vector zt is realized. This allows agents to evaluate the most
recent forecast error




to update their forecasting rule. The estimate is updated according to the following
9This is another common simplifying assumption in the adaptive learning literature. In an extension,
I relax this assumption and find that it has similar implications as having agents learn the Taylor rule:
initial responses to shocks lack intertemporal expectation effects, but these reemerge as the evolution of










 f ′t|t−1)′, (21)




Here Rt is the 4× 4 variance-covariance matrix of the regressors and kt is the learning
gain, specifying to what extent the updated estimate loads on the forecast error. Clearly,
a high gain implies high loadings and thus strong changes in the estimated coefficients
φt. A low gain, by contrast, means that a given forecast error only has a small effect
on φt.
1.3.2 Endogenous gain as anchoring mechanism
The vast majority of the learning literature specifies the gain either as a constant, ḡ, or
decreasing with time, so that kt = t
−1, where t indexes time. Instead, to capture the
notion of anchoring, I follow Carvalho et al. (2019) in allowing the gain to fluctuate in a
time-varying way in response to short-run forecast errors. I use the following endogenous
gain specification: I assume the gain evolves as
kt = g(kt−1, ft|t−1), (23)
where g(·) is a smooth function. I refer to g(·) as the anchoring function. Notice that
this function is an extension to the conventional decreasing or constant gain specifica-
tions, as it nests both as special cases. A decreasing gain implies g(kt−1, ft|t−1) = t
−1,
while a constant gain g(kt−1, ft|t−1) = ḡ. Furthermore, in both special cases, g1 = g2 =
0.
By contrast, my novel specification entails the following assumptions on the function
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g(·):
g1 ≥ 0, (24)
g22 ≥ 0. (25)
Equation (24) says that the current value of the gain depends positively on its past value.
In a similar vein, Equation (25) suggests that g(·) is convex in its second argument. In
other words, the gain is increasing in the absolute value of forecast errors.
The novelty of specifying the evolution of the gain using (23) with the properties
in (24) and (25) is that it offers a time- and state-dependent model of private sector
learning. In both of the standard, exogenous gain schemes the gain is divorced from the
current environment. It either decreases deterministically (kt = t
−1), or is a constant
(kt = ḡ). This means that the private sector’s learning is static and not state-dependent
in the sense that a volatile environment results in the same learning pattern as a stable
one. My specification, instead, allows the private sector to learn in a time-varying and
state-dependent way. When high volatility results in large forecast errors in absolute
value, the anchoring function outputs a larger gain than when forecast errors are close
to zero. Thus the learning coefficients at and bt respond more to forecast errors in
volatile states of the world than in stable ones. The time-varying nature of the gain
therefore generates periods of well-anchored expectations (low gain) as well as highly
unanchored episodes (high gain). The model thus interprets the gain as a metric of the
extent of unanchoring.
My anchoring mechanism also displays desirable empirical features. First, as demon-
strated by Milani (2014), endogenous gain learning models can match time-varying
volatility in the data, a feature that constant gain learning models cannot account for.
More importantly, since at is my model’s expression for long-run expectations, the fact
that the gain is a convex function of forecast errors allows the model to match the
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time-varying sensitivity of long-term inflation expectations documented in Fig. 1.
I am not the first to postulate an endogenous gain. In fact, Milani (2014)’s estima-
tion is based on an endogenous gain scheme introduced by Marcet and Nicolini (2003).
Furthermore, Carvalho et al. (2019) are the first to lay out an endogenous gain specifi-
cation as a model of anchored expectations. The novelty of my endogenous gain model
is that, as opposed to Carvalho et al. (2019), the anchoring function g(·) is a smooth
function. In Carvalho et al. (2019)’s specification, discussed in detail in Appendix A.6,
g(·) is a discrete function of the endogenous component of forecast errors. In their
partial equilibrium model, firms use a constant gain if the endogenous component of
forecast errors exceeds a given threshold, otherwise they use a decreasing gain.
Assuming instead that g(·) is a smooth function is useful for two reasons. First, since
the derivatives of g(·) exist, this formulation allows me to consider the Ramsey problem
of the monetary authority. This is thus a necessary condition to be able to study optimal
monetary policy in the model, which is the main contribution of this paper. Second,
the smoothness of g(·) renders the size of the gain a meaningful metric of the degree
of unanchoring. By contrast, in Carvalho et al. (2019)’s model, expectations are either
fully anchored or unanchored. My model thus provides more flexibility regarding the
extent of unanchoring, in line with the evidence on varying degrees of responsiveness of
long-run expectations to short-run mistakes.
My smooth specification of g(·) also allows me to take the anchoring function to
the data. As discussed in Section 1.4, I employ a semi-nonparametric approach to back
out the functional form of g(·) from the data. I then use the estimates to calibrate my
model to carry out the numerical analysis of monetary policy.
It is intuitive why the central bank might care whether expectations are anchored or
not. When expectations are strongly unanchored at time t, the private sector believes
that the true DGP involves a different mapping between states and jumps than they
previously maintained. Private sector forecasts will thus drift in the direction of the
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update, implying that the observables will also shift in the same direction owing to
the law of motion (14). From the perspective of the central bank, stabilization of the
observables therefore implies stabilization of expectations. Indeed, the contribution
of this paper is to analyze formally the nature of the monetary policy problem when
expectations are formed using the anchoring mechanism in Equation (23).
1.3.3 Actual law of motion
To complete the model, I now use the specifics of the anchoring expectation formation
to characterize the evolution of the jump variables under learning. Using the PLM from









Substituting these into the law of motion of observables (Equation (14)) yields the







where gl is a 3 × 4 matrix given in Appendix A.5. Thus, instead of the state-space
solution of the RE version of the model (Equations (15) and (A.13)), the state-space
solution for the learning model is characterized by the pair of equations (15) and (27),
together with the PLM (19), the learning equations (21) and (22), as well as the an-
choring function (23).
1.3.4 Simplifying assumptions
To simplify the analytical work in Section 1.5.1, I make two assumptions that I maintain
for the rest of the paper.
Assumption 1. e′iat = 0, i = 2, 3,∀t and bt = g h ∀t.
18
Here ei is a 3 × 1 vector of zeros with 1 as its ith element. Assumption 1 amounts
to restricting the intercepts in the forecasts of the output gap and the interest rate and
the slope coefficients of all forecasts to what they would be under rational expectations.
This means that instead of learning the intercept and slope parameters for all three
endogenous variables, the private sector only learns the intercept of the inflation process.
The rationale behind this assumption is that it is the smallest possible deviation
from rational expectations that at the same time has enough flexibility to study the
unanchoring of inflation expectations. In particular, since the inflation intercept is
learned using my novel anchoring mechanism, the formulation is able to capture the
time-varying sensitivity of long-run inflation expectations to short-run forecast errors
in inflation. In extensions, I relax this assumption and find that it does not change the
qualitative or quantitative implications of the model.
With Assumption 1, the updating equations (21) and (22) simplify to a single equa-
tion:
π̄t = π̄t−1 + ktft|t−1, (28)
where, using the notation that b1 ≡ e1b, the k-period-ahead inflation forecast is given
by
Êtπt+k = π̄t−1 + bk1st, ∀k ≥ 1. (29)
Lastly, the one-period-ahead forecast error in inflation simplifies to
ft|t−1 = πt − (π̄t−1 + b1st). (30)
Assumption 2. g1 = 0.
The interpretation of this assumption on the anchoring function is that the current
gain depends only on forecast errors, not on its own past level. The motivation is
to simplify the analytical solution of the Ramsey problem in Section 1.5.1. Appendix
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A.9 provides a treatment of the Ramsey problem with the general specification of the
anchoring function, relaxing Assumption 2. As seen in the Appendix, this does not
change the mechanics nor the intuition behind the solution of the Ramsey problem.
1.4 Quantification of learning channel
The numerical analysis of monetary policy requires a functional specification for the
anchoring function g(·) of Equation (23). For this reason, I back out the functional
form of g(·) from data. Apart from its usefulness for numerical analysis, the form of the
anchoring function is interesting in its own right because it describes empirical properties
of the anchoring of expectations. In particular, central bankers may want to know how
much forecast errors of a particular sign and magnitude unanchor expectations.
I carry out the estimation in two steps. I first calibrate the parameters of the
underlying New Keynesian model. Conditional on these parameter values, I estimate
the anchoring function by simulated method of moments à la Lee and Ingram (1991),
Duffie and Singleton (1990) and Smith (1993). I target the autocovariance structure of
the Baxter-King filtered observables of the model and expectations. The observables
are CPI inflation from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BEA), the output gap and
the federal funds rate from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.10
For expectations, I rely on 12-month-ahead CPI inflation forecasts from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF). The dataset is quarterly and ranges from 1981-Q3 to
2020-Q1. Appendix A.7 contains a detailed description of the estimation methodology.
1.4.1 Calibration
For the calibration of the NK backbone of the model, I split the parameters into two
subsets. The first is calibrated using values from the literature, while the second is
calibrated to match the moments outlined above. Tables 1 and 2 show the two subsets
10The output gap measure is constructed as the difference between real GDP from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) and the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) estimate of real potential output.
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of calibrated parameters respectively. As Table 1 depicts, I adopt standard parameters
from the literature where possible. In particular, for β, σ and other parameters under-
lying κ, the slope of the Phillips curve, I rely on the parameterization of Chari et al.
(2000), advocated in Woodford (2003).
The composite parameter κ is given by κ = (1−α)(1−αβ)α ζ, where ζ is a measure of
strategic complementarity in price setting. Assuming specific factor markets, constant
desired markups with respect to output levels and no intermediate inputs, ζ = ω+σ
−1
1+ωθ .
Here θ is the price elasticity of demand and ω is the elasticity of the marginal cost
function with respect to output. Chari et al. (2000)’s calibration involves θ = 10, σ =
1, ω = 1.25, β = 0.99, so that together with my choice of α, κ is pinned down. Note
that I lower β slightly (0.98 instead of Chari et al. (2000)’s 0.99). This allows the model
to better match the autocovariance structure of the output gap because it lowers the
pass-through of long-horizon expectations in the IS curve.
The probability of not adjusting prices, α, is set to match an average price duration
of two quarters, which is slightly below the numbers found in empirical studies.11 In
the literature, the average price duration is a little above 7 months. My number for
α corresponds to 6 months. I choose the lower end of this spectrum in order to allow
the learning mechanism, and not price stickiness, to drive the bulk of the model’s
persistence.
To simplify the numerical analysis as well as interpretation, I restrict the shocks to
be iid. The volatilities of the disturbances and, where applicable, the output-coefficient
of the Taylor rule, are set to match the above-mentioned moments. As shown in Table 2,
this implies standard deviations of 0.01 for the natural rate and monetary policy shock
and 0.5 for the cost-push shock. In sections of the paper where I assume a Taylor rule,
the moment-matching exercise results in a 0.3 coefficient on the output gap. The last
11On the lower end of the empirical values for α, Bils and Klenow (2004) find a mean duration of 4.3 months
and Klenow and Malin (2010) 6.9 months. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008)
agree on between 7-9 months, while Eichenbaum et al. (2011)’s number is 10.6 months.
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Table 1: Parameters calibrated from literature
β 0.98 stochastic discount factor
σ 1 intertemporal elasticity of substitution
α 0.5 Calvo probability of not adjusting prices
κ 0.0842 slope of the Phillips curve
ψπ 1.5 coefficient of inflation in Taylor rule*
ḡ 0.145 initial value of the gain
Table 2: Parameters set to match data moments
ψx 0.3 coefficient of the output gap in Taylor rule*
σr 0.01 standard deviation, natural rate shock
σi 0.01 standard deviation, monetary policy shock*
σu 0.5 standard deviation, cost-push shock
*Parameters with an asterisk refer to sections of the paper where a Taylor rule is in effect.
parameter of the New Keynesian core is the inflation coefficient of the Taylor rule, ψπ.
Unless otherwise specified, I set ψπ to 1.5, the value recommended by Taylor (1993).
Note that the asterisks in Tables 1 and 2 demarcate parameters that pertain to the
Taylor rule and thus only to sections of the paper which assume that a Taylor rule is
in effect.
I initialize the value of the gain at ḡ = 0.145. This is Carvalho et al. (2019)’s estimate
for the case of unanchored expectations in their discrete anchoring function model. In
the case of a discrete anchoring function, as in Carvalho et al. (2019), this parameter
has important implications for model dynamics because by construction, the gain takes
on this value very frequently. However, since my specification for g(·) is smooth, ḡ does
not have a strong bearing on model dynamics.
1.4.2 Estimation
In inferring the functional form of the anchoring function g(·), I proceed as follows.
First, since the analysis in Section 1.5 relies on Assumptions 1 and 2, I similarly impose
these on the estimation. In other words, I seek to back out the functional form of the
relationship between the size of the gain and forecast errors in inflation, kt = g(ft|t−1).
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To be as close as possible to a non-parametric estimate of g(·), while at the same






Here bi(·) is a piecewise linear basis and γ is a vector of approximating coefficients. The
index i refers to the breakpoints of the piecewise linear approximation. As explained
above, I estimate γ by simulated method of moments, targeting the autocovariance
structure of the observables of the model and expectations.
Figure 2: Estimated α̂: kt as a function of ft|t−1
Estimates for 5 knots, cross-section of size N = 1000
Fig. 2 presents the estimated coefficients: γ̂ = (0.82; 0.61; 0; 0.33; 0.45). The
circles indicate the nodes of the piecewise linear approximation. The interpretation of
the elements of γ̂ is the value of the gain the private sector chooses when it observes
a forecast error of a particular magnitude. For example, a forecast error of -4 pp in
inflation is associated with a gain of 0.82.
Before interpreting the estimated anchoring function, it is helpful to work out what
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amounts to a large gain. In particular, since the gain is the model’s metric of the
extent of unanchoring, from what size of the gain should one consider expectations to
be significantly unanchored? The consensus in the literature on estimating learning
gains is that if the true model is one with constant gain learning, then the gain lies
between 0.01-0.05. On the higher end of the empirical estimates, Branch and Evans
(2006) obtain a constant gain on inflation of 0.062. Milani (2007) finds 0.0183. The
estimates of the maximal value for endogenous gains lie somewhat higher, at 0.082 in
Milani (2014) and at 0.145 in Carvalho et al. (2019). Calibrated models tend to use the
consensus values between 0.01-0.05, with the number 0.05 having attained particular
prominence. However, Eusepi and Preston (2011) find that the value of 0.002 is sufficient
to significantly alter the dynamic behavior of a standard RBC model.
An intuitive interpretation of the gain is that its inverse gives the number of past
observations the private sector uses to form its current forecasts. Eusepi and Preston
(2011)’s number, 0.002, thus implies that firms and households rely on the last 125
years of data. By contrast, the consensus number of 0.05 translates to using five years
of data.
Seen from both of these perspectives, a gain of 0.05 corresponds to a sizable amount
of unanchoring. With this benchmark number in mind, the message of Fig. 2 seems
stark: the estimated coefficients are very large. The highest gain value in my estimation,
0.82, can be interpreted as seeing forecast errors of 4 pp in absolute value prompting
the private sector to discount any observations older than about 5 months. That is a
very short time.
Presumably, such large forecast errors are rare, however. In fact, Fig. 3 confirms
that this is indeed the case in the SPF data since the 1990s. As shown on the left panel,
in this time period, forecast errors were always below 4 percentage points in absolute
value, the largest being an error of -3.31 pp. The right panel depicts the time series
for the gain implied by the model and the estimated γ̂. The mean and median values
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Figure 3: Forecast errors and implied gain in the SPF data
(a) (b)
Forecast errors are in annualized percentage points.
of the gain, 0.121 and 0.098 respectively, suggest that there is substantial sensitivity of
long-run expectations to forecast errors overall in the data.
Clearly, the main feature of the gain is that it is time-varying. Periods of near-zero
values are frequently followed by high values around or above 0.1. The negative inflation
surprises brought on by the Great Recession and the Covid-19 crisis unsurprisingly result
in very large gains, almost 0.7 and around 0.35 respectively, yielding highly unanchored
expectations. More surprising is the fact that the decade-long boom between 2010 and
2020 also involves a very unanchored episode. In fact, the gain in 2015 is above 0.4,
exceeding its 2020 value. Moreover, following 2015, the gain remained elevated for
almost five years. By contrast, after the Great Recession, expectations recovered fast
and by 2010 looked very well-anchored.
On the one hand, this suggests that exogenous shocks such, for example shocks to
credit or to oil prices, have similar effects as the Fed missing its inflation target. On
the other hand, a potentially more alarming implication is that failing to get inflation
back up to target seems to go hand-in-hand with persistently unanchored expectations.
Thus central bank misses may result in unanchoring that is more difficult to combat
than that following exogenous shocks.
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The three sizable unanchoring episodes since 2008 may also stem from a change in
the pattern of forecast errors. Up to 2008, most forecast errors were positive and small
in magnitude. This reversed in 2008. Not only were most post-2008 forecast errors
negative, but they were also larger than the positive surprises. This connects with
the finding that unanchoring is asymmetric. Notice that, as seen on Fig. 2, negative
inflation surprises raise the gain about twice as much as positive ones do. Consistent
with the findings of Hebden et al. (2020), this indicates that long-run expectations are
more sensitive to negative than to positive surprises. This implies, then, that not only
is the magnitude of forecast errors after 2008 responsible for the spikes in the gain,
but also that inflation consistently turned out to be lower than what the public had
expected.
1.5 Monetary policy and anchoring
This section sets up and solves the optimal monetary policy problem in the model with
the anchoring expectation formation. In Section 1.5.1, I begin by analyzing the Ramsey
problem of determining optimal paths for the endogenous variables that policy seeks
to bring about. While the anchoring mechanism introduces substantial nonlinearity
into the model, it is possible to derive analytically an optimal target criterion for the
policymaker to follow. As we shall see, the optimal rule prescribes for monetary policy
to act conditionally on the stance of expectations, and will thus be time-varying and
state-dependent. In particular, whether expectations are anchored or not matters for
the extent to which there is a tradeoff between inflation and output gap stabilization,
and also for the volatility cost of getting expectations anchored.
I then turn to the question of how to implement optimal policy. Section 1.5.2
uses global methods to solve for the interest rate sequence that implements the target
criterion. I then discuss the properties of the optimal interest rate policy and why it is
successful in stabilizing both inflation expectations and inflation.
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The optimal interest rate policy will thus be a nonlinear function of all the states in
the model - a complicated object to compute. In practice, however, monetary policy is
most commonly modeled using time-invariant rules like the Taylor rule that are simple
to compute and to communicate to the public. In Section 1.5.3, I therefore restrict
attention to Taylor-type feedback rules for the interest rate. I solve for the optimal
Taylor-rule coefficient on inflation numerically and investigate how this choice affects
the anchoring mechanism. As I expand upon further in Section 1.5.3, a Taylor rule
with given coefficients involves higher fluctuations in the anchoring model than under
rational expectations because it does not allow the central bank to respond to long-
run expectations. At the same time, it involves responding to inflation even in periods
when expectations are anchored, causing excess volatility. For this reason, the optimal
Taylor-rule inflation-coefficient is lower than under rational expectations.
1.5.1 The Ramsey policy under anchoring
I assume the monetary authority seeks to maximize welfare of the representative house-
hold under commitment. As shown in Woodford (2003), a second-oder Taylor approxi-




{(πT − π∗)2 + λx(xT − x∗)2}, (32)
where λx is the weight the central bank assigns to stabilizing the output gap. In
the rational expectations New Keynesian model, λx is a function of deep parameters:
λx =
κ
θ . Just as under rational expectations, one can show that it is optimal to set
the central bank’s targets, π∗ and x∗, to zero. The central bank’s problem, then, is to
determine paths for inflation, the output gap and the interest rate that minimize the
loss in Equation (32), subject to the model equations (10) and (11), as well as the PLM
(19), the learning equations (21) and (22), and the anchoring function (23). The full










xt = −σit + Êt
∞∑
T=t
βT−t((1− β)xT+1 − σ(βiT+1 − πT+1) + σrnT ),
πt = κxt + Êt
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t(καβxT+1 + (1− α)βπT+1 + uT ),
Êtπt+k = π̄t−1 + bk1st ∀k ≥ 1,
π̄t = π̄t−1 + ktft|t−1,
kt = g(ft|t−1). (33)
1.5.1.1 Optimal Ramsey policy as a target criterion As foreshadowed
above, the nonlinearity of the model due to the anchoring function prevents a full
analytical solution to the Ramsey problem. Therefore I now characterize the first-order
conditions of the problem analytically, and proceed in Section 1.5.2 to solve the full
problem numerically. The details of the derivations are given in Appendix A.8, which
also illustrates how the endogeneity of the gain introduces nonlinearity into the model.
The solution of the Ramsey problem is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Target criterion in the anchoring model






















Proved in Appendix A.8. For a general target criterion without Assumption 2, see
Appendix A.9.
Here, Et is the central bank’s expectation. The notation reflects the assumption that
the central bank has model-consistent expectations and observes the private sector’s
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expectations. This assumption, which Gaspar et al. (2010) refer to as “sophisticated
central banking,” is quite strong. In practice, it is likely that the central bank’s measure
of private sector expectations is noisy at best. Nevertheless, it is a useful case that can
serve as a benchmark for future research.
The interpretation of Equation (34) is that the intratemporal tradeoff between infla-
tion and the output gap due to cost-push shocks is complemented by two intertemporal
tradeoffs: one due to learning in general, and one due to anchoring in particular. The
first intertemporal effect comes from the current level of the gain, kt, which captures
how far learning is from converging to rational expectations. The second intertem-
poral tradeoff is manifest in the derivative of the anchoring function today, gπ,t, as
well as in all expected levels and changes in the gain in the future in the expression
(1 − kt+1+j − ft+j|t+j−1gß̄,t+j) in the second bracket on the right-hand side. These
expressions say that the presence of anchoring qualify the first intertemporal tradeoff
because now the degree and direction in which the gain changes today and is expected
to change in the future matter too. In other words, the central bank needs to consider
whether its chosen interest rate sequence contributes to anchoring expectations in future
periods, or whether it actually serves to unanchor them.
Let me investigate these channels in isolation. To see exactly what the role of
anchoring is in the target criterion, consider first the special case of exogenous gain
adaptive learning, for simplicity with a constant gain specification. In this case the
















which is the analogue of Gaspar et al. (2010)’s Equation (24).12 This result, found
also by Molnár and Santoro (2014), suggests that already the presence of learning by
12Gaspar et al. (2010) provide a parsimonious summary of Molnár and Santoro (2014).
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itself is responsible for the first intertemporal tradeoff between inflation and output gap
stabilization. The fact that the central bank now has future output gaps as a margin of
adjustment means that it does not have to face the full tradeoff in the current period.
Learning allows the central bank to improve the current output gap without sacrificing
inflation stability today; however, this results in a worsened tradeoff in the future. In
other words, adaptive learning by itself allows the central bank to postpone the current
tradeoff to later periods.
Intuitively, this happens because adaptive expectations are slow in converging to
rational expectations. In the transition, the private sector’s expectations do not adjust
to fully internalize the intratemporal tradeoff. This gives the monetary authority room
to transfer the tradeoff to the future.
Contrasting Equations (35) and (34) highlights the role of my novel anchoring chan-
nel. With anchoring, the extent to which policy can transfer the intratemporal tradeoff
to future periods depends not only on the stance of the learning process, as in (35), but
also on whether expectations are anchored, and in which direction they are moving. In
fact, not only the current stance and change of anchoring matters, but also all expected
future levels and changes.
Anchoring, however, complicates the possibility of transferring today’s tradeoff to
the future. One can see this in the fact that forecast errors and the derivatives of the
anchoring function are able to flip the sign of the second term in (34). This means
that anchoring can alleviate or worsen the intertemporal tradeoff. To see the intuition,
consider the equation system of first-order conditions from solving the Ramsey problem.
While the full system is presented in Appendix A.8, let us focus solely on Equation




xt + ϕ5,tkt + ϕ6,tgπ,t. (36)
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The Lagrange multipliers ϕ5 ≥ 0 and ϕ6 ≥ 0 are the multipliers of the updating equation
(21) and the anchoring function respectively. This equation, upon substitution of the
solutions for the two multipliers, yields the target criterion. It is therefore easy to read
off the intuition at a glance. First, since ϕ5,tkt > 0, one immediately obtains the above-
discussed conclusion that as long as the adaptive learning equation is a constraint to the
policymaker (ϕ5,t > 0), the central bank has more room to transfer the contemporaneous
tradeoff between inflation and the output gap to the future.13
However, whether the anchoring equation alleviates or exacerbates the inflation-
output gap tradeoff depends on the sign of gß,t. If the derivative is positive, the effect
is the same as above, and the central bank has more leeway to postpone the tradeoff to
the future. By contrast, if the derivative is negative, that is expectations are becoming
anchored, the intratemporal tradeoff is worsened.
Why do unanchored expectations give the central bank the possibility to postpone
its current inflation-output gap tradeoff? The reason is that when expectations become
unanchored, the learning process is restarted. A not-yet converged learning process
implies, as discussed above, that postponing the tradeoff is possible. Restarting the
convergence process thus unlocks this possibility.
This seems to suggest that from a smoothing standpoint, the central bank should
prefer to have unanchored expectations. As will be shown in Sections 1.5.2-1.5.3, volatil-
ity considerations will suggest otherwise. But in fact, even the smoothing viewpoint
involves some ambiguity on whether expectations should be anchored from the perspec-
tive of the central bank. Clearly, the central bank prefers to face a learning process
that on the one hand has not yet converged, and on the other is converging only slowly.
A high gain under unanchored expectations implies both a sizable distance from con-
13Strictly speaking, ϕ5 and ϕ6 are never zero in this model. The reason is that exogenous disturbances
induce unforecastable variation throughout the lifetime of the economy. Thus, at any point in time, forecast
errors can emerge that will unanchor expectations, restarting the learning process. This is in stark contrast
with Carvalho et al. (2019), where the gain only depends on the endogenous component of the forecast error.
Therefore, in their model, absent regime switches, expectations can never become unanchored once learning
has converged.
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vergence as well as faster learning and thus faster convergence. Therefore, ideally the
central bank would like to have expectations anchored but the gain far from zero; a
contradiction. Once the gain approaches zero, only unanchored expectations can raise
it again to restart the learning process. But once the gain is large, the only way to slow
down learning is to anchor expectations, that is, to lower the gain.
1.5.1.2 Time-consistence of optimal plans under adaptive learning
Now simplify the target criterion further, assuming that learning has converged, kt =





which corresponds to the optimal discretionary solution for rational expectations in
Clarida et al. (1999). This is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Coincidence of commitment and discretion under adaptive learning
In an adaptive learning model with exogenous or endogenous gain, the optimal Ramsey
policies under commitment and discretion coincide. The optimal Ramsey plan is more
akin to discretion than to commitment as it does not involve making promises about fu-
ture policy actions. Optimal policy is thus not subject to the time-inconsistency problem
of Kydland and Prescott (1977).
To illustrate this result in a parsimonious manner, consider a simplified version of








t + ϕ1,t(πt − κxt − βet + ut)
+ ϕ2,t(et − et−1 − kt(πt − et−1)) + ϕ3,t(kt − g(πt − et−1))
}
,
where the IS curve, xt = Et xt+1 + σet − σit + σrnt , is a non-binding constraint, and
is therefore excluded from the problem. ϕi are Lagrange-multipliers and Et xt+1 is
rational. In this simplified setting, et is a stand-in variable capturing inflation expec-
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tations and evolves according to a recursive least squares algorithm. The anchoring
function g(·) specifies how the gain kt changes as a function of the current forecast
error according to Assumption 2. Note that the problem involves commitment because
the monetary authority internalizes the effects of its actions both on the evolution of
expectations and on that of the gain.




xt − ϕ2,t(kt + gß(πt − et−1)) = 0, (38)
−2β λx
κ
xt + ϕ2,t − Et ϕ2,t+1(1− kt+1 − gf (πt+1 − et)) = 0. (39)
Inspection of this system reveals that, unlike the rational expectations case (et =
Et πt+1), the optimal solution does not involve lagged multipliers. This implies that
the monetary authority cannot condition the optimal time path of inflation and the
output gap on the past; optimal policy is not history-dependent.
This result is not specific to endogenous gain models, but generalizes to any adaptive
learning. It has been demonstrated in the case of constant gain learning by Molnár and
Santoro (2014), and for decreasing gain models by Mele et al. (2019).
The intuition behind this result is easy to see if one compares rational expectations
and adaptive learning in an infinitely repeated game setting. Under rational expec-
tations, the lagged multiplier appears in the solution because expected inflation is a
jump variable. This reflects that expectations fulfill a form of optimality, rendering
the private sector a strategic player. The adjustment of expectations under rational
expectations enables the central bank to make promises about future policy that are
incorporated into expectations.
Not so for adaptive expectations. Learning agents look exclusively to past data
to form expectations. Their expectations thus cannot incorporate the policymaker’s
promises about the future course of policy. In fact, a private sector with adaptive expec-
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tations has a pre-specified, non-strategic expectation formation. Therefore, households
and firms act as an automaton, leaving the central bank unable to make promises that
have any effect on expectations.
Should we be surprised that adaptive learning involves no distinction between discre-
tion and commitment? Not at all if we recall that the rational expectations revolution
had as one of its aims to remedy this feature of expectations. The seminal Lucas-
critique, for instance, emphasizes that reduced-form regressions are not ideal guiding
principles for policy precisely because they miss the time-varying nature of estimated
coefficients due to model-consistent expectations that incorporate promises about policy
action (Lucas (1976)).
One might be concerned that a model of anchoring that is not immune to the
Lucas-critique may not be a desirable normative model for policy. But recall that the
anchoring model is a description of the economy in transition, not of one at its ergodic
mean. It characterizes expectation formation en route to becoming model-consistent as
the private sector learns the underlying DGP.
Moreover, data suggest that in terms of positive implications, learning models fare
much better than rational expectations models do. Since the seminal work by Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2015), rational expectations as a structural model for expectations
has been rejected in numerous empirical papers. At the same time, the literature cited
in the Introduction demonstrates the success of learning models in fitting both the
properties of expectations in the data and in improving the business cycle dynamics
of other model variables. To the extent that adaptive expectations offer an alternative
structural model of the expectations process that captures main features of the data,
in particular the feature of unanchoring, investigating their role for policy is a valuable
exercise.
There are also avenues to address the Lucas-critique in learning models. One option
is to reintroduce a sense of optimality to expectation formation directly, as in the
34
literature on central bank reputation. (See Cho and Matsui (1995) and Ireland (2000)).
Another possible remedy is to retain a sufficient degree of forward-looking expectations
as in the finite-horizon planning approach advocated by Woodford (2019). A third
possibility is to model communication by the central bank in the form of news shocks
that enter the state vector, and thus show up in the information set of agents, as in
Dombeck (2017). All in all, Proposition 2 does not render the advances of the rational
expectations revolution void. Instead, it points to the fact that as long as the private
sector extracts information from data to form beliefs, expectations will quantitatively
resemble adaptive expectations. Thus, the policy predictions of adaptive expectations
can complement our understanding of monetary policy from rational expectations with
novel, empirically relevant insights.
1.5.2 Implementing the Ramsey policy: the optimal interest rate
sequence
Having a characterization of optimal policy in the anchoring model as a first-order
condition, the next relevant question is how the central bank should set its interest rate
tool in order to implement the target criterion in (34). In other words, we would like to
know what time-path of interest rates implements the optimal sequence of inflation and
output gaps. As emphasized in Section 1.5.1, the nonlinearity of the model does not
admit an analytical answer to this question. I therefore solve for the optimal interest
rate policy numerically using global methods. I rely on the calibration presented in
Tables 1 and 2 and the estimated parameters of the expectations process in Section 1.4.
Furthermore, I set the central bank’s weight on output gap fluctuations, λx, to 0.05,
the value estimated by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
Appendix A.10 outlines my preferred solution procedure, the parameterized expec-
tations approach, while Appendix A.11 gives the details of the parametric value function
iteration approach I implement as a robustness check. The main output of this proce-
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dure is an approximation of the optimal interest rate policy as a function of the vector
of state variables. Due to Assumption 2, the relevant state variables are expected mean
inflation and the exogenous states at time t and t − 1, rendering the state vector five-
dimensional:
Xt = (π̄t−1, r
n
t , ut, r
n
t−1, ut−1). (40)
As a first step, I plot how the approximated policy function depends on π̄t−1, while
keeping all the other states at their mean. The result, depicted on Panel (a) of Fig. 4,
suggests that optimal interest-rate setting responds linearly and very sensitively to the
stance of expectations, π̄t−1. If expected mean inflation decreases by 5 basis points, the
interest rate drops by about 250 basis points.14
This is a large response. Clearly, optimal policy involves subduing unanchored ex-
pectations by injecting massive negative feedback to the system. One may then wonder
why optimal policy is so aggressive on unanchored expectations when the analysis of the
target criterion in Section 1.5.1 suggested that learning can alleviate the stabilization
tradeoff between output and inflation.
The reason is that the anchoring expectation formation introduces another intertem-
poral tradeoff to monetary policy: a volatility tradeoff. One can see this on Fig. 5,
portraying the dynamics of the system following a two-standard-deviation inflationary
cost-push shock, conditional on a Taylor rule with baseline parameters. The figure
contrasts the rational expectations version of the model with a well-anchored, weakly
anchored and strongly unanchored scenario in the anchoring model.
The same shock that under rational expectations completely vanishes by the second
period, triggers a large, persistent and oscillatory response in the anchoring model.15
14This result is qualified if one relaxes Assumption 1. If the private sector learns about all observables,
not just inflation, interest rate expectations play a major role in determining forecasts of future inflation
and thus add a stabilizing channel that is absent from the current specification. In the more general case,
then, an order of magnitude smaller responses in the current interest rate are sufficient.
15As periodically noted in the literature, adaptive learning models tend to produce impulse responses
that exhibit damped oscillations. Authors making explicit note of this phenomenon include Evans and
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Figure 4: Policy function and implied volatility in long-run expectations
(a) i(π̄, all other states at their means)
(b) Histogram of changes in π̄
Clearly, the size and persistence of the shock, as well as the magnitude of oscillations
increase the more unanchored expectations are. This comes from the fact that if ex-
pectations are anchored, stable expectations lower the pass-through between shocks
and observables. Instead, if expectations are unanchored, they become volatile, passing
through the shocks and amplifying them. Having unanchored expectations, then, comes
at a volatility cost in the central bank’s target variables. This volatility cost dictates
that, in the long run, the central bank wishes to have expectations anchored.
Honkapohja (2001), Evans et al. (2013) and Anufriev and Hommes (2012). The reason is that under an
adaptive learning framework, forecast errors following an impulse are oscillatory. In fact, the higher the
learning gain, the higher the amplitude of forecast error oscillations. Appendix A.12 presents a simple
illustration for why this is the case.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses after a cost-push shock
Shock imposed at t = 25 of a sample length of T = 400 (with 5 initial burn-in periods), cross-sectional
average with a cross-section size of N = 100. The remark on whether expectations are anchored or not
refers to whether the gain is below the 10th, in the neighborhood of the 50th, or above the 90th percentile of
simulated gains at the time the shock hits.
From the viewpoint of the central bank, this problem is amplified by the fact that
anchoring expectations itself comes at a convex volatility cost. Anchoring expectations
requires an aggressive interest response because by these means the central bank can
introduce negative feedback to the system. But innovations to the interest rate surprise
the private sector, raising forecast errors. The more unanchored expectations are, the
more volatility the interest rate movement inflicts on the economy.
We can see from the policy function how optimal policy resolves this tradeoff: it
reacts extremely aggressively to movements in long-run expectations. This way, the
central bank hopes to avoid even larger interventions that would become necessary
were expectations to unanchor further. To avoid having to pay so high a price, the
central bank is extra aggressive in the short run to prevent massive unanchoring from
ever materializing. Thus the optimal response to the volatility tradeoff is to temporarily
increase volatility in order to reduce it in the long-run. In this way, the central bank’s
aggressiveness in the model is driven by the desire to prevent upward (downward)
drifting long-run expectations from becoming a self-fulfilling inflationary (deflationary)
spiral.
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The large interest-rate responses resemble the idea advocated by Goodfriend (1993)
that the central bank moves to offset “inflation scare” (or “deflation scare”) episodes.
As Goodfriend shows, it was historically not uncommon to move the interest rate by
hundreds of basis points to subdue inflation scares. For example, in March 1980, the
Fed raised the interest rate by 230 bp to convince the public that it would not tolerate
high inflation. The optimal policy function prescribes that this is exactly what the
policymaker should do to fight unanchored expectations.
What Fig. 4 also suggests is that acting aggressively in the short run indeed delivers
the long-run benefits of stabilizing economic fluctuations. As Panel (b) depicts, employ-
ing the optimal policy implies that realized changes in long-run inflation expectations
are very small. As seen on the histogram of ∆π̄, with the optimal policy in place,
the model spends most of its time in the region of minuscule fluctuations in π̄. The
mode of the distribution is a change of 0.3 basis points in absolute value, implying that
in normal times, the central bank only needs to raise or lower the interest rate by 15
basis points. In other words, the aggressive nature of optimal policy allows the central
bank to keep expectations anchored or quickly reanchor them following shocks. In this
way, the monetary authority eliminates as much volatility stemming from unanchored
expectations as it possibly can.
1.5.3 Optimal Taylor rule under anchoring
Monetary policy is often formulated using a Taylor rule. Proponents of such a char-
acterization, like Taylor (1993) himself, emphasize the benefits of having a simple,
time-invariant and easily verifiable rule. Also in the anchoring model, a policymaker
may thus be interested in using a Taylor-type approximation to optimal policy in or-
der to combine the benefits of having a simple, yet near-optimal rule.16 Therefore I
16Recall from Woodford (2003) that even under rational expectations, a standard Taylor rule is not
fully optimal because its purely forward-looking nature precludes the use of promises of future policy. Since
Proposition 2 tells us that in the anchoring model there is no distinction between commitment and discretion,
this point may be less relevant here than for rational expectations.
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now consider the restricted set of Taylor-type policy rules and ask what value of the
time-invariant Taylor-rule coefficient on inflation is optimal in the case of the anchoring
model.
In this section, I thus restrict attention to a standard Taylor rule:
it = ψπ(πt − π∗) + ψx(xt − x∗) + īt, (41)
where ψπ and ψx represent the responsiveness of monetary policy to inflation and the
output gap respectively. Lastly, īt is a monetary policy shock. I also assume that when
the Taylor rule is in effect, the central bank publicly announces this. Thus Equation
(41) is common knowledge and is therefore not the object of learning. In an extension,
I consider the case where the Taylor rule is not known (or not believed) by the public
and therefore is learned together with the relations (10) and (11). This only changes
model dynamics for a short period of time as long as the Taylor rule has not yet been
learned. In the approximately five quarters where the public’s learning is in progress,
the model’s responses are dampened; afterwards, the model dynamics are identical to
those of the baseline.
I compute the optimal Taylor rule coefficient on inflation numerically by minimizing
the central bank’s expected loss in a cross-section of N = 100 simulations of both
the rational expectations and learning versions of the model. I continue to use the
calibration of Tables 1 and 2 and to parameterize the anchoring function using the
estimated γ̂ from Section 1.4.
Table 3 presents the optimal Taylor rule coefficient ψπ for the rational expectations
and anchoring models. The table also compares the baseline parameterization with an
alternative in which the central bank attaches no weight to output gap stabilization.
One notices that if the central bank has no concern to stabilize the output gap (λx = 0),
ψπ is infinity for RE, but strictly below infinity for the anchoring model. For the rational
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expectations version of the model, this is because if the central bank suffers no loss upon
output variation, then the fact that the divine coincidence is violated does not pose a
problem. An infinite inflation coefficient then allows the authority to eliminate inflation
fluctuations altogether.




Baseline (λx = 0.05) 2.2101 1.1083
λx = 0 ∞ 1.4421
Not so for the anchoring model. Even for λx = 0, the optimal inflation coefficient is
below infinity. Also for the baseline calibration, the monetary authority finds it optimal
to choose a significantly lower ψπ in the anchoring model than under RE. Why this is
the case can be gleaned from Fig. 6, which depicts the central bank’s loss as a function
of the inflation coefficient ψπ for the baseline calibration.
As seen on Fig. 6, both models predict a sharp increase in the loss as ψπ is lowered
for low values of ψπ. This is intuitive: the lower ψπ, the more inflation fluctuation the
central bank tolerates. This leads to losses in both models. In the anchoring model,
the loss is further increased by the fact that inflation volatility leads to higher forecast
errors. This implies higher fluctuations in expectations, which in turn feed back into
inflation. In this manner, the positive feedback loop in the anchoring model in general
leads to higher inflation fluctuations in the anchoring model than in the RE version,
resulting in a higher loss as well.
But Fig. 6 has a more surprising implication too. As opposed to RE, the loss
is strongly convex in the anchoring model. In fact, this remains the case also if the
central bank has no concern for output gap stabilization (λx = 0). In the anchoring
model, then, the losses caused by tolerating too much inflation volatility cannot be
eliminated by raising ψπ infinitely. This means that beyond a threshold, raising ψπ
41
Figure 6: Central bank loss as a function of ψπ
Sample length is T = 100 with a cross-section of N = 100.
actually increases inflation volatility, instead of decreasing it. For this reason, as seen in
Table 3, the optimal choice involves a much smaller inflation coefficient under anchoring
than under RE (1.1 instead of 2.2). How does this come about?
The mechanism is the following. As the IS curve of Equation (10) makes explicit,
the private sector relies on expectations of not just future inflation and output gaps,
but also of interest rates when choosing its actions today. A high ψπ, together with the
assumption that the private sector knows the Taylor rule, means that if conditions today
cause the private sector to expect high inflation in the future, the private sector will
internalize future policy responses and therefore also expect high interest rates down
the line. This implies a shift in the entire term structure of expectations, adding fuel
to the positive feedback between expectations and outcomes. But not only that. The
fact that agents can anticipate future policy actions induces oscillatory expectations, as
adverse shocks today are expected to be offset by expansionary policy, et vice versa.17
In the case of the private sector internalizing the policymaker’s reaction function, then,
anticipation effects of future interest rates play a key role in determining the conduct
17In a more general specification of the model where the private sector does not initially know the Taylor
rule, impulse responses take time to become oscillatory because as long as the Taylor rule is not yet learned,
intertemporal anticipation effects cannot play out. But eventually as the Taylor rule is internalized, impulse
responses oscillate exactly as in the present version of the model.
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of policy.
We can see how this plays out by contrasting impulse responses of the model for
various levels of inflation aggressiveness ψπ, depicted on Fig. 7, again for an inflationary
cost-push shock. A small value of ψπ = 1.01 imposes too little negative feedback to
get inflation back to its pre-shock value fast. A too high value of ψπ has the contrary
effect: the impulse responses overshoot. In fact, the higher ψπ, the larger the over-
shooting. This highlights the anticipation effects of future interest rates. When the
contractionary monetary policy shock hits, inflation and the output gap fall on impact.
By the next period, expectations update, initially implying lower future inflation and
output gaps. But an internalized Taylor rule means that the private sector connects
low future inflation with expansionary policy going forward. This expectation causes
the overshoot.
The model dynamics here resemble the predictions of Ball (1994) of expansionary
disinflation. Ball (1994) observes that an overlooked implication of rational expectations
New Keynesian models is that disinflations are expansionary. Since the prediction that
disinflation is costless, indeed expansionary, is at odds with data, Ball concludes that
central bank announcements must suffer from credibility issues that render expectations
unresponsive to the announcement of a coming disinflation.
Note that in the present context, as seen on Fig. 5, the amplitude of the oscillations
depends positively on the size of the gain. In other words, the more unanchored ex-
pectations are, the more impulse responses look as Ball (1994) predicts: we obtain an
expansionary disinflation. This feature indicates that the key difference between Ball’s
interpretation and my model is what channel generates the unresponsiveness of expec-
tations. Thus I arrive at a different conclusion than Ball (1994); instead of credibility
issues, it is anchored expectations that are responsible for the absence of expansionary
disinflations.
In contrast to the conventional wisdom in the adaptive learning literature, as ex-
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Figure 7: Impulse responses for unanchored expectations for various values of ψπ
Cost-push shock imposed at t = 25 of a sample length of T = 400 (with 5 initial burn-in periods), cross-
sectional average with a cross-section size of N = 100.
emplified for example by Orphanides and Williams (2004), I thus find that monetary
policy specified as a Taylor rule should be less aggressive on inflation than what would
be optimal under rational expectations. Technically speaking, the difference stems from
two sources. The first is whether one models the aggregate relationships of the model as
corresponding to the learning assumptions concerning individual agents. As suggested
in Section 1.3, the majority of the papers in the learning literature consider Euler-
equation learning. This implies that long-horizon expectations do not enter the IS and
Phillips curves.
By contrast, relying on Preston (2005)’s long-horizon learning approach reintroduces
the full term structure of expectations into the IS and Phillips curves and thus assigns a
role to interest-rate expectations. Eusepi et al. (2018) is the first to use the long-horizon
approach to investigate the interaction between long-horizon learning and interest-rate
expectations. Unsurprisingly, they reach the same conclusions as I do: anticipation
effects coming from interest-rate expectations force the central bank to be less aggressive
on inflation than it would be under rational expectations.
Secondly, the anchoring mechanism is responsible for the lower optimal value of
the inflation coefficient. Standard specifications of the gain in the adaptive learning
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tradition involve no channel through which monetary policy could affect the learning
of agents. Whether the gain is constant or deterministically decreasing, there is no link
between the interest-rate setting of the central bank and the gain.
Here, however, the anchoring mechanism relates the gain to forecast errors. Forecast
errors, in turn, arise as a function of central bank action, in particular of whether the
central bank is able keep inflation at the private sector’s perceived mean. Movements in
the interest rate, then, are a double-edged sword: in contributing to get inflation to the
target, they can close forecast errors and thus stabilize long-run expectations. But any
central bank intervention also results in adjustments in expectations (either because
it takes the private sector by surprise, or because the private sector understands its
implications for future policy), increasing the volatility of observables.
This highlights that the time-varying nature of optimal policy is its key characteris-
tic. The ability to take the stance of anchoring into account is what enables the central
bank to be exceedingly aggressive if and only if expectations are about to unanchor,
and maintain a dovish stance otherwise. Thus it seems reasonable to expect that if the
central bank were allowed to select time-varying Taylor-rule coefficients, it would choose
low coefficients when expectations are anchored and high ones when expectations show
signs of unanchoring. Such a central bank, as well as one following the optimal policy,
would appear to the econometrician as time-varying, echoing the findings of Lubik and
Matthes (2016).
1.6 Conclusion
Central bankers frequently voice a concern to anchor expectations, that is, to render
expectations of long-run inflation unresponsive to short-run economic conditions. The
contribution of this paper is to lay out a simple behavioral model which captures the
time-varying sensitivity of long-run expectations to short-run conditions and to inves-
tigate how this affects the conduct of monetary policy. I quantify my novel anchor-
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ing mechanism by estimating the form of the function that determines the degree of
unanchoring. I use the model to characterize monetary policy both analytically and
numerically.
The simulated method of moments estimation establishes that the anchoring func-
tion provides a realistic description of expectations. On the one hand, expectations
become more sensitive to forecast errors when the private sector made larger mistakes
in predicting inflation in the past. On the other hand, like in Hebden et al. (2020),
negative mistakes unanchor expectations more than positive ones of the same magni-
tude do. Moreover, I use the estimated anchoring function to back out an implied time
series for the gain, the model’s metric for the degree of unanchoring. The median gain,
0.098, is in line with estimates in the literature such as Milani (2014) and Carvalho
et al. (2019), and implies that agents in the model discount observations older than 10
quarters when updating their long-run expectations.
Using the thus quantified model, I provide three sets of results on monetary policy.
I first consider the Ramsey policy of the central bank, deriving an analytical target
criterion that prescribes how the monetary authority should respond to shocks. I show
that the presence of my novel anchoring channel makes it desirable and feasible to
smooth out shocks over time. However, the extent this is feasible varies over time in
tandem with the current and expected future degree of unanchoring.
Second, I use global methods to solve the nonlinear system of first-order conditions of
the Ramsey problem numerically. I thus obtain an approximation to the optimal policy
function, providing the fully optimal path of interest rates conditional on the sequence of
exogenous disturbances. Like in Goodfriend (1993)’s account of US monetary policy, the
optimal policy involves responding aggressively when expectations unanchor in order to
suppress the volatility that high degrees of unanchoring cause. By contrast, the central
bank need not intervene when expectations are anchored, resulting in accommodating
inflation fluctuations in this case.
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Lastly, I explore the implications of the model for the most common specification
of monetary policy, the Taylor rule. As my numerical solution for the optimal inflation
coefficient demonstrates, the central bank should be less aggressive on inflation in my
model than under rational expectations. The first reason is that a time-invariant Taylor
rule involves the same response to a given movement in inflation regardless of the degree
of unanchoring. Second, as in Eusepi et al. (2018), interest-rate expectations impose
limits on how aggressive the policymaker can be. Therefore, the central bank induces
additional volatility into the model if it responds too aggressively to fluctuations in
inflation. An optimal inflation coefficient in my model is able to eliminate the majority
of such additional volatility.
A number of interesting questions emerge from the analysis of monetary policy and
the anchoring expectation formation. One may wonder whether the central bank can use
tools other than its leading interest rate to anchor expectations. Especially concerns
around a binding zero lower bound would motivate the use of alternative monetary
policy tools. Thus the interaction between anchoring and central bank communication,
in particular forward guidance, would be worthwhile to examine. In future work, I plan
to make explicit the communication policy of the central bank to investigate whether
the anchoring expectation formation could help to resolve the forward guidance puzzle.
This, however, requires overcoming the implication of Proposition 2 that adaptive
expectations are not able to incorporate any information that is not embedded in the
current state vector. One option is to model central bank communication similarly to
news shocks in the sense of Beaudry and Portier (2006). In this case, the anchoring
model is likely to deliver differing predictions regarding the effectiveness of Delphic
versus Odyssean forward guidance (Campbell et al. (2012)) because sharing the central
bank’s forecasts would not constitute a questioning of the interest rate reaction function,
while committing to a future interest rate path would.
From this perspective, it is desirable to extend models of adaptive expectations
47
in general to allow the private sector to internalize promises of the policymaker. As
discussed in Section 1.5.1, the inability to incorporate communication stems from the
fact that adaptive expectations involve a sub-optimal expectation formation. Viewed
from the lens of an infinitely repeated game, the private sector is an automaton. One
would thus need to reintroduce some notion of optimality into expectation formation
that would render the private sector a strategic player. Such an extension would likely
be akin to the reputation-building literature à la Cho and Matsui (1995) or to the finite
planning-horizon model of Woodford (2019).
Presumably, there are variables other than long-run inflation where expectations
exhibit varying degrees of unanchoring. For instance, fixed exchange rate regimes might
become subject to speculative attacks the moment when the peg is no longer believed
by the public. Exploring the causes and timing of currency crises is thus a natural
application of my model which I plan investigate in future research.
In general, extensions to the anchoring expectation formation proposed here would
be of interest. The determination of the gain could be endogenized using approaches
that allow the private sector to choose its forecasting behavior in an optimizing fashion,
perhaps by selecting among competing forecasting models as in Branch and Evans (2011)
or by picking the size of the gain to minimize the estimated forecast error variance.
Lastly, a foray into the empirics of anchoring expectation formation is important
to get a clearer idea of the expectation formation process of the public. In practice,
it is likely that this process is heterogenous, not just across households and firms, but
also within various demographic groups or sectors of the economy. If so, then monetary
policy would need to collect and monitor a host of long-run expectations time series to
manage the challenge of keeping expectations anchored.
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2 Talking in Time
- Dynamic Central Bank Communication
2.1 Introduction
Central bankers and researchers have been emphasizing that regular, recurring commu-
nication with the public about the current and future economic outlook is fundamental
for the transmission of monetary policy. However, the implications of dynamics for cen-
tral bank communication are less well understood. Where there is a distinction between
the current and future economic stance, how should the monetary authority weight the
future versus the present in its communication? And in what way does a central banker
talk differently when it is understood that she will talk again in the future?
The novelty of this paper is that it formulates a dynamic central bank communica-
tion problem and contrasts it with its static analogue. The static and dynamic models
involve a Bayesian persuasion-type communication game between a central bank (CS)
and the private sector (PS) about two economic fundamentals. The central bank tracks
the first fundamental, while the private sector tracks the second. The central bank sends
the private sector a noisy signal which is a weighted sum of the two fundamentals. Im-
portantly, the two models are identical up to the correlation structure between the two
states: while in the static model, this is a cross-sectional correlation between other-
wise unrelated variables, in the dynamic model, instead, the two states are temporally
dependent.
This allows me to isolate the role of dynamics for optimal communication design.
In particular, I investigate the effect of dynamics on two dimensions of communication.
I first ask how strongly the central bank should weight the current against the future
fundamental in its signal - a dimension of communication I refer to as “targetedness.”
Secondly, I explore whether the optimal precision of the dynamic signal differs from
that of the static one. In other words, does dynamic communication involve a different
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amount of noise than static communication?
I find that the main difference between the static and the dynamic problems is the
endogeneity of the private sector’s prior beliefs in the dynamic setting. The endogenous
priors serve to dampen the persuasiveness of the central bank’s signal in two crucial
ways. First, in terms of targetedness, this implies that the optimal weight on the central
bank’s preferred state is always larger in the dynamic than in the static model. The key
is that in a dynamic setting, the private sector uses its prior in two ways: firstly, to form
a prior forecast of its preferred state, and secondly to filter out irrelevant information
from the signal it receives today. From the perspective of the central bank, the private
sector’s optimal choice of how to use the prior always results in the prior dampening
the effect of the central bank’s signal. In particular, when the correlation between
fundamentals is negative, the private sector relies more on the forecasting function of
the prior, while when the correlation is positive, it leans more on the filtering function.
Therefore the central bank has to weight the signal more heavily in the desired direction.
Second, in the dynamic model, prior beliefs can be too tight from the perspective of
the central bank. This lowers the effectiveness of central bank communication because
the private sector views the same signal as less informative when its priors are tight.
Thus, to increase its persuasive power, the central bank optimally loosens the private
sector’s priors, and it does so by introducing more noise into the signal than it would
in the static model. Optimal precision is thus lower in the dynamic problem than in
the static one as the central bank smoothes the information it provides the public over
time.
2.1.1 Related literature
The paper is related to two main strands of literature. First, my main point of reference
is the global games literature in the vein of Morris and Shin (2002), Svensson (2006),
Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009). Several papers have
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used this literature as a starting point to study particular dimensions of communication.
Chahrour (2014), for example, uses the rational inattention literature à la Sims (2003)
to investigate the optimal amount of central bank communication.
To my knowledge, only few papers consider the time dimension in some form. One
is Gaballo (2016), who analyzes Delphic forward guidance, the communication of the
central bank about its own information set, in an overlapping generations (OLG) global
games model. However, Gaballo only introduces dynamics in the evolution of the funda-
mental; central bank communication in his model is simply revealing information about
the central bank’s one-period-ahead forecast. In this sense, central bank communication
in Gaballo (2016) maps one-to-one to the standard static problem of Morris and Shin
(2002). Reis (2011) analyzes the optimal timing decision of an authority that knows
about a future policy change the public is unaware of. The problem of the authority is
to decide when to publicly announce the future policy change. Hansen and McMahon
(2016) instead examine how the voting behavior of monetary policy members changes
over time as a result of dynamically changing signaling incentives.
My work is also related to the Bayesian persuasion literature in the wake of Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011). Bayesian persuasion is a signaling game where a sender designs
his communication so as to persuade a receiver to take a sender-preferred action. Such a
setting has been widely adopted in many applications such as stress tests (Goldstein and
Leitner (2018) and Inostroza and Pavan (2017)) or even central bank communication
(Eunmi Ko’s 2019 job market paper18). Importantly, the sender has access to a full-
commitment technology, and thus persuasion in this setting works through signal design,
not through untruthfulness.
Viewed from the lens of commitment, my work ties in closer with the Bayesian
persuasion literature than with the macroeconomic literature on discretionary monetary
policy and cheap talk such as Moscarini (2007) and Frankel and Kartik (2018). While
18This paper is available on Ko’s website; see sites.google.com/site/iameunmiko/research.
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the discretionary monetary policy literature has an explicit concern for dynamics, the
central question in this literature is not how to provide information to the public, but
how to design central bank action over time.
I choose to focus on a full-commitment communication problem in the Bayesian per-
suasion sense exactly because of the Barro and Gordon (1983)-result that reputation
arises in equilibrium as a commitment device. With a rational receiver, lying is unsus-
tainable in a dynamic game unless the sender does not care about his reputation. For
central banks, where reputation is key for the proper transmission of monetary policy,
this is clearly not the case. For this reason, my solution concept is that of a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) instead of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE).
Lastly, I focus on central bank communication about economic fundamentals, not
about future policy. To use the terminology of Campbell et al. (2012), I thus model
Delphic, and not Odyssean, forward guidance. This way I can isolate the effect of pure
communication instead of considering the implications of the central bank tying its
hands concerning the evolution of future policy.
The paper is outlined as follows. Section 2.2 develops the dynamic communication
game in parallel with its static analogue. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 describe the targetedness
and precision dimensions of the optimal communication policy respectively. Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 The dynamic model and the static analogue
Suppose there are two correlated random variables. Throughout the paper, I will inter-
pret these as correlated economic fundamentals, for example two realizations of GDP.
Let θ1, θ2 denote the two random variables in the static environment, and θt, θt+1 be
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the corresponding states in the dynamic world. I assume that




θt+1 = ρθt + εt+1 with εt+1 ∼ N (0, σ2ε) and σ2ε = 1− ρ2. (43)
Thus in both static and dynamic models, the two states have zero mean and unit
variance. The only difference between the static and dynamic setups is the interpretation
of ρ, the correlation between the two variables. While in the static model, ρ captures
correlation between two otherwise unrelated states, in the dynamic environment, ρ is a
temporal correlation linking the two fundamentals to one another across time.
In this setting, consider a Bayesian persuasion game à la Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011), a communication game between a central bank (CB) and the private sector (PS),
in which the CB has the opportunity to design its signals to persuade the PS to choose
its actions in a way that maximizes the expected payoff of the CB. Like Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011), I assume that no lying is allowed, so that all signals are truthful.
Suppose the PS is interested in tracking one state, but the CB would like it to
track the other. The example underlying this setup is one where the PS embarks on
an investment project and is thus interested in the state relevant for the returns on
investment. The CB instead has a mandate to smooth out business cycle fluctuations,
and is therefore concerned with the state that captures the current stance of the business
cycle. Letting I denote the PS’ choice of investment, the loss functions of the two players
are
LPS,static = EPS(I − θ2)2, (44)
LCB,static = ECB(I − bθ1)2, (45)
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in the static model, and




βt(It − bθt)2, (47)
in the dynamic model, with b ∈ [0,∞) denoting the weight which the CB places on
tracking θ1 and θt respectively, and β ∈ (0, 1) being the central bank’s discount factor.
Apart from the temporal structure, the two problems are identical. In both setups,
the PS seeks to set investment according to the state that determines the returns on
investment, while the CB wishes to follow its mandate of stabilizing the business cycle.
The only difference is that the dynamic setting lends this problem a temporal dimension,
as the PS’ and the CB’s target states, θt+1 and θt respectively, can be interpreted as
different realizations of the same economic fundamental over time. To fix ideas, I will
refer to θt and θ1 as “today’s state,” and θt+1 and θ2 as “tomorrow’s state.”
I argue that this temporal dimension is a very natural element of any central bank’s
communication problem. Firstly, economic fundamentals evolve over time, introducing
a distinction between the current and the future economic outlook. This distinction
motivates the need for the CB to differentiate what time period it is talking about.
Secondly, in a one-shot game it is not intuitive why the PS and the CB would have
misaligned preferences. In a dynamic game, instead, the CB’s mandate for business
cycle stabilization motivates its interest in the current stance of the business cycle,
while rationality dictates that the PS pays attention to the future state, since that is
what determines the returns on investment. Lastly, in practice the monetary policy
decision is a cyclical process, recurring several times per year, every time accompanied
by communication about the central bank’s outlook on the current and expected future
stance of the economy. Thus, in practice, central bankers’ communication is dynamic
in two ways: it is both about a dynamic object - economic fundamentals -, as well as
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itself a temporal phenomenon.
To capture communication that involves both current and future economic funda-
mentals, I assume that the central bank sends a signal to the private sector of the
following form
s = θ1 +
1
ψ
θ2 + v v ∼ N (0, σ2v), (48)
st = θt +
1
ψ
θt+1 + vt vt ∼ N (0, σ2v), (49)
where the formulation with the time indices corresponds to the dynamic model.
There are two dimensions to the CB’s communication problem embedded in this
signal structure. The first choice variable, ψ, represents how strongly the CB down-
weights the state the PS tracks. I refer to this dimension of dynamic communication as
“targetedness,” by which I mean the degree to which the signal is driven by one state
versus the other. Targetedness is minimal when ψ = 1, so that the weight on both states
in the signal is equal. I refer to such a signal as a “confounding signal.” By contrast,
when ψ →∞ or ψ → 0, targetedness goes to infinity. As the last two cases make clear,
a highly targeted signal can either be targeted toward today’s state (ψ →∞) or toward
tomorrow’s (ψ → 0).
The second choice variable of the CB is σ2v , the variance of the noise term v in the
signal. This corresponds to the precision dimension of communication. A low σ2v renders
a signal with given targetedness more precise, et vice versa. Most papers in the central
bank communication literature focus on this dimension of communication, asking how
precise information the CB should optimally provide to the public. The targetedness
dimension, instead, is a fundamentally new dimension to dynamic communication.19
For simplicity, I assume the CB observes the full history of states perfectly, including
the one-period-ahead state, while the PS’ information set only includes the history of
19Appendix B.1 considers an alternative formalization of the targetedness dimension via a signal structure
comprising two independent signals, where the choice variables of the CB are the variances of the noise
terms in each signal.
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the signal. Formally, the information sets of the two players in a particular period are
ICB = {θ1, θ2}, IPS = {s}, (50)
ICBt = {θt+1, θt, . . . , θ0}, IPSt = {st, st−1, . . . , s0}, (51)
where again the expressions with time indices correspond to the dynamic model.
Noting that the PS’ problem implies that the PS’ investment choice corresponds
to its expectation of tomorrow’s state, the CB’s problem can be stated as minimizing
its loss function subject to optimal PS inference. Since the signal is linear with Gaus-
sian noise, the optimal PS forecast in the static model is given by the optimal linear
projection formula
θ2|s = φs, (52)
and by the Kalman filter formula in the dynamic model
θt+1|t = m1θt|t−1 +m2θt +m3θt+1 +m4vt. (53)
Here θ2|s := EPS [θ2|s], while the optimal projection is given by the OLS formula φ =
Cov(θ2,s)
V ar(s) . Similarly, θt+1|t := Et[θt+1|I
PS
t ], andmi, i = 1, . . . , 4 are given by the Kalman
filter, as derived in Appendix B.2. Then the CB’s problem is
min
ψ,σv
ECB(θ2|s − bθ1)2 s.t. θ2|s = φs (54)






βt(θt+1|t − bθt)2 s.t. θt+1|t = m1θt|t−1 +m2θt +m3θt+1 +m4vt (55)
in the dynamic model. Having set up the CB’s problem, I close this section by providing
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the definition of equilibrium in the static and dynamic models.
Definition 1. Let µX(x) be the probability distribution of a variable X induced by the
PS’ beliefs. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is an action rule It, belief system µ and a
communication policy (ψ∗, σ∗v) such that
• It = arg minLPSt (It, θt+1) s.t. E
PS
t (θt+1|st),
• (ψ∗, σ∗v) = arg minLCB({It, θt}∞t=0) s.t. E
PS
t (θt+1|st) and
st = θt +
1
ψ θt+1 + vt with vt ∼ N (0, σ
2
v),







Integrating out the states from the central bank’s loss function, one obtains V, the CB’s
expected loss function. In the static model, this takes the following form
Vstatic = V ar(θ2|s)− 2bCov(θ2|s, θ1) + b2, (56)
where I have utilized the fact that V ar(θ1) = 1. Analogously, the expected loss function




V ar(θt+1|t)− 2bCov(θt+1|t, θt) + b2
)
, (57)
where I have similarly made use of the fact that V ar(θt) = 1. On the one hand, these
expressions show that the structure of the static and dynamic communication problems
is the same. One sees this on the fact that the expected loss function in both models
depends on the variance of the PS’ beliefs minus the weighted covariance between PS
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beliefs and the state the CB tracks. On the other hand, the optimal dynamic evolution
of beliefs renders the variances and covariances of beliefs much more involved in the
dynamic model than in the static one. This explains why the evaluated expected loss
function in the dynamic model, provided in Appendix B.3, is a much longer expression
than the one in the static model. For this reason, while an analytical solution for ψ
exists in the static model, it cannot be obtained for the dynamic model. Therefore I
now present the analytical solution for ψ in the static model, and contrast it with a
numerical solution for the dynamic model.
Proposition 3. In the static model, optimal targetedness is given by
ψ∗static =
√




+ σ2v + 1
2 (bρ2 + b− ρ)σ2v − 2 (ρ2 − 1) (b− ρ)
.
(58)
Figure 8 illustrates the optimal ψ in both models for a benchmark calibration of
b = 1, β = 0.99 and σv = 1. I will use this figure throughout the section to analyze the
optimal targetedness policy. The left panel depicts ψ∗ as a function of ρ. The middle
panel shows |1− | 1ψ ||, a metric of CB targetedness that evaluates the absolute distance
between the weights the signal places on today’s versus tomorrow’s fundamental. The
right panel plots various measures of PS responsiveness as a function of ψ∗ and ρ:
responsiveness to today’s state and to noise (φ and κ in the static and dynamic models
respectively), responsiveness to tomorrow’s state ( φψ and
κ
ψ ) and, in the dynamic model
only, to past beliefs (m1). Before turning to the differences in optimal targetedness
between the static and dynamic models, let me first characterize the commonalities
between the two solutions for ψ. This is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Shared features of optimal targetedness policy
Both in the static and dynamic model, ψ∗(ρ) has the following properties:
• ψ∗ ≥ 0 ∀ρ.
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Figure 8: Optimal targetedness and PS responsiveness as a function of ρ
The left panel of the figure shows the optimal targetedness, ψ∗. The middle panel shows the absolute distance
between the weights on today’s and tomorrow’s state in the signal, an alternative measure of targetedness. In these
two panels, the blue lines correspond to the static, and the red lines to the dynamic model. The right panel depicts
the PS’ responsiveness to today’s state (φ and κ in static and dynamic models) and to tomorrow’s state (φ/ψ and
κ/ψ in static and dynamic models), as well as m1, the PS’ loading on past beliefs θt|t−1 (dynamic model only)
• When ρ→ −1, ψ∗ → 1 from above.
• When ρ→ 1, ψ∗ → 0 from above.
• ∃ ρa such that for ρ < ρa, ψ∗ is increasing in ρ, but for ρ > ρa, ψ∗ is decreasing
in ρ.
• ∃ ρs > ρa such that ψ∗(ρs) = 1, and for a small ε > 0, ψ∗(ρs−ε) > 1 > ψ∗(ρs+ε).
I refer to ρa and ρs as the alignment and switching threshold respectively.
Figure 9 explains Proposition 4 by replotting the left panel of Figure 8 schematically,
splitting the ρ-space into four different regions. In Region I, shown in red, ρ < 0,
rendering the preferences of the PS and the CB severely misaligned. This means that
there exists a ψ̄ such that if ψ > ψ̄, sign(κ) = sign(φ) = −sign(ψ). In other words, if
the CB downweights tomorrow’s state too much in the signal, the PS understands that
the signal is primarily driven by today’s state, and responds in the opposite direction.
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One can see an example of this on the leftmost panel of Figure 10, which plots φ and κ,
the PS’ responsiveness to the signal in the static and dynamic models respectively, as
a function of ψ. When ρ = −0.99, κ and φ switch sign when ψ is barely above 1. This
constrains how strongly the CB can target the state it cares about, today’s state, and
therefore it selects the highest permissible ψ < ψ̄. In the limit, when ρ = −1, ψ̄ = 1 and
thus the best the CB can do is to send a perfectly confounding signal, ψ = 1, resulting
in the PS ignoring the signal completely (κ = φ = 0, as seen on the right panel of
Figure 8). As ρ approaches zero from below, ψ̄ rises, loosening the constraint on how
strongly the CB can target θt, its preferred state. Therefore, throughout Region I, ψ
∗
is increasing in ρ.





-1 0 1ρa ρs
Region I Region II Region III Region IV
Once ρ ≥ 0, we enter Region II, the gray-shaded region on Figure 9. Here, since
ρ ≥ 0, there is no ψ̄ that constrains the CB in raising ψ and thus targeting its object of
interest, today’s state, more strongly. And it is desirable to raise ψ for the CB because
ρ is sufficiently close to zero that the CB’s and the PS’ preferences are still misaligned.
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However, the CB cannot raise ψ indefinitely, since responsiveness falls the higher ψ is.
For example, when ρ = 0, the middle panel of Figure 10 shows that ∂κ∂ψ < 0 for any
ψ > 1.
The blue-shaded region, Region III, begins once ρ > ρa. At this point, ρ is high
enough for the two players’ preferences to become more aligned. Thus the CB becomes
interested in raising the PS’ responsiveness to tomorrow’s state instead of today’s.
As shown in Appendix B.2, the PS’ responsiveness to tomorrow’s state is κ/ψ in the
dynamic, and φ/ψ in the static model. Thus in both models the CB can raise this by
lowering ψ. A lower ψ not only lowers the denominator, but also raises the numerator,
as κ and φ are decreasing in ψ if ψ > 1 and ρ is positive and not too close to 1 (see third
and fourth panels of Figure 10). Thus in this region, the CB maximizes responsiveness
to a weighted average of today’s and tomorrow’s state.
Once ρ > ρs, the two states are so strongly correlated that the CB’s and the PS’
preferences are strongly aligned. In this region, shaded green and marked Region IV on
Figure 9, the CB’s primary concern is the noise in the signal. Since ρ is approaching
1, the CB is indifferent to whether the PS responds to today’s or tomorrow’s state,
and the only thing that can get in the way of that is the noise. Thus as ρ → 1, the
CB shrinks ψ∗ → 0. As seen on the rightmost panels of Figures 8 and 10, κ and φ
decrease as a result, while κ/ψ and φ/ψ shoot up. This way, the PS’ responsiveness to
tomorrow’s state increases, while its responsiveness to the signal in general, and thus
to noise, is kept in check. Thus once ρ crosses the switching threshold ρs, the CB
becomes indifferent to which fundamental the PS responds to, and therefore switches
the targetedness of the signal from θt to θt+1.
In this manner, ρ, the correlation between the two states, determines the optimal
choice of targetedness in both the static and the dynamic model. In the limit, severe
misalignment results in a perfectly confounding signal that does not target any of the
two states, while the opposite extreme of perfect alignment leads the CB to target
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Figure 10: PS responsiveness to the signal as a function of ψ for various values of ρ
The figure shows the PS’ responsiveness to the signal, φ in the static model (blue) and κ in the dynamic model (red),
as a function of of targetedness, ψ, for various levels of correlation between the states (ρ).
the PS’ preferred state, θt+1, infinitely. Between the limiting cases, the CB balances
the need for a high level of θt-targetedness if alignment is low against the shrinking
responsiveness of the PS to the signal if it is too targeted toward today’s state.
However, as Figure 8 indicates, ψ∗ is quantitatively different across the two models.
Moreover, the threshold ρs after which the CB only aims to drive down the respon-
siveness to noise arrives later in the dynamic model than in the static one. The next
proposition states these results.
Proposition 5. Higher weight on the central bank’s target in the dynamic model
ψ∗dynamic ≥ ψ∗static ∀ ρ. (59)
In the dynamic model, the central bank finds it optimal to target its own preferred state





The switching threshold is higher in the dynamic model than in the static model.
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Why is it optimal for the central bank to target today’s state more in the dynamic
model? Recall that the comparison of the expected loss functions in Equations (56)
and (57) revealed that in both models, the CB’s loss function consists of a term that
captures the variance of the PS’ beliefs of tomorrow’s state, minus a term capturing
the covariance between those same beliefs and today’s state. Thus the structure of the
CB’s objective is the same, implying that the difference in the solutions must come from
differences in the evolution of beliefs.
Let us therefore investigate the laws of motion of beliefs in the two models. Substi-
tuting in the signal in the optimal forecast in the static model from Equation (54), and
writing out the Kalman filter equation in the dynamic model, Equation (55), with the
help of Appendix B.2, one can write the evolutions of the beliefs that enter the CB’s
loss function in the following way:
Static: θ2|s = φθ1 +
φ
ψ
θ2 + φv, (61)
Dynamic: θt+1|t = m1θt|t−1+κθt +
κ
ψ
θt+1 + κvt. (62)
This neatly illustrates two sources of difference between static and dynamic. The
most obvious difference is the presence of m1 in the dynamic belief equation, signifying
that in a dynamic world, current beliefs are informed to some degree by past beliefs. In
a static setting, by contrast, the loading on past beliefs is clearly zero. Yet even if the
loading on past beliefs were zero in the dynamic model, the evolutions of beliefs would
not coincide, because κ is not necessarily equal to φ. In fact, as Figure 10 indicates, in
general κ 6= φ. Let us look at each of these channels in turn.
63
2.3.1 Responsiveness in static versus dynamic





















where pi, i = 1, 4 are the two diagonal elements of the 2 × 2 forecast-error-variance
matrix P . These correspond to the prior variances of the two fundamentals at the
steady state: p1 is the tightness of the prior belief about θt+1, while p4 the tightness of
the prior on θt. Letting π(θT ) and p(θT , st) denote prior and posterior variances of θT ,
where T = t, t+ 1 in the dynamic model, and T = 1, 2 in the static model,
π(θT ) := E[(θT − θT |t−1)2], (64)
p(θT , st) := E[(θT − θT |t)2]. (65)
For the dynamic model it follows that
p1 = π(θt+1), (66)
p4 = π(θt). (67)
One observes that if p1 = p4 = 1, then κ = φ. In this case, the prior variance of
today’s and tomorrow’s state exactly equals the variance of the state, 1, signifying that
the PS has not updated its beliefs after receiving signals from the CB. This suggests
that the main difference between φ and κ is that the latter, through the tightness of
the priors p1 and p4, captures the PS learning about θt and θt+1 from observing the
signal over time. Another way to say this is that the static problem is a special case
of the dynamic problem in which the PS’ prior beliefs have a constant, unit variance.
Constant priors are unaffected by the CB’s signal and thus drop out of the problem.
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From comparing the analytical expressions for φ and κ, it is not obvious how the
priors affect responsiveness, or how the CB’s targetedness affects the priors. To get
a better sense of this, consider Figure 11, which plots p1 in blue and p4 in red as a
function of ψ, for different values of ρ. Firstly, it is clear that (p1, p4) ∈ [0, 1]. Recalling
that V ar(θT ) = 1 ∀T ≥ 0, one can interpret a unit prior variance as a perfectly loose
prior since even absent any information, the variance of the state is an upper bound
on the variance of the PS’ beliefs. A zero prior variance, by contrast, corresponds to a
perfectly tight prior.
Secondly, p1 ≥ p4 ∀ ψ. This is most noticeable when ρ = 0, plotted on the middle
panel of the figure. In this case, the PS cannot enter any given period t with anything
but perfectly flat priors on θt+1 because when the states are unrelated, there is no way
to receive any information on θt+1 in period t− 1. The reason that even in this case of
uncorrelated states, p4 is still below 1 is that, in contrast with θt+1, the PS enters every
period t already having received information about θt in the previous period. The signal
structure in Equation (49) means that the PS effectively receives two signals about θt,
as both st and st−1 contain information about it. This is the reason why p4 ≤ p1;
unlike in the static model, in any given period in the dynamic model, the PS has more
information about today’s state than tomorrow’s.
However, we see from Figure 10 that the magnitudes and the comparative statics of
φ and κ are qualitatively and quantitatively similar, at least in the intermediate regions
of ρ. This suggests that however the CB affects the tightness of the priors p1 and p4,
these effects end up balancing each other out. Looking at Figure 11, we see that this
comes from the fact that unless ρ = 0, p1 and p4 always respond to ψ in the same way.
If decreasing ψ tightens the prior about θt+1, it also tightens the prior on θt, et vice
versa. Thus manipulating the tightness of the priors through the choice of ψ does not
do much for the CB in terms of affecting the PS’ responsiveness to the signal. So this
is not the primary wedge between the static and dynamic models. But if this is not it,
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Figure 11: Prior variances of θt+1 and θt (p1 and p4 respectively) as a function of ψ for various ρ
The figure plots the prior variances of the two states as a function of targetedness, ψ, for various levels of correlation
between the states, ρ. The blue line, p1 = π(θt+1), corresponds to the tightness of the prior on tomorrow’s state,
while the red line, p4 = π(θt), corresponds to the tightness of the prior on today’s state.
then what is?
2.3.2 Loading on past beliefs
To answer this question, I now turn to the second dimension of difference between the
static and the dynamic models: m1, the loading on the past belief θt|t−1. Let us start
by investigating what this loading is.







Observing that ρψ + 1 = Cov(θt, st), one can decompose m1 into two elements. The
first is ρ, the temporal dependence between the two states. From this, the PS subtracts
the responsiveness-weighted covariance of the signal with today’s state, κ( ρψ + 1). I
will refer to the first component as the “AR-component” given that it comes from the
autoregressive coefficient of the θ-process. Since the PS knows that θt+1 = ρθt + εt+1,
the optimal forecast of θt+1 given knowledge of θt is ρθt. Since in this environment,
whether static or dynamic, the states are never fully revealed, the PS uses its best guess
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of θt in this optimal forecast: θt is replaced by θt|t−1.
But the PS can do better than simply extrapolating θt+1 from past beliefs using the
AR-component ρθt|t−1. This insight is the starkest when ρ = 0. In this case, since the
states are serially uncorrelated, one might think that past beliefs are uninformative and
should thus be completely ignored by the PS. However, even if ρ = 0, m1 = −κ 6= 0, so
that the dynamic model does not coincide with the static model even in this case.
What is going on here is that when ρ = 0, the AR-component of m1 is shut off, since
the autoregressive transmission between the states is gone. But even in this case, the
covariance of st with θt is not 0, but 1. So the PS can use its knowledge that today’s
signal was to a known extent (Cov(θt, st) = 1) reflective of today’s state instead of the
state the PS cares about, θt+1. So m1 = −κ in this case can be interpreted as the PS
filtering out its best guess of θt from its beliefs of θt+1. This is possible purely because
at any given time, the CB’s signal mixes today’s and tomorrow’s state, and therefore
st is already the second signal the PS receives about θt.
Thus we can interpret the κ( ρψ +1) part of m1 as a component that the PS subtracts
from the AR-component in order to filter out new information about θt arriving at time
t. Therefore I will refer to this part as the “filter-component.” Of course, this component
is in action when ρ 6= 0 as well. And glancing at the right panel of Figure 8, we see from
the evolution of ρ, ψ∗ and κ why m1 is negative for most of the ρ-space. In Region I,
when ρ is negative and κ(ψ∗) is small, the AR-component of m1 dominates, resulting
in m1 < 0. In the limit of ρ → −1, κ → 0, and so m1 → −1, pushing the PS’ beliefs
exceedingly strongly in the opposite direction to what the CB intends. Thus, in this
region, the AR-component of m1 makes the CB’s life difficult as it exerts influence on
the PS’ beliefs that works against the CB’s signal.
When ρ > 0 but small, the AR-component no longer pushes against the CB’s signal,
but now the filter-component dominates, so that m1 is still negative, and thus still
causes the CB headaches as it dampens the effectiveness of the CB’s signal. Only once
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ρ > κ( ρψ + 1) does m1 become positive, stopping to cancel out the effect of the CB’s
signal.
The main difference between the static and dynamic problem, then, from the per-
spective of the CB’s choice of targetedness, is how to deal with the influence of the PS’
priors on current beliefs. This influence is captured in the loading m1, and, as we have
seen, for most of the ρ-space, it goes the opposite way as the CB wants it to. Therefore,
the new element of the CB’s optimal choice of ψ in the dynamic model is aiming to
cancel out the loading on the PS’ prior beliefs if it goes the wrong way. Out of the two
components that make up m1, the CB can however only affect the filter-component. To
understand how the central bank’s choice of targetedness affects the filter-component,
consider Figure 12, which illustrates how the filter-component that is subtracted from
ρ changes when ψ changes, for various values of ρ. I also plot ρ in blue, so that m1 is
just the sum of the two lines.
Figure 12: The components of m1 as a function of ψ for various values of ρ
The figure decomposes m1, the PS’ loading on past beliefs, θt|t−1, into two components, the AR-component (ρ) in
blue and the filter-component (κ( ρ
ψ
+1)) in red, and plots how these components evolve as a function of targetedness,
ψ, for various levels of autocorrelation, ρ. Note: the red line is the negative of the filter-component, so that the sum
of red and blue lines gives m1.
The main message of the figure is that because the sign of the filter-component is
usually the opposite of the sign of the AR-component, a higher ψ∗ in the dynamic model
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is the result of the CB trying to decrease m1 when it has the wrong sign, or increase it
when the sign is correct. When m1 pushes against the CB’s signal, the CB thus tries
to raise the filter-component to cancel out m1. When instead m1 acts as a tailwind to
the CB’s signal, the CB tries to prevent the AR- and filter-components cancelling out,
and thus lowers the filter-component. The figure illustrates why in both of these cases,
the optimal thing to do is to select a larger ψ than what would be optimal in the static
model.
When ρ  0, for instance ρ = −0.99 on the leftmost panel of the figure, the AR-
component is working strongly against the CB’s signal. Intuitively, what is happening
here is that because of the strong negative correlation, the PS’ prior beliefs about θt are
large and, from the standpoint of the CB, have the wrong sign. Since the PS tracks θt+1
and ρ < 0, it uses its priors to conclude that θt+1 is strongly in the opposite direction
of the signal. In such a situation, the CB wishes that the filter-component of m1 were
stronger, so that the PS would filter out more of its priors, in other words, would update
its beliefs of θt stronger after observing st. This leads the CB to want to increase the
absolute value of the filter-component. As the leftmost panel of Figure 12 points out,
the CB achieves this by raising ψ.
In the opposite extreme, when ρ→ 1, depicted on the rightmost panel of Figure 12,
the AR-component goes the right way, but is now dampened by the PS’ filtering out
incoming information regarding θt. Thus in this case the CB wishes that the PS would
filter out less of its priors, and therefore wants to minimize the absolute value of the
filter-component. Now from the rightmost panel of Figure 12, we see that to do so, the
CB again needs to raise ψ.
The endogenous prior beliefs of the private sector, and the way those priors influ-
ence current beliefs through the loading m1, thus serve as a dampening force to how
the central bank can influence beliefs and thus exercise persuasion on the PS. When
misalignment is severe, the CB cannot affect the loading on the prior and regrets having
69
informed the PS about θt in period t − 1, as those prior beliefs push posteriors away
from the CB’s desired direction. By contrast, when alignment is very strong, the tail-
wind effect of the priors is dampened by the PS’ rational update from today’s signal.
In order to work against the dampening effect of the prior on the PS’ beliefs, the CB
finds it optimal to always push today’s state more strongly in its signal than under the
static model, either to work against undesirable prior beliefs, or to brake the updating
away from desirable priors.
2.4 Optimal precision
Now I turn to the question of how precise the central bank’s signal should be for a given
targetedness. Thus, holding ψ fixed, the central bank now chooses σv to minimize the
loss function in Equation (57). The next proposition gives an analytical characterization
of the solution in the static and dynamic models.
Proposition 6. Corner versus interior solutions
In the static model, optimal precision is a corner solution: σ∗v is either 0 or ∞. In the





























and both corner and interior solutions exist.
This result suggests a qualitative difference between optimal precision in the static
and dynamic models: whereas in the static model, the solution for σv is bang-bang, this
is not necessarily the case in the dynamic model. Figure 13 provides a visual illustration
of this point by showing σ∗,staticv in blue and σ
∗,dynamic
v in red dashed, both as a function
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of ρ and for three different values of ψ: 0.2, 1 and 1.8. The ψ-values are selected to
encompass a case where the CB’s signal is targeted toward θt+1 (ψ < 1), when the
signal is not targeted toward any state (ψ = 1), and lastly when it is targeted toward
θt (ψ > 1). Also, I continue to use the calibration with b = 1 and β = 0.99 throughout
the section.
Figure 13: Optimal precision σ∗v as a function of ρ for various values of ψ
2.4.1 Corner solutions in the static model
Focusing first on the blue line on Figure 13, which corresponds to σ∗v in the static model,
one observes the bang-bang nature of optimal static precision. When ψ = 0.2 < 1, so
that the CB targets tomorrow’s state in its signal, shown in the left column of Figure 13,
the CB sets σ∗v = 0 only if ρ ≥ ρb(ψ), that is, if ρ is higher than a particular threshold
which I will refer to as the bang-bang threshold, and which is a function of ψ. Note that
if ψ < 1 and σv = 0, the CB’s signal in Equation (49) is an invertible moving average
process, so in this case sending an infinitely precise signal (σv = 0) would mean that
the CB reveals the θ-process fully. Therefore, in this case, when preference alignment
is high enough (ρ ≥ ρb(ψ)), the CB in the static model prefers to fully reveal the two
fundamentals, and otherwise, it sends an infinitely imprecise signal.
71
A similar situation arises in the static model when ψ > 1, so that the signal is
targeting the CB’s preferred state, θt. Again, there exists a bang-bang threshold ρ
b(ψ)
such that for ρ > ρb(ψ), the CB’s signal becomes infinitely precise, and is infintely
imprecise otherwise. Since in this case the signal weights the CB’s preferred state more
strongly, the bang-bang threshold is lower than it is when the signal is targeted toward
the PS’ preferred state: for ψh > 1 > ψl > 0, ρb(ψh) < ρb(ψl). This reflects that the
CB reverts to communicating infinitely precisely already for a lower level of alignment
if it gets to skew its signal towards θt.
The only ψ for which the CB chooses σ∗v = 0 for any ρ is ψ = 1. The reason is that in
this case, the signal is not targeting either θt or θt+1, and is thus perfectly confounding.
Therefore the information provided by the CB improves the PS’ expectations without
pushing them in the wrong direction, even if ρ→ −1.
2.4.2 Tightness of prior beliefs in the dynamic model
Let us now examine the optimal precision σ∗v in the dynamic model, shown by the red
dashed line on Figure 13. The main qualitative difference is that, in contrast to the
static model, the solution is not generally bang-bang. While there exist (ρ, ψ) pairs for
which σ∗v is corner (0 or ∞), for many (ρ, ψ) pairs the optimal precision is interior.
When ψ = 0.2 (left panel of Figure 13), so that the CB’s signal is targeted toward
θt+1, the PS’ preferred state, σ
∗
v shifts from ∞ to an interior value when ρ exceeds
ρi(ψ), a threshold value I will call interiority threshold. Optimal noise only shrinks to
zero when ρ = 1. When ψ = 1, so that the weight on the two states in the CB’s signal is
equal, the same pattern obtains. For ρ < ρi(ψ), σ∗v =∞, and as ρ > ρi(ψ), σ∗v <∞,
converging to zero for ρ → 1. The only difference between the θt+1-targeted and the
untargeted signal is that for ψh = 1 > ψl > 0, ρi(ψh) < ρi(ψl). This resembles the
intuition in the static model that for a signal that is more targeted towards the CB’s
preferred state (has a higher value of ψ), the CB pivots away from infinite imprecision
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already for a lower level of ρ.
Something entirely different happens when the CB’s signal is strongly targeted to-
wards θt, the CB’s preferred state. This situation, depicted on the right panel of Figure
13, involves an initial bang-bang as σ∗v transitions from ∞ to 0 when ρ hits a partic-
ular bang-bang threshold ρb(ψ) < 1. Afterwards, σ∗v remains 0 as ρ increases, until
ρ exceeds an interiority threshold. Here, σ∗v becomes interior from below, surprisingly
increasing as alignment between the two states grows. Finally, once alignment becomes
very strong, σ∗v reverses course and decreases back down to asymptote to 0 as ρ→ 1.
What is going on? Why is optimal precision often interior in the dynamic model,
while it never is in the static model? And if σ∗v passes from∞ to 0 through an interiority
region when ψ ≤ 1, why does this interiority region disappear when ψ > 1, only to
reappear for much higher ρ-values? To understand why all of this happens, it is helpful
to investigate the tightness of prior and posterior beliefs in the two models. Recall the
notation of π(θT ) for prior and p(θT , st) for posterior variances of θT , introduced in
Equation (65) of Section 2.3 and reproduced here for convenience:
π(θT ) := E[(θT − θT |t−1)2],
p(θT , st) := E[(θT − θT |t)2].
Let us also define
I(θT , st) := π(θT )− p(θT , st), (70)
as the decrease in uncertainty in θT given st. With a slight abuse of terminology, I
will refer to I(θT , st) as mutual information on θT , i.e. the extent to which the signal
is informative about θT .
20 As demonstrated in Appendix B.5, the PS’ prior on any
of the two states in the static model is equal to the unconditional variance of the
fundamentals, 1. In the dynamic model, instead, in any period t = τ , the posterior
20While, formally, mutual information is the expected difference between the log posterior and the log prior
distribution, I simply compare the level difference between the second moments of the prior and posterior.
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variance p(θt+1, st) is carried over to the next period, becoming the endogenous prior
π(θt) in period t = τ + 1. On the one hand, this has the important consequence that in
the static model
I(θT , s) = V ar(θT |s), T = 1, 2, (71)
implying that mutual information is a monotonically decreasing function in σv. It is
easy to verify that this is true for mutual information on θt+1 in the dynamic model as
well, as
I(θt+1, st) = (1− ρ2)V ar(θt+1|t). (72)
On the other hand, it clearly does not hold for θt:
I(θt, st) = V ar(θt|t)− V ar(θt|t−1). (73)
In other words, the dynamic model has the property that mutual information on θt is
non-monotonic in σv. The following proposition and corollary summarize this insight,
together with its implications for the optimal precision choice.
Proposition 7. Tight priors dampen informativeness in the dynamic model
Mutual information on θt is non-monotonic in σv because the endogenous prior carries
over information from period t − 1 to period t. Let sh denote a high-precision signal,
while sl a low-precision one. If a precise signal in the previous period, sht−1, tightens
the prior in t sufficiently, then the reduction in uncertainty at time t due to the signal
pair {st, sht−1} is lower than for the pair {st, slt−1}.
Corollary 7.1. Information smoothing in the dynamic model
In the dynamic model, a lower degree of precision serves to keep priors from getting too
tight; the optimal precision choice involves the smoothing of information provision.
The non-monotonicity of I(θt, st) comes from the signal structure in Equation (49),
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which implies that in any given period t, the current signal st is not the first to provide
the PS with information about θt. If all signals have sufficiently high precision, then
by the time period t arrives, the PS has already learned enough about θt from st−1,
and will therefore find the current signal less informative than if it had acquired less
information in the past.
Figure 14 illustrates Proposition 7, plotting the reduction in uncertainty in θt+1 in
dashed blue against that in θt in solid blue, both as a function of σv for various (ρ, ψ)
pairs, and with values on the left y-axis. The red line corresponds to the (1−β)-weighted
central bank loss, V, with values on the right y-axis. Just like Equation (72) suggests,
I(θt+1, st) indeed decreases monotonically in σv. I(θt, st), instead, is hump-shaped in
the majority of cases, assuming a maximum at a precision level I will denote by σIv :
σIv := arg max I(θt, st). (74)
The CB’s loss function V, shown in red on Figure 14, lends support to Corollary
7.1. The interior solutions for σv are visible as the interior minima of V. Whenever
the optimal precision is interior, σ∗v is in the neighborhood of σ
I





away from zero. In other words, the CB finds it optimal not to shrink the signal
noise to zero because this allows it to push I(θt, st) up. This lets the CB ensure that
in any period t, the current signal contributes to the PS’ information set and thus
exerts persuasion. In other words, the CB wants the PS to receive approximately equal
amounts of information in each period, a phenomenon I refer to as the smoothing of
information provision.
Thus it is the non-monotonicity of mutual information on θt that is behind the
interior solutions in σv in the dynamic model. Intuitively, this non-monotonicity cap-
tures the effect of the tightness of the PS’ priors on the CB’s communication problem.
Clearly, there are parameter configurations for which it is optimal to communicate in-
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Figure 14: Dynamic loss V and mutual information I(θT , st) as a function of σv for various (ρ, ψ) pairs,
T = t, t+ 1
The figure plots the (1− β)-weighted expected loss function of the CB, V, in the dynamic model in red on the right
axis, against mutual information on θt+1 and on θt in blue dashed and blue solid on the left axis. Note: for my
purposes, I define mutual information on θT as I(θT , st) := π(θT )−p(θT , st), so that it is the level difference between
prior and posterior variances.
finitely precisely. But for many (ρ, ψ) pairs, precise communication in period t−1 would
tighten the PS’ prior in period t too much, rendering the PS less responsive to the CB’s
period t signal. Therefore the key driver of the difference between static and dynamic
optimal precision is the varying tightness of the prior.
But it is not quite the only driver. If it were, then the CB would find it optimal to
set σ∗v = σ
I
v for all (ρ, ψ) pairs. This is however clearly not the case, as one can see if one
compares the maxima of I(θt, st) with the minima of the loss in the figure: sometimes
σ∗v > σ
I








v = 0. So to find
out what other forces are behind the optimal precision choice, let us now investigate
how σ∗v depends on first ρ and then ψ.
Fixing ψ and increasing ρ means that for a fixed column, one moves down through
the rows of Figure 14. When ρ  0, σ∗v = ∞. This tells us that when preference
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misalignment is strong, the CB wishes to minimize both I(θt+1, st) and I(θt, st), because
in this case, any information in the signal will be misused by the PS in the sense that
its investment choice will be of opposite sign to θt. When alignment rises above the
interiority threshold, ρi(ψ), for example when ρ rises from -0.9 to 0 in the ψ = 1 column
of Figure 14, the CB seeks to maximize I(θt, st), i.e. to provide as much information
about θt as possible. This requires both σv < ∞ and σv > 0 because of the non-
monotonicity of I(θt, st). At the same time, depending on the extent of alignment,
the CB sometimes sees it necessary to also minimize the information it reveals about





alignment becomes near perfect, for instance in the last row of the figure, where ρ = 0.9,
the CB no longer simply maximizes I(θt, st) because providing information about θt+1
pushes the PS in the same direction as information about θt. Now instead it is optimal
to maximize I(θt, st) + I(θt+1, st), the sum of information provision about both states.
This pushes σ∗v below σ
I
v toward zero.
Let us now hold alignment fixed and investigate how targetedness affects the optimal
precision choice. For a fixed ρ, increase ψ by moving right along on any row of Figure
14. Except for the first row, where ρ  0 and thus σ∗v = ∞ ∀ψ, a higher ψ leads to a
strictly lower σ∗v . For example, in the middle row of the figure, where ρ = 0, σ
∗
v = ∞
when ψ = 0.2. As ψ increases to 1, σ∗v takes on an interior value around 1.4. Finally,
when ψ rises to 1.8, σ∗v drops to zero. Intuitively, what is happening here is that the CB
renders those signals precise that target its favored state strongly. What the example
of the middle row of Figure 14 also makes clear is the effect of ψ on the interiority
threshold ρi(ψ). For the same alignment, ψ = 0.2 < 1 leads to σ∗v =∞, while a higher
ψ, ψ = 1, results in an interior solution. Thus, as foreshadowed by Figure 13, the
interiority threshold ρi(ψ) is decreasing in ψ.
There is something special about ψ > 1, however. The case when the CB’s signal
is targeted towards θt, the CB’s preferred state, leads to different behavior of optimal
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precision than ψ ≤ 1. As the right panel of Figure 13 recalls, not only does this involve
the only bang-bang σ∗v-behavior in the dynamic model, so that σ
∗
v switches from ∞ to
0 once ρ exceeds the bang-bang threshold ρb(ψ), but σ∗v rises above 0 again for ρ high
enough. We can read off why this happens from the right column of Figure 14. The
cases of ρ = −0.9 or 0 are the only instances on the figure where I(θt, st) > I(θt+1, st).
This is because for a combination of sufficiently low alignment and sufficiently high
θt-targetedness, the CB’s signal is very informative about θt, but this informativeness
does not carry over to θt+1. In this case, the CB can max out informativeness about θt
by setting σ∗v = 0. If alignment is too low, however, as in the top right panel of Figure
14, where ρ = −0.9, the informativeness of the signal about θt is misused by the PS to
deduce clues about θt+1, and thus the CB can do no better than to shut off precision
and set σ∗v =∞. If alignment is instead too high, then it is no longer the case that the
signal is more informative about θt than about θt+1, and therefore adding a little noise
is optimal to push I(θt, st) up and I(θt+1, st) down a bit.
The optimal precision choice of the CB is thus a much more complicated object
in the dynamic model than in the static one. It is mainly driven by the tightness
of the private sector’s prior, which, in the dynamic world, is endogenous to central
bank communication. A too tight prior is a constraint to the CB as it renders current
communication ineffective. Therefore adding noise to the signal serves the function of
loosening up the prior and distributing the information provided to the PS evenly across
time.
2.4.3 Approximating the indirect utility function of the central bank
As we have seen, different levels of alignment and targetedness modulate the ways
in which the PS’ prior becomes a constraint to the CB. That this is a complicated
interaction can be grasped from Figure 15, which plots the optimal precision σ∗v as a
function of ρ and ψ. Note that Figure 13 is a cross-section of Figure 15 for three values
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of ψ, and that Figure 15, therefore, gives a more complete picture of the dependence
of σ∗v on ρ and ψ. Figure 15 suggests that on average, (ρ, ψ) pairs in which both ρ
and ψ are high involve higher optimal precision than pairs with low ρ and ψ. It also
shows that the full precision region (σ∗v = 0) is concentrated in the neighborhood of low
autocorrelation (ρ ≈ 0) and high targetedness toward θt (ψ  1).
Lastly, the surprising interiority region (0 < σ∗v < ∞) in the area with high θt-
targetedness and high alignment (ρ  0) is also clearly visible. To summarize these
insights as a simple behavioral rule, I now propose an indirect utility function to qual-
itatively capture the interplay between alignment, targetedness and the tightness of
priors in the CB’s optimal precision choice.
Proposition 8. Indirect utility of the optimal precision choice














where Iρ≥ρi(ψ) is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if ρ ≥ ρi(ψ) and zero
otherwise, ρi(ψ) is the interiority threshold, and w(ρ, ψ) ∈ [0, 1] is a weight function,
increasing in ψ and with w(1, ψ) = 1.
One can think of Proposition 8 as an algorithm specifying how a central banker
should decide how clearly to communicate with the public. In the first step, the CB
checks whether, given ψ, ρ exceeds the interiority threshold ρi(ψ). If not, Iρ≥ρi(ψ) =
0, and the second term of Equation (75) applies. This says that since for the given
targetedness, alignment is not high enough, informative signals would be misused by
the PS, and the CB had better give up on precise communication. It is thus optimal to




Figure 15: Optimal precision σ∗v as a function of ρ and ψ
If instead ρ > ρi(ψ), then Iρ≥ρi(ψ) = 1, and the first term of Equation (75) becomes
relevant. Since alignment is sufficiently high, the optimal thing to do is to maximize a
weighted average of informativeness about θt and θt+1. The second step of the decision
algorithm is to decide on those weights. Let us start with a limiting case: ψ = 2, ρ = 1,
the closest tip of Figure 15. Since w(1, ψ) = 1 by definition, the first term of Equation
(75) simply equals I(θt+1, st). What this is saying is that in the limit that the two
states are perfectly correlated, the CB can simply maximize informativeness about
θt+1, the PS’ preferred state, because the two states coincide anyway. Since I(θt+1, st)
is monotonically decreasing in σv, it is always maximized at σv = 0.
But when ρ is even marginally below 1, the weight w(ρ, ψ) drops marginally below
1 also. Thus the weight on I(θt, st) in the maximization problem (75), 1 − w(ρ, ψ),
exceeds zero, implying that as long as there is even a tiny misalignment between the
two states, the CB has an incentive to push I(θt, st) up, i.e. to loosen the PS’ prior
beliefs. This is the crucial wedge that explains the interior solutions σ∗v > 0 even when
both alignment and θt-targetedness are high, and this is why the σ
∗
v-function in the
high-ρ, high-ψ region of Figure 15 is concave.
The indirect utility function of Proposition 8 thus summarizes how autocorrelation
and targetedness affect the CB’s precision choice. But the key determinant of that choice
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is the decision whether to provide information about θt or θt+1, and, consequently, how
much loosening of the PS’ prior is necessary. In the static model, where the CB cannot
influence the prior, there is no possibility to temporally smooth information provided
to the PS. In the dynamic model, instead, the (ρ, ψ) pairs determine both how much
smoothing is desirable and how much is feasible. Therefore, the optimal precision choice
in a dynamic world is ultimately a problem of finding the right tightness of the private
sector’s prior.
2.5 Conclusion
Central bank communication is a dynamic problem: in a world where economic funda-
mentals evolve over time and the monetary authority communicates repeatedly, central
bankers have to provide information about both the present and the future. This paper
is the first to investigate the implications of dynamics for central bank communication.
In particular, I explore how strongly monetary policy should target current versus fu-
ture fundamentals in its communication and how much noise it should introduce into
its messages over time.
Analyzing two models identical up to the interpretation of the correlation between
two states allows me to isolate the effect of temporal dependence between the states on
the communication problem. It turns out that the fact that the private sector’s prior
beliefs become endogenous in the dynamic model drives a wedge between the static
and dynamic communication policies. Both the optimal response of the private sector’s
beliefs to the prior as well as the tightness of the prior dampen the persuasiveness of
the central bank’s signal. This has implications both for optimal targetedness and for
optimal precision.
Optimal targetedness in the two models differs due to the dampening channel of
endogenous priors mattering for current beliefs. In particular, the dynamic model in-
volves a higher weight on the central bank’s preferred state in the signal than the static
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model for any correlation. For negative or positive but low correlation, this comes
about because the private sector updates its priors too little, while for positive and high
correlation, because it updates its priors too much.
Optimal precision is always weakly lower in the dynamic model than in the static
one. This is driven by the central bank’s desire to loosen the private sector’s priors,
which, if too tight, render the central bank’s signal less persuasive. Adding noise to the
signal flattens the information profile of the private sector in the sense that it does not
receive too much information too early. The optimal precision choice thus involves the
smoothing of information provision.
The dynamic communication policy studied in this paper has natural applications
either to the everyday of the subset of the public that follows central bank announce-
ments closely, or to unusual circumstances where the entire private sector pays a lot of
attention to central bank announcements. An example for the former are stock-market
participants. Since such individuals seek to maximize returns on investment, they ex-
pand vast amounts of resources at any given time to correctly infer the future stance
of the economy from clues from the central bank. The analysis in this paper provides
conditions for when the central bank should provide such investors with precise infor-
mation, and when it is preferable to communicate in noisy “Fedspeak” that leaves them
some residual uncertainty around the current and future economic outlook.
Times of crisis, on the other hand, are an example for when the general public
listens closely to messages from central bankers. In such scenarios, current and future
fundamentals are often misaligned, since even at the depth of the crisis, when the
current output gap is negative, the future output gap is likely to be positive. For
instance, as the US economy recovers from the Covid-19 induced recession, should
the Federal Reserve attribute more weight to the current, negative output gap in its
communication, or should it instead signal that good times are ahead? The present
model suggests that as long as the Fed’s mandate pertains to stabilizing the current
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output gap, its communication should focus more heavily on that, and this conclusion
is stronger than it would be in a world where the private sector’s beliefs are detached
from priors.
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3 ICT and Future Productivity:
Evidence and Theory of a General-Purpose Technol-
ogy
3.1 Introduction
Although there is large consensus on the importance of productivity as a driver of
economic performance, there is less agreement on the underlying sources of productivity
growth. For several years, much of the business-cycle literature decided to avoid such
questions by proxying movements in productivity by exogenous shocks.21 However,
the robust empirical evidence of the slowdown in productivity right before the Great
Recession has led recent literature to take a step back and devote more attention to the
drivers of medium-term productivity growth.22
Along with Comin and Gertler (2006), theoretical contributions rationalize endoge-
nous productivity dynamics by incorporating features of endogenous growth models
in standard models of business cycles. Following Romer (1990), most of these papers
augment final-good production functions with an expanding composite of intermediate
goods invented by the Research & Development (R&D) sector in order to allow for an
endogenous rate of adoption of new technologies.23 Guided by the prediction of such
theoretical work that R&D developments matter for growth, other papers attempt to
provide empirical evidence of a slowdown in the productivity of the R&D sector. Specif-
ically, they show that although research effort keeps rising, the rate of new ideas and
discoveries is slowing down.24
21Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long Jr and Plosser (1983) are among the first papers which consider
productivity shocks in general equilibrium models.
22See Cette et al. (2016) and Byrne et al. (2016) among others.
23Bianchi et al. (2014), Anzoategui et al. (2016), Moran and Queralto (2017) and Guerron and Jinnai
(2015) use similar techniques to endogenize growth. Bianchi et al. (2014) augment a DSGE model using
a quality ladders model in the vein of Grossman and Helpman (1991). Anzoategui et al. (2016), Moran
and Queralto (2017) and Guerron and Jinnai (2015), similarly to Comin and Gertler (2006), use a model of
expanding variety à la Romer (1990).
24Jones (2009) and Bloom et al. (2017) are two contributions that highlight these facts.
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Motivated by this wave of research, this paper follows a different path and argues
that Information and Communication Technology (hereafter ICT) plays an important
role in driving medium-term productivity in sectors that are ICT users. Our contribu-
tion is twofold. First, we provide robust empirical evidence to show that current rises
in ICT investment explain significant and persistent increases in future Total Factor
Productivity (hereafter TFP). Second, we analyze a standard theoretical framework in
order to both rationalize our empirical results and to draw conclusions concerning the
nature of the ICT contribution to future productivity.
In the empirical section, we identify technological shocks specific to the ICT sector
in a Structural VAR context.25 Our multivariate system includes three key variables:
TFP, ICT investment (hereafter ICTI), and relative prices (hereafter RP). ICTI is
defined as the total expenditure in equipment and computer software meant to be used
in production for more than a year. Thus, an increase in ICTI is ICT capital deepening.
RP is the ratio between the price level of ICT durable goods and the price level in the
overall economy.
We use two main identifying restrictions in order to back out an ICT technology
shock: (i) it must be orthogonal to current total factor productivity and (ii) maximize
the impact effect on ICT investment. First of all, Restriction (i) is justified because the
share of the ICT sector accounts for a negligible part of the whole economy implying
that ICT shocks should have approximately zero impact effect on TFP. In other words,
although TFP embodies ICT technical changes by construction, we argue that the
direct impact effect of an ICT technological shock on TFP is so tiny to be approximately
neglected in our identifying restriction. Moreover, we follow results by Greenwood et al.
(1997) and Fisher (2006) (among others) to support Restriction (ii). In particular, a
vast body of literature on sector-specific technological changes argues that a sectoral
25An interesting paper related to our empirical work is Jafari Samimi and Roshan (2012). The authors
identify ICT shocks as a potential driver of the Iranian business cycle using a completely different identifi-
cation strategy and obtaining qualitatively different results.
85
technology shock should boost quantities in the underlying sector implying a current
large impact effect on ICT investment.26
In response to this shock, ICTI rises on impact and remains significant for several
quarters. RP persistently and significantly declines for more than two years, suggesting
that we are indeed identifying the correct sectoral shock. Our main result is that TFP,
restricted not to respond on impact, rises after few quarters and remains significant
and stable for at least 5 years, despite the tiny size of the ICT sector relative to the
economy. Finally, variance decomposition analysis suggests that ICT shocks explain a
remarkable size of economic fluctuations over the medium and long run. These shocks
drive about 40% and 33% of the overall GDP and TFP fluctuations over a 10-year
horizon, respectively.
Although our results are robust over different specifications, a critique to our em-
pirical strategy is reverse causality coming from news on future TFP. As suggested by
the news-shock literature, the positive reaction of ICTI on impact may be triggered by
signals related to future increases in TFP and not to contemporaneous ICT technolog-
ical improvements. In other words, our identification strategy may confound our shock
of interest with a news shock which contemporaneously enhances investment in ICT
capital goods. We address this issue by providing a series of alternative identification
strategies which we show deliver the same time series of ICT innovations as our initial
specification. The heart of these robustness checks is sequential identification of news
and ICT shocks: we first identify a news shock in the spirit of Barsky and Sims (2011),
and subsequently we identify our sectoral ICT shock using the previous identification
strategy. Encouragingly, controlling for signals regarding future movements in TFP
does not affect our results. We view this as strengthening the causality relation from
current ICT investment to future TFP.
26For theoretical reasons discussed in more detail in Section 3.2, we do not impose any restriction on RP
in our main specification; instead, we let the ICT shock maximize the impact response of ICTI. As pointed
out by both Greenwood et al. (2000) and Basu et al. (2010), letting the the direction of RP be the sole
identifying restriction does not properly capture technological changes between sectors. This is the main
reason why we do not impose the direction of RP as a direct identifying condition.
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In order to understand the economics behind our empirical results, we then analyze
a two-sector DSGE model which allows ICT to be the general-purpose technology (here-
after GPT) of the whole economy. There are two main justifications for interpreting
ICT as a GPT. On the one hand, there is a vast literature that makes a case for the
general-purpose nature of ICT capital.27 On the other hand, the tiny share of the ICT
sector both in overall investment and overall output makes our results of a strong and
persistent TFP increase after an ICT shock hard to interpret in absence of an additional
force such as an externality coming from the general-purpose property of ICT capital.
In our model, both sectoral production functions are fed with three inputs: (i) labor,
supplied by households, (ii) hard capital, produced by the final sector, and (iii) ICT
capital, produced by the ICT sector. As explained by both Basu et al. (2003) and Basu
and Fernald (2007), a GPT should be able to enhance accelerations in productivity in
sectors that are users of the underlying technology. We then interpret ICT as the GPT
of the last 30 years of the U.S. economy assuming that exogenous technological changes
in the ICT sector are able to affect economy-wide productivity above the direct effect
coming from the technology increase itself.28 In particular, when an ICT technology
shock arrives, both sectors accumulate ICT capital since it is easier to produce and
cheaper to buy. This ICT capital deepening consequently enhances the productivity of
both sectors by means of a spillover coming from the accumulated ICT capital stock.
What is the intuition behind our assumption of ICT as a GPT showing up in the
economy as a spillover? To better understand this externality assumption, consider the
special nature of ICT capital. Since the purpose of ICT capital is to improve information
acquisition and sharing, the quality and speed of communication fundamentally depends
on the diffusion of these technologies among agents. As a simple example, owning a
27See for example Oliner and Sichel (2000) and Stiroh (2002) amongst others.
28A clarification is in place here. In a two-sector model, total factor productivity is a convolution of the
two exogenous productivities. Thus sectoral productivity changes trivially show up in TFP as a direct effect.
Our assumption of ICT capital being a GPT means that overall productivity responds much more to an
ICT-sector-specific technology shock than warranted by this shock directly. We address this question in
detail in the main text in Section 3.2.
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mobile phone enables one to contact another person instantaneously only if the other
person is also endowed with the same technology. As a result, the effectiveness of ICT
capital is intrinsically related to its own diffusion. This line of thought is what leads us
to augment the production function of each sector with a spillover effect capturing the
diffusion of ICT capital. Having a spillover arise from a state variable is also consistent
with both the GPT literature above and with our empirical results, since it also leads
to model dynamics in which the accumulation of ICT capital is a slow process and the
benefits of an ICT technology shock show up in the production functions of ICT-users
with lags.29
As a last step, we use both our empirical and theoretical results to estimate the key
parameters of the model via impulse-response matching to an ICT technology shock.
The key parameters are (i) the elasticity of productivity to ICT capital diffusion, namely
the parameter which governs the spillover effect, and (ii) the standard deviation and (iii)
persistence of ICT technology shocks. Results consistently obtain a positive spillover
effect of ICT capital deepening on TFP, confirming that within this class of theoretical
models, data supports the existence of spillovers from ICT capital. Thus, our theoretical
model suggests to interpret the responses obtained in the empirical section in light of
ICT as a general-purpose technology which enhances productivity of ICT capital users
through a spillover effect related to its own diffusion.
The paper is structured as follows. We present empirical results and main robustness
checks in Section 3.2. We then present and analyze the two-sector DSGE model in
Section 3.3. We estimate via impulse-response matching key parameters of the model
and assess its empirical reliability in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
29Notice that differently to Basu et al. (2003) and Basu and Fernald (2007), we interpret the general-
purpose nature of ICT in the spirit of an endogenous growth model.
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3.2 Empirics
In this section we present our main empirical results. Our attempt is to properly identify
technological shocks which are specific to the ICT sector in a Structural VAR context
and to analyze their impact on key macroeconomic variables.
3.2.1 Main Specification
We start by illustrating our main specification where we impose minimal discipline on
the model. In subsequent sections, we try vastly different empirical strategies. It turns
out that the set of results presented here are consistent with the different robustness
checks.

















where TFPt is the log-level of Fernald total factor productivity at time t, ICTIt is
the log-level of real information and communication technology investment at time t,30
GDPt is the log-level of real gross domestic product at time t, Ct is the log-level of real
consumption at time t, and RPt is the log-deviation of the ratio between prices of ICT
goods and services and the consumer price index (CPI).31 32 Our dataset is quarterly
30ICTIt is defined as the total expenditure at time t in equipment and computer software meant to be
used in production for more than a year.
31Except for RPt, which is not cointegrated with the remaining variables, we opt for estimating the VAR
in levels since this produces consistent estimates of the impulse responses and is robust to cointegration
of unknown forms. In particular, as suggested by Hamilton (1994), when there is uncertainty regarding
the nature of common trends, estimating the system in levels is considered the conservative approach. The
alternative approach is to estimate the system as a vector error correction model (VECM); our results remain
very similar also in this case.
32Using the PCE deflator instead of the CPI yields similar results.
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and covers the U.S. economy from 1989:Q1 to 2017:Q1.33 B(L) is a (5 × 5) matrix of
lag-operator functions of the same order. Following the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC), we choose one lag, which implies that we regress variables at time t with their
own lagged values at t − 1.34 Finally, it is a (5 × 1) vector of correlated innovations
where Σ = i′tit.
3.2.1.2 Empirical Strategy Our simplest identification strategy assumes that
an ICT technological shock (hereafter ICT shock) has (i) no impact effect on TFP
and (ii) maximal impact effect on ICTI. We justify these two assumptions with both
empirical and theoretical arguments. First of all, as data released in April, 2018 by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) shows, the real value added of the information
sector on real GDP is slightly below 5% for the underlying quarter.35 Thus, since the
ICT sector accounts for a negligible part of the whole economy, we think it is safe to
assume that an ICT shock is orthogonal to current TFP.
In addition, the theory of multi-sector models, as presented by Greenwood et al.
(1997), predicts that a productivity increase in one sector should lead to sectoral output
becoming cheaper. Thus, we expect that an ICT shock should enhance sector-specific
investment since ICT goods are less costly to produce and to buy. As a result, we expect
an ICT shock to have a maximal impact effect on ICTI.
Using a notation similar to Barsky and Sims (2011), we implement our identification
strategy as follows. Let yt be the (5 × 1) vector of observables of length T presented
33All data are from the BEA except for TFP, which is the series constructed by John Fernald, available
on his website.
34The Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQ) suggests to use two lags. Results remains consistent following this
second criterion.
35There are many ways to quantify the size of the ICT sector, both in terms of what share one considers
and how one defines the ICT sector. The number in the text refers to the value added share of the ICT
sector, defined as in Section 76. The statement that the ICT sector is tiny is however not sensitive to the
definition of the sector or to the choice of share. Even with broader definitions, one obtains numbers in the
range of 5%.
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above. The reduced-form VAR takes the following form,
yt = B(L)yt−1 + it
Assume now that there exists a linear combination that maps innovations it to structural
shocks st,
A0st = it
which implies the structural-form VAR
A−10 yt = C(L)yt−1 + st
where C(L) = A−10 B(L) and st = A
−1
0 it. The impact matrix A0 must be such that
Σ = A0A
′
0. Notice that for any arbitrary orthogonalization Ã0 such that Σ = Ã0Ã
′
0,
impact matrix A0 can be back out by the appropriate orthonormal matrix D (DD
′ = I)
where A0 = Ã0D.
Thus, the matrix of impact responses to all shocks is:
Π(0) = Ã0D
and is specifically formed by the following elements, denoting the responses of variable




where ek is a selector column vector of the same dimension as Ã0 with 1 in the kth
element and zero elsewhere. In particular, notice that ej is selecting a specific column
of D. Let this column be denoted by γj . Using this notation, Ã0γj is the vector of
impact responses of all the variable to shock j.
Observe from System 76 that TFPt is ordered first and ICTIt second. Our identi-
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1Ã0γj = 0, and (78)
γ′jγj = 1 (79)
where j represents the arbitrary position of the ICT shock. Then, in order to ensure
that this identification belongs to the space of possible orthogonalizations of Σ, the
problem is formulated in terms of choosing γj conditional on any orthogonalization, Ã0.
Objective function 77 imposes that an ICT shock has a maximal impact effect on ICT
investment. Constraint 78 orthogonalizes current TFP to ICT shocks and Constraint
79 satisfies the condition that γj is derived from an orthogonal matrix D.
3.2.1.3 Main Set of Results Figure 16 shows the estimated impulse responses
of System 76 to the identified ICT shock. The shaded gray areas are the 90% and
95% confidence bands from the bias-corrected bootstrap procedure of Kilian (1998)
using 2000 simulations. Our main interest, panel (a) of the figure, shows the impulse
response of TFP to an ICT shock. TFP takes around 4 quarters before displaying a
positive and significant effect and reaches its peak of 1.2% after 24 quarters. Real ICT
investment has a large and positive impact response of almost 2% that gets even larger
after a quarter. Then, it slowly starts to decay, remaining significant for more than 40
quarters. Real GDP has a significant impact response of 0.3% and reaches its peak of
almost 0.5% approximately at the same time as TFP. Similarly, real consumption has
an impact effect of 0.2% with a delayed peak of 0.5%. Finally, panel (e) depicts that
response of relative prices. Despite imposing no restriction here, the response of RP is
broadly in line with multi-sector theory. Relative prices drop significantly on impact by
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0.4% and remain persistently below their own steady state value for almost 9 years.





The red solid lines are the estimated impulse responses to our ICT shock. The shaded dark gray area and
the shaded light gray area are the 90% and 95% confidence intervals, respectively, from 2000 bias-corrected
bootstrap replications of the reduced-form VAR. The horizontal axes refer to forecast horizon and the units
of the vertical axes are percentage deviations.
In addition, Table 4 presents forecast error variance decompositions for the ICT
shock on each variable. The table shows decompositions on impact, and at a one-
, two-, four-, six-, and ten-year horizon. These results are very interesting in their
own right, as they hint that the ICT sector may have a particular role for the overall
productivity of the economy. In line with the impulse responses, ICT shocks, which are
orthogonal to current productivity, explain nothing of current TFP fluctuations. At a
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ten-year horizon, however, this fraction is over a third! This crucial result is a strong
sign that the ICT sector matters for overall productivity over and beyond the direct
contribution of its sectoral productivity (which, as we have seen, is marginal). At the
same time, ICT shocks drive almost the whole variation in ICT investment on impact,
with a slow decay over time to below 50% after 10 years. Interestingly, both output
and consumption have a remarkable reaction on impact: 26% and 19%, respectively.
Moreover, this effect tends to increase, reaching 40% in both cases at the maximal
horizon. Finally, ICT shocks only account for a small fraction of movements in relative
prices. The fraction of fluctuations explained on impact is only 6% with a peak of 14%
between four and six years. Overall, these variance decompositions all seem to suggest
that the ICT shock leads to complex forms of reallocation and accumulation that take
place over the medium run in the economy and that seem to result in productivity
growth. Our structural model of Section 3.3 provides a theoretical framework to think
about these dynamics and to give them an economic interpretation.
Table 4: Variance decomposition
h = 1 h = 4 h = 8 h = 16 h = 24 h = 40
TFP 0 0.0023 0.0194 0.1088 0.2273 0.3382
ICT Investment 0.9997 0.9038 0.7964 0.6320 0.5310 0.4371
Real GDP 0.2620 0.3061 0.3486 0.3936 0.4046 0.3881
Real Consumption 0.1952 0.2638 0.3219 0.3931 0.4188 0.4064
Relative Prices 0.0618 0.0967 0.1276 0.1511 0.1516 0.1467
The letter h denotes the forecast horizon. The numbers refer to the fraction of the forecast error variance
of each variable at various forecast horizons to the identified ICT shock
3.2.2 Controlling for News Shocks
In this section, we present a set of robustness checks aimed to show that our previous
results are not driven by future signals regarding exogenous productivity. The main
concern against the specification of 3.2.1 is reverse causality coming from the presence
of news about future TFP that is not accounted for. Indeed, the news-shock literature
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warns that the positive reaction of ICTI on impact may be triggered by signals related
to future increases in productivity and not to a contemporaneous ICT shock. In other
words, our identification strategy may confound our shock of interest with a news shock
which contemporaneously enhances investment in ICT capital goods. We address this
issue by providing two main alternative identification strategies which we show deliver
the same time series of ICT shocks as our initial specification.
As a first-pass test, we check if our results are robust once we remove all the forward-
looking variables whose fluctuations may be unrelated to sector-specific technological
changes: consumption and output. Technically speaking, consumption and output
may Granger-cause movements in future TFP for reasons which are orthogonal to ICT
shocks. For example, the forward-looking nature of consumption may provide the VAR
with information regarding future changes in TFP not related to an ICT shock, which
our identification strategy is not able to filter out.
Our second and main robustness test is running a VAR in which we identify both
ICT shocks and news shocks. In particular, we apply a sequential identification where
we first identify a news shock in the spirit of Barsky and Sims (2011), and subsequently
we identify our sectoral ICT shock using our original identification strategy. This second
strategy has the specific purpose of directly filtering out all the current movements in
forward-looking variables related to future fluctuations of TFP which are not related to
current ICT shocks, as such fluctuations are all captured by the identified news shock.
As is illustrated in the rest of this section, both our robustness checks recover the
same series for structural ICT shocks as our initial specification, and thus leave our
results unaffected. We therefore conclude that controlling for signals regarding future
movements in productivity does not affect our identified ICT shocks, and thus confirm
the causal relation between current ICT investment and future TFP.
3.2.2.1 Removing Forward-Looking Variables We now show our first-pass
test in detail. As discussed by Sims (2012), Forni and Gambetti (2014) and Barsky et al.
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(2015), the presence of forward-looking variables in the VAR is a necessary condition
to correctly identify a news shock. In particular, since the univariate TFP process
cannot predict its own future values,36 a news shock can only be identified if there are
variables that Granger-cause TFP inside the VAR. For example, Beaudry and Portier
(2006) use current movements in stock prices to predict future productivity, but also
contemporary fluctuations in consumption, hours, investment, may implicitly reflect
information regarding future technical change.
Thus, as a simple test, we redo the exercise described in Section 3.2.1, omitting the
two forward-looking macroeconomic variables not directly related with the ICT sector:
consumption and output.37 If we are actually confounding news shocks with our ICT
shock series then we would expect to see some differences in this second estimate,
because absent the two forward-looking variables, our VAR is deprived of a source of
information useful to recover a news shock and should thus no longer be able to capture
it appropriately.











where TFPt, ICTIt, and RPt are defined and treated as in System 76. As before, the
dataset is quarterly and covers the U.S. economy from 1989:Q1 to 2017:Q1. Finally,
analogously to before, we follow the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to choose one
lag. Using the same identification strategy presented in 3.2.1.2, we recover a series of
ICT shocks. The newly recovered series is correlated at 95% with the one estimated in
the five-dimensional system, indicating that our main specification is not contaminated
36It is well-accepted that TFP growth can be approximated as a white noise process.
37Note that output implicitly reflects the behavior of hours and investment once we control for consump-
tion.
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by news. Figure 26 in Appendix C.1 shows the ICT shock series for both the three-
dimensional system and the five-dimensional one. In line with the very high correlation
coefficient, the two series overlap perfectly, suggesting that both procedures recover the
same structural shock series. Thus, our first-pass test indicates that our initial result is
not driven by the forward-looking power of consumption and output on TFP.
However, although this result is encouraging, the first-pass test has weak power
because the jump of ICTI on impact may itself be triggered by exogenous signals on
future TFP. In this case, ICTI would be itself the source to Granger-cause TFP and
our ICT shock would be upward biased by news. To address this deeper concern, we
proceed to employ a more complicated strategy aimed at directly capturing and filtering
out news.
3.2.2.2 Sequential Identification Strategy We now turn to an alternative
procedure to rule out the presence of news from our recovered ICT shock. In this second
test we run a VAR where we identify both ICT shocks and news shocks. In contrast to
our first-pass test, this approach aims to directly identify and filter out future signals
unrelated to current ICT shocks.
We apply a sequential identification which involves first identifying a news shock in
the spirit of Barsky and Sims (2011), and subsequently identifying the ICT shock using
our original strategy. Specifically, in the first step the news shock is identified as the
shock orthogonal to current TFP that best explains its future movements. Then, as a
second step, the ICT shock is identified as the shock orthogonal to current TFP that
maximizes the impact effect on ICT investment.
However, in order to correctly employ this procedure, we need to take care of a
second issue. As Barsky and Sims (2011) warns,
A general objection to our emprical approach would be that a number of
structural shocks, which are not really news in the sense defined in the lit-
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erature, might affect a measure of TFP in the future without impacting
it immediately. Among these shocks might be research and development
shocks, investment specific shocks, and reallocative shocks. Our identifica-
tion (and any other existing VAR identifications) would obviously confound
any true news shock with these shocks.
Barsky and Sims (2011),
p. 278.
In other words, by naively employing the procedure presented above, any ICT shock
would be interpreted as a news shock since it is orthogonal to current TFP and explains
its future movements. Put plainly, to get the identification of the two shocks right, we
need to add a restriction that is able to distinguish between them.
Thus, to avoid confounding ICT shocks with news shocks, we need to augment the
first step with an extra restriction. The restriction we will use here is derived from a
two-sector structural model in the tradition of Greenwood et al. (1997).38 Here, we
refrain from presenting the model in its entirety; the reader is referred to Section 3.3.
Instead, Proposition 9 presents the key property of the model that gives rise to our
identification assumption.
Proposition 9. In a two-sector economy, if both production functions display identical
input shares, then any economy-wide productivity shocks do not affect relative prices
between the two sectors.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Proposition 9 implies that an anticipated future sector-neutral technological change
(the so-called news shock) never affects relative prices between sectors. Obviously, this
statement is correct under the extreme assumptions that (i) the shock is expected to have
38While our model belongs to the class of models along the lines of Greenwood et al. (1997), our exposition
is closer to that of Oulton (2007). We discuss this choice in detail in Section 3.3.
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the same impact on the two sectors and (ii) production functions have identical input
shares. If those assumptions hold in the data, then the correct additional restriction
would be to restrict the impulse response of relative prices to a news shock to hard zero
at all horizons. However, this restriction would obviously penalize the identification
of news shocks since it is unlikely that assumptions (i) and (ii) perfectly hold in the
data. We therefore opt for a more moderate strategy where we impose that the impulse
response of relative prices to news should be zero on some specific horizons rather than
at all horizons. While results are robust to different horizon restrictions, our favorite
specification is the one which sets relative prices to have zero response in the first three
periods.
Data Motivated by Section 3.2.2.1, we augment our initial VAR system with stock
prices in order to provide an additional forward-looking variable to the system. Thus,



















where TFPt, ICTIt, GDPt, Ct, and RPt are defined and treated identically to System
76. SPt represents the log-transformation of Standard & Poor’s 500 stock price index.
As before, the dataset is quarterly and covers the U.S. economy from 1989:Q1 to 2017:Q1
and following the BIC and HQ criteria we choose one lag.
Empirical Strategy Using the notation of Section 3.2.1.2, assume for simplicity
that B(L) = B allows for only one lag. Define the impulse response of variable i to the
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Given this and recalling that TFP is ordered first, ICTI second and RP sixth, the
identification strategy can be summarized as follows,
























where the first constraint represents the zero-impact restriction of news on TFP. The
second constraint is the restriction derived from Proposition 9 to have the response of
relative prices to news relatively small.40 Finally, the last constraint imposes that γnews
should be a column derived from the orthogonal matrix D.
39We also suppress the constant to simplify the notation. Of course, our identification strategy can be
applied for B(L) allowing for more than one lag and with the constant.
40Our identification strategy is robust to different restrictions to relative prices. Results hold if we set the
zero restriction on other horizons.
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Step 2 - Identification of γICT
max
γICT




Π1,ICT (0) = 0,
γnewsγ
′
ICT = 0, and γICT γ
′
ICT = 1.
where the first constraint represents the zero-impact restriction of ICT on TFP and
the last constraint imposes that both γnews and γICT should be two different columns
derived from the orthogonal matrix D.
Results Figures 17 and 18 show estimated impulse responses to both news and ICT
shocks. Figure 17 focuses on the responses of TFP, stock prices, and ICT investment,
while Figure 18 shows the responses of GDP, consumption and relative prices. The
shaded gray areas are the 90% and 95% confidence bands from the bias-corrected boot-
strap procedure of Kilian (1998) using 2000 simulations.
A first comforting indication is that the responses to an ICT shock are almost
identical to the ones from our main identification of Section 3.2.1. After few lags, TFP
displays a positive and significant response and reaches its peak of 1.2% after 6 years.
Interestingly, stock prices jump on impact and the effect remains significant over the
medium run. Real ICT investment has a large and positive impact response and slowly
starts to decay, remaining significant for a long period of time. Both real GDP and real
consumption have a significant impact response and reach their peak approximately
after 6 years. The response of relative prices is negative and persistent as we have
previously discussed. Finally, the ICT shocks explains 27% of TFP fluctuations over a
10-year horizon. Also this result is completely in line with the previous results presented
in Table 4.
In addition, we show the impulse responses to a news shock to confirm that our
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Figure 17: Empirical impulse responses of TFP, Real Stock Prices, and Real ICT Investment to a news




The red solid lines are the estimated impulse responses to our ICT shock. The shaded dark gray area and
the shaded light gray area are the 90% and 95% confidence intervals, respectively, from 2000 bias-corrected
bootstrap replications of the reduced-form VAR. The horizontal axes refer to forecast horizon and the units
of the vertical axes are percentage deviations.
identification strategy is picking up news shocks correctly (left panel of the same figures).
As the figures depict, constraining the response of relative prices to news does not
qualitatively affect the behavior of news shocks; our identified news shock generates
responses broadly in line with those found by the news shock literature. In particular,
in line with Barsky and Sims (2011), it takes more that 2 years after the news shock for
TFP to display a positive, significant and strongly persistent effect. Stock prices have a
strong forecasting power and show a 4% impact effect which is persistent and significant
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Figure 18: Empirical impulse responses of Real GDP, Real Consumption, and Relative Prices to a news




The red solid lines are the estimated impulse responses to our ICT shock. The shaded dark gray area and
the shaded light gray area are the 90% and 95% confidence intervals, respectively, from 2000 bias-corrected
bootstrap replications of the reduced-form VAR. The horizontal axes refer to forecast horizon and the units
of the vertical axes are percentage deviations.
in the long run. Real ICT investment does not show a positive impact response but it
slowly starts to increase, getting significant after almost 2 years. As found by Barsky and
Sims (2011) in their main specification, real GDP has an insignificant impact effect, but
it rises fast with all the variables of the system. Moreover, as was expected, considering
the forward-looking nature of consumption, real consumption has a significant impact
response and reaches its peak once the TFP response becomes significant. Finally,
relative prices are initially constrained to have a zero response, and then show a small,
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negative and persistent deviation for at least five years which eventually dies out.
Figure 19: ICT shock series using two different empirical strategy.
Blue solid line represents shock series for the 5-dimension system 76 presented in 3.2.1. Red dotted line
represents shock series for the 6-dimensional system 81 presented in 3.2.2.2 where we employ a 2-step
identification strategy in order to control for news shocks.
Thus, not only are the responses to the ICT shock in line with those of our main
specification, but the identified news shock also seems to be capturing the right thing:
anticipated future technology changes. Having thus correctly filtered out news compo-
nents from our ICT shock, we now check how this newly recovered ICT shock series
compares to the series backed out by our main specification of Section 3.2.1.2. It turns
out that the correlation between the two shock series is 94%! Figure 19 portrays the
two ICT shock series. Again, the two recovered shocks are nearly identical, visually
reinforcing the very high correlation between them. Thus we can confidently state that




In the previous section, we have documented results regarding the relation of current
ICT investment and future productivity. Clearly, to rationalize the empirical responses
of aggregate macroeconomic variables to ICT shocks, we need a two-sector approach
that distinguishes ICT goods from other output. In this section, we present a simple
two-sector model that rationalizes our structural VAR estimates. We also attempt to
give an economic explanation for why a sector that accounts for a minuscule fraction
of the entire economy can give rise to medium-run responses of the magnitude we
documented in the previous section. As discussed below in more detail, we therefore
entertain the possibility that there are spillover effects coming from the stock of ICT
capital, and we confront the model with data to see if this explanation can be supported
empirically.
The model presented has several common features with the two-sector environment
of Greenwood et al. (1997) where one sector displays a faster technology than the other.
Three main assumptions distinguish our model from the one by Greenwood et al. (1997).
First of all, we focus specifically on the ICT capital sector, rather than equipment, as
the sector with faster technological improvement. This assumption will be necessary
if we want to fit the fact that relative prices between ICT investment and the overall
economy display a downward sloping trend. A second difference is that we consider two
production functions - one for each sector. As Oulton (2007) shows, the two formulations
are isomorphic, so our modeling choice has no implication for the resulting dynamics.
The reason we choose this approach is because it allows for definitions of GDP and
TFP in the model that are consistent with the way these variables are constructed in
the national income accounts.41 Finally, and crucially, we assume that the total ICT
capital stock has a positive spillover effect on the production function of both sectors.
What considerations lead us to augment both production functions with a spillover
41See also Whelan (2003).
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from ICT capital? First of all, the large, significant and persistent impulse responses of
aggregates like TFP, GDP and consumption to an ICT shock are hard to square with
the fact that the ICT sectoral share is less than 5%. This seems to suggest that there is
an additional, indirect effect coming from the ICT sector. A spillover is a natural way
of capturing such an indirect effect.
Secondly, a long line of literature going back to the early 1990s postulates that ICT
may be a general-purpose technology.42
Following the classical definition of Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1992), GPTs are
technologies that alter the process of economy-wide production, and thus affect the
productivity of the entire economy. This effect can come about through several chan-
nels. For example, investment in ICT goods may trigger accumulation of unobserved
complementary capital, as suggested by both Basu et al. (2003) and Basu and Fernald
(2007). Conversely, as advocated by Bresnahan et al. (2002), new ICT goods may
change managerial practices, thus affecting the production process. We take a broader
view in which we simply consider the diffusion of ICT goods to be the crucial element
of ICT’s general-purpose nature.
To understand what we mean by ICT diffusion, consider again the example of pur-
chasing a mobile phone from the Introduction. Clearly, an individual’s productivity
improves when acquiring a mobile phone, since she gains access to many functionalities
she couldn’t enjoy previously. However, the full productivity boost can only materialize
when others also use mobile phones. In fact, the more mobile phones there are in the
economy, the more productivity gain the individual experiences. Thus, the higher the
diffusion of ICT, the higher is its effect on productivity. This is the effect our spillover
assumption means to capture. The key exercise, then, of our theoretical model will be to
verify via impulse-response matching whether data support the existence of a spillover
42Oliner and Sichel (2000), Basu et al. (2003), and Basu and Fernald (2007) are some examples. In
addition, we are somehow related to the so-called Gordon-Mokyr debate where the two authors present
opposing views of future innovation. Among the series of published papers we highlight the followings two:
Gordon (2012) and Mokyr (2014).
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and thus the hypothesis of ICT as a GPT in the three decades following 1989 in the US
economy.
3.3.1 Household
The household in our economy is completely standard. The economy is inhabited by a















where ct and lt represent consumption and labor at time t.
3.3.2 Final-Good Producers
The production side of the final-good sector consists of a set [0, 1] of firms. In each
period, final-good firm j ∈ [0, 1] produces yct (j) using the services of labor lt, and two
types of capital: hard capital, kct and ICT capital, k
i
t. In addition, the production
function is augmented with (i) neutral productivity common across sectors, (ii) sector-
specific productivity, and (iii) a positive spillover effect related to the diffusion of ICT
capital in the whole economy. Production of final output of firm j is undertaken in
accordance with










, 0 < a, b < 1 (83)
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γ . ηt is the neutral technological compo-
nent which moves along the following deterministic trend
ηt = (Γ
η)teεt , (84)
εt = ρνεt−1 + νt (85)
where ρν ∈ (0, 1) and νt ∼ N(0, σ2ν) represents a neutral technology shock.43 θct is the




Then, γ represents the parameter that governs the size of the spillover effect of ICT
capital in the production function. Moreover, kct (j) is the part of hard capital k
c
t used
by firm j in oder to produce final-good output. Similarly, kit(j) and lt(j) are the parts
of ICT capital kit and labor lt used by firm j in oder to produce final-good output,
respectively.
Since all the final-good producers are identical, the following conditions hold,
∫ 1
0










lt(j)dj = l1,t, (89)
43In this case, a news shock would be a current signal regarding innovations to the future values of ηt.
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where kc1,t is the aggregate part of hard capital k
c
t devoted to the final-sector, i.e. sector
1. Moreover, ki1,t and l1,t are the aggregate parts of ICT capital k
i
t and labor lt devoted
to the final-good sector, respectively.








1−a−b, 0 < a, b < 1 (90)
and it can be used for two purposes: consumption, ct and investment in hard capital,
ict ,
yct = ct + i
c
t (91)
Notice that elements in the equation above are normalized such that both output and
investment are measured in units of consumption. Moreover, hard structures can be
produced from final output on a one-to-one basis. The stock of hard capital evolves
according to
kct+1 = (1− δc)kct + ict (92)
where 0 < δc < 1 represents the period depreciation of hard capital.
3.3.3 ICT-Good Sector
Production of ICT capital goods is symmetric to final-output production. It is populated
by a set [0, 1] of firms. Similarly, ICT-good firm q ∈ [0, 1] produces yit(q) with labor lt,
hard capital, kct and ICT capital, k
i











, 0 < a, b < 1 (93)
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γ . Analogously to the first sector, production function is aug-
mented by neutral productivity ηt, sector-specific productivity θ
i
t, and the spillover ef-
fect (kit)
γ . In particular, θit is the sector-specific technological component which moves
along the following deterministic trend
θit = (Γ
i)teζt , (94)
ζt = ριζt−1 + ιt (95)
where ρι ∈ (0, 1) and ιt ∼ N(0, σ2ι ) represents an ICT technology shock. In line with
the first sector, kct (q) is the part of hard capital k
c
t used by firm q in oder to produce
ICT goods. Similarly, kit(q) and lt(q) are the parts of ICT capital k
i
t and labor lt used
by firm q in oder to produce ICT goods, respectively.
Since we assume homogeneity across ICT producers, following conditions hold
∫ 1
0










lt(q)dq = l2,t, (98)
where kc2,t is the aggregate part of hard capital k
c
t devoted to the second sector. Similarly,
ki2,t and l2,t are the aggregate parts of ICT capital k
i
t and labor lt devoted to the ICT-
good sector, respectively.
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1−a−b, 0 < a, b < 1 (99)











Also here the elements in the equation above are normalized such that both output and
investment are measured in the same units. Moreover, ICT output is converted to ICT
goods on a one-to-one basis. The law of motion of ICT capital is described as follows,
kit+1 = (1− δi)kit + iit (101)
where 0 < δi < 1 represents the period depreciation of ICT capital.
3.3.4 Market Clearing across Sectors











lt = l1,t + l2,t. (104)
Taking as given Equations 83-104 and assuming that factor markets are perfective




















t + wtlt (105)
where pt represents the price of ICT capital expressed in consumption units. Since the
price of consumption is normalized to be 1, pt also represents the relative price between
final output and ICT output.
3.3.5 Competitive Equilibrium and Solution Method
Competitive equilibrium is represented by (i) Equations 82-104, (ii) the household’s first
order conditions with respect to consumption ct, labor lt, hard capital k
c
t , ICT capital










and lt(q). In order to simulate responses to (i) neutral technology shocks, νt and (ii)
ICT shocks, ιt we employ a standard first-order approximation of the log-transformation
of the system around the detrended (stationarized) steady state.44
3.4 Model Assessment
We now turn to describing the parameter values and testing the empirical performance
of the model. Following Christiano et al. (2005), we partition the model parameters into
two groups. We calibrate parameters of the first group using steady-state relations or
results from previous works. We estimate the second group by minimizing the distance
between the model-implied impulse responses and the empirical results presented in
Section 3.2.1. In particular, the second group focuses on parameters specifically related
to the effect of ICT investment on future TFP: (i) the standard deviation σι of the ICT
shock ζt, (ii) the persistence ρι of the ICT shock ζt and (iii) the size of the spillover
effect of ICT capital on productivity γ.
44The stationarized system as well as code to replicate our results are available on request.
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3.4.1 Parameterization
We calibrate the model at a quarterly frequency. We set the discount factor β to 0.97
1
4
to match the average yield of 3% of the 3-month Treasury bill using data from 1989:Q1
to 2017:Q1. We set the ICT share b equal to 0.0310 following Oulton (2012) and hard
capital share a equal to 0.3. Moreover, adapting Oulton (2012) accordingly to our
additional assumptions, we derive steady state growth rates of final-sector technology















where pt/pt−1 and ct/ct−1 are derived from the simple mean of their empirical related
values using quarterly data from 1989:Q1 to 2017:Q1. This implies Γc = 1.0034 and
Γi = 1.0160.4546 Finally, to avoid an over-identification problem we set the growth rate
of sector-neutral technology Γη equal to one.
In addition, we set the Frisch elasticity of labor supply χ to be equal to 1. More-
over, following Bureau fo Economic Analysis (BEA) depreciation estimates, we set the
quarterly depreciation rates for hard capital δc to be equal to 0.0206 in order to match
an annual depreciation rate of 0.08. Similarly, according to BEA depreciation estimates
(i) communication equipments and (ii) computer and electronic products depreciate at
an annual rate of 0.15 and 0.14 respectively. Thus, we set the quarterly depreciation
rates for ICT capital δi to be equal to 0.0398 in order to match the highest of the two
values.
45Notice that the value of γ is unknown at this step since it is going to be evaluated using impulse-
response matching. This implies that the solution for Γc, Γi, and γ should be a fixed point where given
γ∗ we obtain (Γi)∗ and (Γc)∗ solving 106. Given (Γi)∗ and (Γc)∗ we obtain γ∗ by minimizing the impulse-
response matching. At this step, however, we are simply solving the system assuming γ equal to zero, but
a more refined solution will be provided in future.
46Other different systems might be use in order to pin down the steady state growth rates of both sectors.
At this first stage, we opt for System 106 because both relative prices and aggregate consumption are well
observable variables in the data.
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3.4.2 Impulse-Response Matching
Now we estimate the model’s key parameters governing the effect of ICT investment
on future TFP by imposing theoretical impulse responses of an ICT shock (ζt) to be
as close as possible to the empirical ones. Using empirical impulse responses of TFP,
ICT investment, consumption, and relative prices, we estimate three parameters: the
variance of an ICT technology shock, σ2ι , the persistence of the same shock, ρι, and the





where Ψ(Ω) denotes the mapping from Ω to the theoretical impulse responses, and Ψ̂
denotes the empirical impulse responses of an ICT shock to TFP, ICTI, consumption,
and relative prices. Λ is a diagonal weighting matrix, which is the inverse of the variance
matrix of the empirical impulse responses. These elements serve as weights to impose
more precision on some estimates of the optimization problem. Finally, consistent with
our choice of horizons presented above, we use a horizon of 40 periods for each response.
Table 5: Estimated parameters
Symbol Economic Interpretation Estimated Value
σ2ι Variance of ICT technological shock 0.01
2
ρι Persistence of ICT technological shock 0.9
γ Size of spillover of ICT capital on TFP 0.5881
Parameters are estimated by imposing that the model’s impulse responses of an ICT shock are as close as
possible to the empirical ones. Theoretical estimates are impulse responses to an ICT-specific technological
shock, ζt which are functions of key parameters: σ
2
ι , ρι, and γ. Empirical impulse responses of an ICT
shock to TFP, ICTI, consumption, and relative prices are derived from Specification 76 using the empirical
strategy presented in Section 3.2.1.2. We use a horizon of 40 periods for each response.
Table 5 shows results of Problem 107. The estimate of the spillover effect of ICT
capital on TFP, γ, is 0.58, while estimates of variance and persistence of an ICT-
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specific technological shock σ2ι and ρι are 0.01 and 0.9 respectively.
47 These results
convey a number of interesting messages regarding the fit of our two-sector model. Most
importantly, the key question of our model was whether the presence of ICT shocks alone
can account for the empirical responses we observe in data, or whether ICT diffusion
plays a crucial role in this dynamics. This amounts to asking whether γ = 0 is supported
by the data. Clearly, our estimate of 0.58 rejects this hypothesis strongly. Thus, the
data favor an interpretation of our model in which there are considerable spillovers to
ICT capital. Accordingly, ICT shocks do not need to be extremely large in magnitude
to have sizable effects on TFP, GDP and consumption. This is indicated by the value
we obtain for σ2ι of 0.01. Confronted with data, the model is clearly telling a story in
which there are small (relative to the overall economy) but persistent (ρι = 0.9) ICT
shocks that lead considerable medium-run effect on TFP and consumption because of
large spillovers from ICT capital accumulation.
Using the estimated parameter values in Table 5, Figure 20 displays empirical im-
pulse responses along with theoretical ones. Our simple model is able to mimic em-
pirical movements in TFP, ICT investment, consumption, and relative prices. In both
the model and the data, a sector-specific technological shock ζt has a delayed positive
effect on TFP which tends to last over the medium and long run. Moreover, in both
cases, ICT investment has a large initial peak and then tends to remain persistently
positive over the 40-quarter horizon. In the model and the data, consumption responds
positively on impact, reaches its peak after 4 years and persistently remains positive.
Finally, model-generated and empirical impulse responses of relative prices have a large
and negative impact response which dies out in about 6 years.
47Estimated parameter values are strongly robust to various alternative specifications. Using different
empirical results, changing the initial calibration, the number of parameters matched or the methodology
do not qualitative change the estimated value of γ close to 0.6.
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Figure 20: Empirical VAR versus model responses to an ICT shock.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
The black solid lines show the empirical responses to an identified ICT shock in Specification 76. The
dotted red lines show the model’s responses to a shock to the ICT-specific technological component ζt. The
horizontal axes refer to forecast horizon and the units of the vertical axes are percentage deviations.
3.4.3 Interpretation of the Results
Although both the model and impulse-response matching exercise are simple and prelim-
inary, we believe that they are already able to rationalize the empirical results obtained
in Section 3.2 and thus convey the main message of this paper. Formally, the question
we tried to answer is why a contemporaneous technological shock specific to the ICT
sector is able to trigger increases in future total factor productivity even when it is too
small to affect TFP today. In other words, why is an ICT-investment shock able to
increase the productivity of ICT-good users with lags?
We interpret ICT capital as being the general-purpose technology of the U.S. econ-
omy over the last three decades. Specifically, when an ICT technology shock hits the
economy, both sectors invest more on ICT capital goods since they are now cheaper
to purchase and easier to produce. Now, in order to link current higher investment in
ICT goods to future TFP, we assume that the general-purpose nature of ICT goods
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manifests itself in the form of a spillover on both production functions which is not
internalized by the agents.48 Since the spillover comes from the overall stock of ICT
capital, we interpret it as the diffusion of ICT capital.
This assumption is legitimate from a mathematical standpoint for two main reasons.
First of all, the spillover enters the estimated Solow residual since, being an externality,
it is a non-renumerated input. Additionally, since the spillover arises from a state
variable, it leads to a dynamics where the benefits of an ICT technology shock show
up in the productivity of ICT-capital users with some lags because the accumulation
of ICT goods is a slow process. Thus, the spillover effect only comes into play only
gradually once enough ICT capital is being accumulated. The slow-moving nature of
the state variable capital also means that this effect tends to be persistent, which also
helps us match the empirical responses we see in the data.49
More importantly, there is clear economic intuition underlying our assumption of the
spillover. Since the purpose of ICT goods is to enhance communication, the quality and
speed of information acquisition and sharing is also determined by the overall diffusion
of ICT goods. As a simple example different from the one in the Introduction, assume
that in 1995 a scholar decides to purchase a computer with an Internet subscription
in order to speed up the acquisition of information. She is very satisfied with this
investment and does not regret the amount paid. However, at the same time, a former
colleague who is now working in a different university decides to buy a computer with an
Internet subscription as well. Once she learns of this development, the initial researcher
decides to henceforth use her computer to exchange research material with her former
colleague. They eventually decide to start a new project together, since being in two
different universities is no longer a constraint for their joint research. None of the two
48This externality is governed by the parameter γ which has been estimated via impulse-response matching
to be robustly larger than zero.
49We could slow down the dynamics of ICT capital further, for example by assuming investment adjustment
costs. Obviously, this would improve the fit of the model since it would allow the externality effect to play
out even slower. Our key point here, however, is to show how the spillover is necessary to match the main
features of the empirical responses. Without it, the model has no chance to capture the large lagged effect
of ICT shocks on TFP.
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scholars paid for this additional benefit when they purchased a computer, since they
bought it for their personal use and did not expect the other to simultaneously acquire
one also. What is actually happening here is that the research production of both
researchers has been boosted by the positive externality that also the other colleague is
endowed with the same technology. This externality is what we understand under the
general-purpose nature of ICT goods and what our model captures with the assumption
of the spillover.
The impulse response matching exercise of Section 3.4.2 shows that a two-sector
model featuring ICT capital and hard capital can only successfully match the empirical
responses to an ICT shock if indeed the spillover effect is in action. Thus the main take-
away of this paper is that the interpretation of ICT as a general-purpose technology of
the US between 1989-2017 is a good explanation of medium-run TFP growth dynamics.
This relies on understanding the general-purpose nature of ICT goods as the extent to
which their diffusion in the economy matters.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we look at the effect of ICT shocks on medium-run TFP from both an
empirical and a theoretical perspective. In the first part of the paper, we investigate the
effect of technological shocks specific to the ICT sector on future TFP. Using Structural
VAR techniques on quarterly aggregate U.S. data from 1989, we impose two identifying
restrictions to correctly identify ICT shocks: (i) they must be orthogonal to current
productivity and (ii) maximize the impact response of ICT investment. In response to
an ICT shock, ICT investment increases on impact and stays significant for more than
10 years; relative prices persistently decline as an additional support for the reliability
of our identification strategy; and TFP rises after three quarters and remains significant
for more than 10-years. In addition, variance decomposition analysis suggests that the
quantitative impact of ICT shocks on TFP is economically significant since they explain
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about one third of the overall TFP fluctuations over a 10-year horizon.
In order to check whether our identification assumptions may confound our shock
with a news shock which contemporaneously boosts ICT investment, we provide a series
of different identification strategies and show that they deliver analogous results. Our
main robustness check is a sequential identification of news shocks first and then ICT
shocks. Encouragingly, neither this, nor any other robustness check affects our initial
estimates. We view this as a confirmation of the causality relation which goes from
current ICT investment to future TFP.
In the second part of the paper, we dig deeper into the nature of the link between
current ICT investment and future TFP. We rationalize our empirical results by ana-
lyzing a two-sector DSGE model à la Greenwood et al. (1997) augmented by two main
assumptions: (i) the sector with the faster technological improvement produces specif-
ically ICT capital, and (ii) both production functions are augmented with a spillover
related to the overall level of ICT capital which is not internalized by the agents. In
particular, this last assumption points out our interpretation of the general-purpose
nature of ICT capital: the effectiveness of ICT capital is enhanced by its diffusion, and
the cost of ICT goods does not reflect this indirect benefit.
We use both empirical and theoretical results to estimate main parameters of the
model via impulse-response matching to an ICT technology shock. Results show that the
parameter which governs the size of the spillover effect is positive and large, suggesting
that our interpretation of the general-purpose nature of ICT capital is confirmed by
the data. Thus, our investigation suggests not only that ICT is an important driver
of medium-run TFP, but specifically that what matters for the evolution of TFP is
whether ICT can act as a general-purpose technology. In particular, large externalities
from using ICT goods can explain why a sector comprising a tiny fraction of both output
and investment can play an important role for future productivity developments.
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A Monetary Policy and Anchored Expectations - An
Endogenous Gain Learning Model
A.1 Robustness of rolling regression results
I investigate the following alternative specifications. As a first check, I replace the
forecast error with realized CPI inflation. Thus Equation (1) becomes
∆π̄it =β0 + β
w
1 πt + ε
i
t. (A.1)
I then consider the original specification of Equation (1), adding realized CPI infla-









2 πt + ε
i
t. (A.2)
In the last alternative specification, I replace both the ten and the one-year ahead
CPI inflation expectation with PCE core. The regression equation thus looks identical










The three alternative time series of the estimate β̂w1 are depicted in Fig. 21. Qual-
itatively, the same conclusion obtains as in the specification in the main text: the
coefficients are time-varying in size and in statistical significance. In particular, large
sensitivity in the 1990s gives way to an insignificant coefficient in the early 2000s, to
50In a separate specification, I have similarly added uncertainty as a control, but it is so similar that I
suppress it here.
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Figure 21: Time series of responsiveness of long-run inflation expectations to inflation
(a) Specification (A.1) (b) Specification (A.2)
(c) Specification (A.3)
drift back up shortly after 2010. The data is much shorter for the PCE core specifi-
cation, but also in this case one observes the upward drift in the estimated coefficient
starting around 2010.
A.2 Alternative measures of long-run inflation expectations
Measuring long-run expectations is challenging. In particular, two dimensions of expec-
tations are hard to line up between models and data: the identity of the economic agent
forming expectations, and the forecast horizon. To start with the former, one would
ideally wish to measure the expectations of the private sector, firms and households,
since their expectations correspond to the ones in economic models. As for the forecast
horizon, no single horizon is an exact counterpart to the concept of expectations of
average inflation. Arguably, the longer the forecast horizon, the closer the measured
expectation is to expectations of the average.
These considerations can lead the researcher to utilize breakeven inflation, that
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Figure 22: Alternative long-run inflation expectations measures
(a) Market-based inflation expectations from TIPS, various horizons
(b) 10-year ahead inflation expectations of firms (Livingston) and professional
forecasters (SPF)
All inflation rates are annualized percentages. The series are at the following frequency: daily (10-year
TIPS), monthly (20- and 30-year TIPS), quarterly (SPF), twice per year (Livingston).
is, the difference between Treasury yields and Treasury Inflation Protected Securities
(TIPS) (top panel of Fig. 22). There are two main advantages of constructing inflation
expectation measures from TIPS. First, since this measure is based on trades that hap-
pened in the Treasury market, it pertains to agents who are active in a market where
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inflation expectations matter. Such expectations are therefore a good proxy for the pri-
vate sector’s expectations in economic models. Second, the fact that breakeven inflation
is not elicited from surveys allows the econometrician to bypass many of the challenges
that survey data involve. It has been widely documented that survey participants may
have poor understanding of the economic concept elicited, may misunderstand the sur-
vey questions or be unduly influenced by the wording. Most troubling is the fact that
there is no way the econometrician could control for the noise thus introduced in survey
data.
Breakeven inflation measures are not a panacea, however. The illiquidity of TIPS
markets introduces a distortion into the measured expectations in the form of a time-
varying liquidity premium (Appendix A.3 corrects for this by filtering out an approx-
imate liquidity premium series from the 10-year expectation series.) One could also
contend that many firms and the majority of households are not active on the TIPS
market, and therefore that breakeven inflation is not representative of the economy-wide
expectation. For this reason, I turn to alternative long-run inflation measures.
The forecast horizon is a binding constraint: consumer expectations data have a
maximal forecast horizon of three (New York Fed Survey of Consumer Expectations
(SCE)) or five years (University of Michigan Survey of Consumers). To have at least a
forecast horizon of ten years, I thus resort to the Livingston Survey of the Philadelphia
Fed and the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). Another advantage of the SPF is
that comprehensive individual-level data is available, a feature which I exploit for the
regressions in the Introduction and in Appendix A.1.
Fig. 22 plots the breakeven inflation series for a horizon of 10, 20 and 30 years
(top panel) alongside Livingston and SPF (bottom panel). The breakeven inflation
measures are clearly and consistently below the Livingston and SPF measures. Part
of this may be driven by liquidity premia, which I control for in Appendix A.3. At
the same time, both the Livingston and the SPF expectations may potentially suffer
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from representativeness issues. The fact that the two expectations series are so closely
aligned indicates that the Livingston survey may only be reaching a subset of firms.51
This subset seems to be highly correlated with the set of professional forecasters filling
out the SPF. This is a concern because it suggests that the elicited expectations may
not be representative of the economy-wide firm expectations. Moreover, if professional
forecasters respond to the survey by running a (by assumption stationary) econometric
model, then the survey responses may not even accurately reflect their held beliefs.
But all these caveats notwithstanding, there is a single element that is consistent
across all of these measures of long-run inflation expectations: following 2010, they
all shift downward. In other words, they all show responsiveness to the fact that the
Federal Reserve has undershot the 2% inflation target. Given that the Livingston and
SPF measures are initially above the 2% target, one may argue that expectations are
only adjusting following the 2012 announcement of an official target on the part of the
Fed.
However, the 2% target was already understood prior to the 2012 announcement.
Moreover, the Fed’s target is specified in terms of PCE inflation, while the Livingston
and SPF forecasts pertain to CPI inflation. The fact that the latter tends to be higher
than the former also helps to explain why expectations of CPI inflation are above the
Fed’s PCE inflation target.
A.3 Filtering out liquidity risk from TIPS
Some caution is needed when inferring inflation expectations from TIPS. The underlying
idea is that the difference between real (indexed to inflation) and nominal yields should
be a good metric for the market’s expectations of inflation on average for the duration
of the particular maturity. But since TIPS markets face liquidity issues, especially for
51The category codes of individual survey participates in the Livingston survey seems to underscore
this. According to the documentation, the surveyed businesses fall into the following categories: academic
institution, commercial banking, consulting, Federal Reserve, government, industry trade group, insurance
company, investment banking, labor, non-financial business and other.
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seasoned securities, the TIPS yield also incorporates a liquidity premium. The positive
bias in the TIPS yield thus leads to a negative bias in expected inflation.
To gauge the presence of liquidity risk in TIPS, I rely on Andreasen et al. (2018)’s
estimation of the liquidity premium. Since their series only covers the period between
July 11, 1997 - Dec 27, 2013, I make use of the fact that they demonstrate a high
correlation between liquidity risk and uncertainty. In particular, a regression of their
average TIPS liquidity premium measure on the VIX index and controls yields an
estimated coefficient of 0.85 (significant at the 1 percent level), with a constant of -5.21.
Thus I can use the VIX to back out a fitted Andreasen et al. (2018) estimate of the
TIPS liquidity premium after 2013. Doing so, I subtract this fitted liquidity premium
series from the TIPS yields, allowing me to construct an estimate of breakeven inflation
corrected for the liquidity risk bias. Fig. 23 presents the original breakeven inflation
series, along with the bias-corrected estimate.
Figure 23: Market-based inflation expectations, 10 year, average, %
Breakeven inflation, constructed as the difference between the yields of 10-year Treasuries and 10-year TIPS
(blue line), difference between 10-year Treasury and 10-year TIPS, the latter cleaned from liquidity risk (red
line).
In line with Andreasen et al. (2018)’s findings, I obtain a negative bias in the infla-
tion expectations series throughout the sample. This bias averages -0.0966 pp, which
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is sizable, but not as significant as one might have suspected. Also in analogy with
Andreasen et al. (2018)’s results, I find that liquidity issues in the TIPS market pose
a bigger problem in recessions, when the market worries more about future TIPS be-
coming illiquid. In particular once the Covid-19-shock raises worries at the end of the
sample, the estimated liquidity premium hits its highest value of 0.6508 pp. Even this
large upward correction in breakeven inflation does not change the overall picture, how-
ever. The conclusion that long-run inflation expectations trend downward in the second
half of the decade remains solid.
A.4 Compact model notation












































































(I3 − βh)−1, (A.10)
w = 1 + σψx + κσψπ. (A.11)
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Note that this is the formulation for the case where a Taylor rule is in effect and is known
by the private sector. It is straightforward to remove any of these two assumptions.
A.5 The observation matrix for learning
Instead of the matrix g in the rational expectations observation equation
zt = gst, (A.13)


























A.6 Alternative specifications for the anchoring function
The general law of motion for the gain in the main text is given by Equation (23),
reproduced here for convenience:
kt = g(kt−1, ft|t−1). (A.17)
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where bi(ft|t−1) is the piecewise linear basis at node i and γ̂ are the coefficients estimated
in Section 1.4.
To my knowledge, there are only two other papers that consider an endogenous
gain as a model for anchored expectations. The first one, more related to this paper,
is Carvalho et al. (2019). In their model, the anchoring function is a discrete choice
function as follows. Let θt be a criterion to be defined. Then, for a threshold value θ̃,




−1 if θt < θ̃,
ḡ otherwise.
(A.19)
In other words, agents choose a decreasing gain when the criterion θt is lower than
the threshold θ̃; otherwise they choose a constant gain. The criterion employed by
Carvalho et al. (2019) is computed as the absolute difference between subjective and
model-consistent expectations, scaled by the variance of shocks:





where Σ is the VC matrix of shocks, φt−1 is the estimated matrix and [F,G] is the ALM
(see Appendix A.5).
As a robustness check, Carvalho et al. (2019) also compute an alternative criterion.52
Let ωt denote agents’ time t estimate of the forecast error variance and θt be a statistic
52Note that for both criteria, I present the matrix generalizations of the scalar versions considered by
Carvalho et al. (2019).
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evaluated by agents in every period as
ωt = ωt−1 + κ̃kt−1(ft|t−1f
′
t|t−1 − ωt−1), (A.21)




t ft|t−1 − θt−1), (A.22)
where κ̃ is a parameter that allows agents to scale the gain compared to the previous
estimation and ft|t−1 is the most recent forecast error, realized at time t. Indeed, this
is a multivariate time series version of the squared CUSUM test.53
It is interesting to compare the two discrete anchoring functions with my smooth
specification. On the one hand, Carvalho et al. (2019)’s preferred specification requires
the private sector to evaluate model-consistent expectations, which runs counter to the
maintained informational assumptions. It is more consistent with the present model,
then, to assume that firms and households employ a statistical test of structural change,
as is the case with the CUSUM-based and smooth functions. These are therefore more
appealing on conceptual grounds.
On the other hand, simulation of the model using the different anchoring specifica-
tions reveals that Carvalho et al. (2019)’s preferred functional form leads to the opposite
comparative statics of anchoring with respect to monetary policy aggressiveness as the
smooth or the CUSUM-based specifications. In particular, policy that is more aggres-
sive on inflation (a higher ψπ in the Taylor rule) leads to more anchoring in a model
with the smooth or the CUSUM-inspired criterion. If one uses Carvalho et al. (2019)’s
criterion, the same comparative static involves less anchoring. This comes from the
fact that Carvalho et al. (2019)’s criterion endows the private sector with capabilities
to disentangle volatility due to the learning mechanism from that owing to exogenous
disturbances. Thus agents in the Carvalho et al. (2019) model are able to make more
advanced inferences about the performance of their forecasting rule and understand
that a higher ψπ causes more learning-induced volatility. This is however not possible
53See Brown et al. (1975) and Lütkepohl (2013) for details.
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for agents who process data in real time without knowledge of the model. Therefore my
smooth and the discrete CUSUM-inspired specifications are preferable both on concep-
tual and quantitative grounds.
There are two main reasons I opt for a smooth anchoring function instead of the dis-
crete CUSUM criterion. First, the analytical analysis of this paper requires derivatives
of the anchoring function to exist. In such a case, the smooth specification is necessary.
Second, a smooth anchoring function can capture varying degrees of unanchoring, which
is a feature of the data I document in the Introduction.
The second paper with an anchoring function is Gobbi et al. (2019). In their model,
which is a three-equation New Keynesian model, firms and households entertain the
possibility that the model may switch from a “normal” regime to a liquidity trap regime
that the authors name the “new normal.” Expectations are a probability-weighted
average of the regime-specific expectations. The concept of unanchoring in the model
is when p, the probability of the liquidity trap regime, rises significantly. The function
governing the evolution of p, which Gobbi et al. (2019) refer to as the deanchoring
function (DA), is the analogy of my anchoring function. The authors use the following
logistic specification for the DA function:




where yt−1 denotes the output gap and A,B,C and D are parameters.
A.7 Estimation procedure
The estimation of Section 1.4 is a simulated method of moments (SMM) exercise. As
elaborated in the main text, I target the autocovariances of CPI inflation, the output
gap, the federal funds rate and the 12-months ahead inflation forecasts coming from
the Survey of Professional Forecasters. For the autocovariances, I consider lags 0, . . . , 4.
The target moment vector, Ω, is the vectorized autocovariance matrices for the lags
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considered, 80× 1.
Let Θ denote the set of parameters in the New Keynesian model that I calibrate.
Then, for each proposed coefficient vector γ, the estimation procedure consists of sim-
ulating the model conditional on γ, Θ and N different sequences of disturbances, then
computing model-implied moments for each simulation, and lastly choosing γ such that




















where the observed data is of length T = 151 quarters. Here {ent }Tt=1 is a sequence
of disturbances of the same length as the data; note that I use a cross-section of N such
sequences and take average moments across the cross-section to wash out the effects
of particular disturbances. Experimentation with the number N led me to choose
N = 1000, as estimates no longer change upon selecting larger N .
Before computing moments, I filter both the observed and model-generated data
using the Baxter and King (1999) filter, with thresholds at 6 and 32 quarters and
truncation at 12 lags, the recommended values of the authors. I then compute the
moments by fitting a reduced-form VAR to the filtered series and using the estimated
coefficients to back out autocovariances. Because there are four observables to three
structural shocks and occasionally low volatility in the expectation series, I estimate the
VAR coefficients by ridge regression with a tuning parameter of 0.001. This is to ensure
that the VAR coefficients are estimated with a lower standard error, so that estimated
variances of the moments are more accurate. As the weighting matrix of the quadratic
form in the moments, I use the inverse of the estimated variances of the target moments,
W−1, computed from 10000 bootstrapped samples.
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To improve identification, I also impose restrictions on the estimates. First, I require
that the γ-coefficients be convex, that is, that larger forecast errors in absolute value be
associated with higher gains. Second, since forecast errors close to zero render the size
of the gain irrelevant (cf. the learning equation (21)), I impose that the coefficient asso-
ciated with a zero forecast error should be zero. Both restrictions are implemented with
weights penalizing the loss function, and the weights are selected by experimentation.
Both additional assumptions reflect properties that the anchoring function should
reasonably exhibit. The convexity assumption captures the very notion that larger
forecast errors in absolute value suggest bigger changes to the forecasting procedure are
necessary. This is thus a very natural requirement. As for the zero gain for zero forecast
error assumption, the idea here is to supply the estimation with information where it is
lacking. Since the updating of learning coefficients corresponds to gain times forecast
error, as Equation (21) recalls, a zero forecast error supplies no information for the value
of the gain. To impose a zero value here also seems natural, given that since forecast
errors switch sign at zero, one would expect the zero forecast error point to be an
inflection point in the anchoring function. By the same token, Gobbi et al. (2019) also
impose a related restriction when they require that their deanchoring function should
yield a zero value at the zero input. Lastly, the objective function does not deteriorate
upon imposing either assumption, suggesting that they are not at odds with the data.
Lastly, I supply 100 different initial points and select the estimate involving the
lowest value for the loss (A.24). Fig. 24 presents the autocovariances of the observed
variables for the estimated coefficients so obtained.
A.8 The policy problem in the simplified baseline model
Denote by gi,t ∈ (0, 1), i = π, π̄, the potentially time-varying derivatives of the anchor-
ing function g. In this simplified setting, π̄t = e1at, the estimated constant for the infla-
tion process. As in the main text, ei is a selector vector, selecting row i of the subsequent
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Figure 24: Autocovariogram
Estimates for N = 1000












































kt − g(πt − π̄t−1 − b1st−1)
)}
, (A.31)
where ρi are Lagrange-multipliers on the constraints. After a little bit of simplifying,









Et xt+1 + ϕ5,t − (1− kt)Et ϕ5,t+1 + gπ̄,t Et ϕ6,t+1 = 0, (A.33)
ϕ6,t = (πt − π̄t−1 − b1st−1)ϕ5,t. (A.34)
Note that Equation (A.32) is the analogue of Gaspar et al. (2010)’s Equation (22) (or,
equivalently, of Molnár and Santoro (2014)’s (16)), except that there is an additional
multiplier, ϕ6. This multiplier reflects the fact that in addition to the constraint coming
from the expectation process itself, with shadow value ϕ5, learning involves the gain
equation as a constraint as well. One can also clearly read off Proposition 2: when the
learning process has converged such that neither expectations nor the gain process are
constraints (ϕ5 = ϕ6 = 0), the discretionary inflation-output gap tradeoff familiar from
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Clarida et al. (1999) obtains. Combining the above three equations and solving for ϕ5,t,
using the notation that
∏0
0 ≡ 1, one obtains the target criterion (34).
The system of first-order conditions (38)-(39) and model equations for this simpli-
fied system also reveal how the endogenous gain introduces nonlinearity to the equation
system. In particular, notice how in equations (38)-(39), the gain kt shows up multi-
plicatively with the Lagrange multiplier, ϕ2,t. In fact, the origin of the problem is the
recursive least squares learning equation for the learning coefficient π̄t
π̄t = π̄t−1 + ktft|t−1 (A.35)
where the first interaction terms between the gain and other endogenous variables show
up. This results in an equation system of nonlinear difference equations that does not
admit an analytical solution.
Considering equation (A.35) is instructive to see how it is indeed the endogeneity of
the gain that causes these troubles. Were we to specify a constant gain setup, kt would
merely equal the constant ḡ and the anchoring function g(·) would trivially reduce to
zero as well. In such a case, all interaction terms would reduce to multiplication between
endogenous variables and parameters; linearity would be restored and a solution for the
optimal time paths of endogenous variables would be obtainable. Similarly, a decreasing
gain specification would also be manageable since for all t, the gain would simply be
given by t−1, and the anchoring function would also be deterministic and exogenous.
A.9 Relaxing Assumption 2
Consider the general anchoring mechanism of Equation (23):
kt = g(kt, ft|t−1). (A.36)
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xt − ktϕ5,t − gπ,tϕ6,t = 0, (A.37)
cEt xt+1 + ϕ5,t − (1− kt)Et ϕ5,t+1 + gπ̄,t Et ϕ6,t+1 = 0, (A.38)
ϕ6,t + Et ϕ6,t+1 = ft|t−1ϕ5,t, (A.39)
where the red multiplier is the new element vis-à-vis the case where the anchoring
function is specified in levels (kt = g(ft|t−1)), and I am using the shorthand notation





ft|t−1 = πt − π̄t−1 − b1st−1. (A.41)
One can simplify this three-equation-system to:

























Thus a central bank that follows the target criterion has to compute ϕ6,t as the solution

















The interpretation of (A.44) is that the anchoring constraint is not binding (ϕ6,t = 0)
if the central bank always hits the target (πt+i +
λx
κ xt+i = 0, ∀i); or expectations are
always anchored (kt+j = 0, ∀j).
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A.10 Parameterized expectations algorithm (PEA)
The objective of the parameterized expectations algorithm is to solve for the sequence of
interest rates that solves the model equations including the target criterion, representing
the first-order condition of the Ramsey problem. For convenience, I list the model
equations:
xt = −σit +
[






(I3 − βh)−1st, (A.45)
πt = κxt +
[














π̄t−1 + b(I3 − βh)−1st, (A.48)


























Denote the expectation on the right hand side of (A.52) as Et. The idea of the PEA is
to approximate this expectation and to solve model equations given the approximation
Êt. The algorithm is as follows:
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Objective: Obtain the sequence {it}Tt=1 that solves Equations (A.45) - (A.52) for a history of
exogenous shocks {st}Tt=1 of length T .
1. Conjecture an initial expectation Êt = β
0s(Xt).
The expectation is approximated as a projection on a basis, s(Xt), where β
0 are
initial projection coefficients, and Xt = (kt, π̄t−1, r
n
t , ut) is the state vector. I use
54For a thorough treatment of the PEA, see Christiano and Fisher (2000).
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a monomial basis consisting of the first, second and third powers of Xt.
2. Solve model equations given conjectured Êt for a given sequence of shocks {st}Tt=1.
Compute residuals to the model equations (A.45) - (A.52) given {st}Tt=1 and
{Êt}Tt=1. Obtain a sequence {it}Tt=1 that sets the residuals to zero. The output
of this step is {vt}Tt=1, the simulated history of endogenous variables (Christiano
and Fisher (2000) refer to this as a “synthetic time series”).
3. Compute realized analogues of {Et}Tt=1 given {vt}Tt=1.
4. Update β regressing the synthetic Et on s(Xt).
The coefficient update is βi+1 = (s(Xt)
′s(Xt))
−1s(Xt)
′Et. Then iterate until
convergence by evaluating at every step ||βi − βi+1||.
A.11 Parametric value function iteration
This is an alternative approach I implement as a robustness check to the PEA. The
objective is thus the same: to obtain the interest rate sequence that solves the model
equations. The general value function iteration (VFI) approach is fairly standard, for
which reason I refer to the Judd (1998) textbook for details. Specific to my application
is that the state vector is five-dimensional, Xt = (π̄t−1, r
n
t , ut, r
n
t−1, ut−1), and that I
approximate the value function using a cubic spline. Thus the output of the algorithm
is a cubic spline approximation of the value function and a policy function for each
node on the grid of states. Next, I interpolate the policy function using a cubic spline
as well. As a last step I pass the state vector from the PEA simulation, obtaining an
interest rate sequence conditional on the history of states. Fig. 25 shows the resulting
interest rate sequence, obtained through the two approaches, conditional on a simulated
sequence for the exogenous states.
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Figure 25: Policy function for a particular history of states, PEA against VFI
A.12 Oscillatory dynamics in adaptive learning models
Here I present an illustration for why adaptive learning models produce oscillatory
impulse responses if the gain is high enough. Consider a stylized adaptive learning
model in two equations:
πt = βet + ut, (A.53)
et = et−1 + k(πt − et−1). (A.54)
The reader can recognize in (A.53) a simplified Phillips curve in which I am abstract-
ing from output gaps to keep the presentation as clear as possible. Like in the simple
model of Section 1.5.1 in the main text, et represents the one-period inflation expec-
tation Êtπt+1. (A.54), then, represents the simplest possible recursive updating of the
expectations et. My notation of the gain as k indicates a constant gain specification,
but the intuition remains unchanged for decreasing (or endogenous) gains.








which, for β close but smaller than 1, is a near-unit-root process. (In fact, if the gain
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were to go to zero, this would be a unit root process.) Defining the forecast error as








Equation (A.56) shows that in this simple model, the forecast error loads on a near-
unit-root process with a coefficient that is negative and less than one in absolute value.
Damped oscillations are the result.
Note that even if the gain would converge to zero, the coefficient on et−1 would be
negative and less than one in absolute value. Thus even for decreasing gain learning, one
obtains oscillations, but the lower the gain, the more damped the oscillations become.
This corroborates my findings in the impulse responses of Fig. 5. But importantly, the
opposite extreme, when k → 1, results in a coefficient of exactly −1, giving perpetual
oscillations. This clearly illustrates how the oscillatory behavior of impulse responses
comes from the oscillations in the forecast error that obtain when the gain is sufficiently
large.
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B Talking in Time - Dynamic Central Bank Commu-
nication
B.1 A two-signals formulation of the static model
Consider the same environment as in Section (2.2). Instead of signal (48), the CB can
now choose to send two separate signals about the two states.
s1 = θ1 + ε1 ε1 ∼ N(0, σ21) (B.1)
s2 = θ2 + ε2 ε2 ∼ N(0, σ22) (B.2)
The inference of the PS is given by




−ρ2 + σ1 + σ1σ2 + σ2 + 1
(B.3)
φ2 =
−ρ2 + σ1 + 1
−ρ2 + σ1 + σ1σ2 + σ2 + 1
(B.4)
(B.5)
Taking the squares of the CB loss yields, plugging in I = φ1s1 + φ2s2, the expressions
for s1, s2 and φ1, φ2, and subsequently integrating the resulting expressions over Θ, the
support of θi, i = 1, 2, one obtains the expected loss function:
V =
(
b2 − 2bρ+ 1
) (




b2σ1 + (b− ρ)2
)
ρ2 − (σ1 + 1) (σ2 + 1)
(B.6)
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As in the main text, I observe the following properties when integrating:
∫
Θ
θi dθi = E[θi] = 0 for i = 1, 2 and θi ∈ Θ (B.7)∫
Θ




θiθj dθi dθj = Cov[θi, θj ] = ρ for i, j = 1, 2 (B.9)
To simplify, suppose the communication about θ2 is already given, that is, normalize
σ22 = 1. Then, the central bank’s optimization problem can be stated as:
σ21 = arg minV, (B.10)










(ρ2 − 2 (σ1 + 1)) 2
= 0, (B.11)
which clearly has no solution. So I go on to investigate the behavior of the loss function
to see whether we can find a corner solution. This is generalized in the Proposition
below.
Proposition 10. The solution (σ21 , σ
2
2)
∗ to the central bank’s communication problem,




2)→ (∞,∞) if bρ < 12
(σ21 , σ
2
2) = (0, σ
2















and if bρ = 12 , then the CB is indifferent between (∞,∞) and (0,0).
Corollary 10.1. Complete silence is optimal when neither b nor ρ are big enough, that
is when i) the central bank does not want the PS’ action to be sizable relatively to θ1
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ii) the comovement between the states is not strong enough for the PS’s action to be
aligned with the central bank’s preferences.
Corollary 10.2. Full disclosure is better than complete silence when either condition
i) or ii) from Corollary 10.1 is violated. But in this case there exists a threshold σ̄21
such that for higher precision σ21 < σ̄
2




2) = (0, σ̂
2
2)
makes the CB strictly better off.
Why is this the optimal thing for the CB? Because when full disclosure achieves a
lower loss than silence, the states are either sufficiently close to each other or the CB
forcibly wishes the PS’s action to track θ1, so it can communicate unambiguously about
θ1, and get the PS to respond to this information in their efforts to back out θ2.
Corollary 10.3. When the CB is indifferent between full and no disclosure, partial
disclosure always makes it strictly better off.
B.2 The Kalman filter for the dynamic model
Denoting θ
′
t := θt+1, set up the state-space system as:
xt+1 = hxt + ηεt+1 state equation, (B.13)
yt = gxt + vt observation equation, (B.14)







 , h =
ρ 0
1 0





 , εt =
εt
0
 , Q = ηη′ =
σ2ε 0
0 0
 , R = σ2v .
The optimal forecast of the state vector at t+ 1 is:
xt+1|t = hxt|t−1 + hκ(yt − gx xt|t−1), (B.15)
143
where κ = Pg′Ω−1 and the steady-state forecast-error-variance matrix P solves
hPh′ − hPg′Ω−1gPh′ +Q = P, (B.16)
Ω = gPg′ +R. (B.17)




mi i = 1, . . . , 4 are






















For simplicity, I refer to κ1 as κ in the main text.
B.3 Expected loss functions










− 2b(ρ+ ψ)(ρψ + 1) + (ρψ + 1)2
ψ (2ρ+ ψσ2v + ψ) + 1
, (B.22)











+ σ2v + 1
)
+ 2ρψσ2v − 1
)
+ ψ(ρψ + 1)
(
ρ2 − σ2v − 1
))








































+ ψ4σ4v + ψ
4σ2v + 2ψ














((ρ+ 1)2ψ2σ2v − (ρ2 − 1) (ψ − 1)2) ((ρ− 1)2ψ2σ2v − (ρ2 − 1) (ψ + 1)2)
+ ρ2
√
((ρ+ 1)2ψ2σ2v − (ρ2 − 1) (ψ − 1)2) ((ρ− 1)2ψ2σ2v − (ρ2 − 1) (ψ + 1)2)
− ψ2σ2v
√
((ρ+ 1)2ψ2σ2v − (ρ2 − 1) (ψ − 1)2) ((ρ− 1)2ψ2σ2v − (ρ2 − 1) (ψ + 1)2)
)}
,
and the first order condition is suppressed.
B.4 Optimal precision
The first order condition in static model is
− 2ψ
2(ρψ + 1)σv(−2b(ρ+ ψ) + ρψ + 1)
(ψ (2ρ+ ψσ2v + ψ) + 1)
2
= 0, (B.24)
which is solved by σv = 0. That this is either a minimum or a maximum can be verified
by considering the second order condition, which is given by








(ψ (2ρ+ ψσ2v + ψ) + 1)
3
. (B.25)
The first and second order conditions in the dynamic model are too large and are
thus suppressed.
145
B.5 Prior and posterior variances in the two models
Using the definitions of prior and posterior variances from the main text, in the static
model these are given by
π(θ2) = 1, (B.26)
p(θ2) = 1− V ar(θ2|s), (B.27)
π(θ1) = 1, (B.28)
p(θ1) = 1− V ar(θ1|s). (B.29)
In the dynamic model, instead, they are
π(θt+1) = 1− ρ2V ar(θt+1|t), (B.30)
p(θt+1) = 1− V ar(θt+1|t), (B.31)
π(θt) = 1− V ar(θt|t−1) = p(θt+1), (B.32)
p(θt) = 1− V ar(θt|t). (B.33)
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C ICT and Future Productivity - Evidence and The-
ory of a General-Purpose Technology
C.1 Removing Forward-Looking Variables
Figure 26: ICT shock series using the empirical strategy presented in 3.2.1.2.
Blue solid line represents shock series for the 5-dimension system 76 presented in 3.2.1. Red dotted line
represents shock series for the 3-dimensional system presented in C.1.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 9
Notice that in this proof we use the same assumptions and the same notation in the
2-sector model presented in Section 3.3.
First order condition with respect to labor input for firm j is










and first order condition with respect to labor input for firm q is









Since both production functions display identical input shares then in equilibrium input





























From Equation C.5, it is clear that the equilibrium path of pt is fully independent on
the past, current, and future values of neutral technology, ηt.
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